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                                                          Abstract 
 
This paper surveys hundreds of published social-science studies of private, hard-core cartels that 
contain 699 observations of long-run overcharges.  The primary finding is that the median cartel 
overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25%:  19% for domestic cartels, 32% 
for international cartels, and 31% for all successful cartels.  Thus, international cartels have 
historically been about 68% more effective in raising prices than domestic cartels. Cartel 
overcharges are skewed to the high side, pushing the mean overcharge for all types of cartels 
over all time periods to 42%. “Peak” cartel overcharges are typically double those of the long-
run averages. These results are generally consistent with the few, more limited, previously 
published works that survey cartel overcharges. 
  
There is no evidence that convicted cartels are markedly less effective than unpunished ones. 
The results of a second survey of final verdicts in decided U.S. horizontal collusion cases, only 
three of which were international cartels, show an average median overcharge of 21% and an 
average mean overcharge of 30%.  Outside the United States, 62 decisions of competition 
commissions cited median average overcharges of 25% and a mean of 47%.  
  
There are three significant policy implications.  First, there is a view among some antitrust 
writers that there is little evidence that cartels raise prices significantly for a period long enough 
to justify the height of current U.S. cartel penalties.  This survey’s results, which are based upon 
an extraordinarily large amount of data spanning a broad swath of history of all types of private 
cartels, sharply contradict these views.  In fact, the data suggest that U.S. penalties ought to be 
increased.  Mean overcharges are three times as high as the level presumed by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission. Surprisingly, bid rigging was no more injurious than other forms of 
collusion, which suggests that the USSC should amend its Guidelines that currently treat bid 
rigging more harshly than other forms of collusion.  
  
Second, the principal antitrust authorities abroad often base their typical or maximum fines on a 
10% harm presumption.  Average fines imposed since 1995 by Canada and the EU on identical 
cartels have been lower than U.S. government fines, yet overcharges generated by cartels 
discovered outside the United States are higher than North America-centered cartels.  
Consequently, anticartel laws and fine-setting practices abroad are in even greater need of 
strengthening. 
  
Third, cartels with multi-continental price effects are the most harmful type.  Despite the evident 
increases in cartel detection rates and the size of monetary fines and penalties in the past decade, 
a good case can be made that current global anticartel regimes are under-deterring. While the 
recent worldwide trend towards the intensification of cartel penalties has been desirable, global 
cartels are more difficult to detect, have less fear from entry of rivals, achieve higher levels of 
sales and profitability, and systematically receive weaker corporate sanctions than comparable 
domestic cartels.  Antitrust sanctions worldwide should be higher for global cartels than for other 
types. 
 
    
    3





Issue 1: The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
      Origin and Importance of the 10% Presumption 
      Critiques of the 10% Guidelines Presumption 
Issue 2: Cartel Fines in Other Jurisdictions 
Issue 3: Cartel Deterrence 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY ………………………………………………………………….11 
 
Early Monographs on Cartels 
      Books 
      Academic Papers 
Post-World War II Cartel Studies 
Quantitative Estimates of Cartel Overcharges  
 
DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION METHODS ….……………………………….24 
 
Social Science Studies 
U.S. Antitrust Court Verdicts 
Decisions of Other Antitrust Authorities 
 






SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES: RESULTS ………………………………………………38 
 
Numbers of Overcharge Observations    
Trends in Average Overcharges over Time 
Average Overcharges across Types 
Size Distribution of Overcharges 
Peak Overcharges 
Overcharges by Location of Cartel 
Overcharges and Market Size 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES: RELIABILITY ……………………………………….. 54 
 
Sources of the Estimates 
Sensitivity to Publication Dates 
Intra-Episodic Comparisons 
Sensitivity to Peer Review 
   4
U.S.COURT VERDICTS………….………………………………………………………65 
 






                                                                                                 
 
                                                    LIST OF  TABLES 
 
Table 1. Summary of Six Economic Surveys of Cartel Overcharges ……..……………….23        
Table 2.  Number of Cartel Markets, by Type ……………………………………………..35  
Table 3. Number of Cartel Episodes, by Type …………………………………………….36 
Table 4.  Number of Average Overcharge Observations, by Type of Cartel...…………….37 
Table 5. Number of Average Overcharge Observations by Year and Type……………….40 
Table 5A. Number of Zero Average Overcharge Observations by Year and Type………..43 
Table 6.  Median Average Overcharges, by Year and Type……………………………….46  
Table 6A.  Median of Average Overcharges of Successful Cartels, by Year and Type…...46 
Table 7. Mean Average Overcharges by Size Category…………………………………...48 
Table 8. Peak Cartel Overcharges, by Year and Type……………………………………..50 
Table 9. Peak/Average Ratios of Cartel Overcharges, by Year and Type…………………50 
Table 10. Average Overcharges by Cartel Headquarters Location..…………….…………52 
Table 11.  Social-Science Sources of Overcharge Estimates………………………………54 
Table 12. Average Overcharge Estimates by Publication Dates…………………………...56 
Table 12A. Average Overcharge Estimates by Publication Dates, Successful Cartels…….58 
Table 13. Median Average Overcharges by Publication and Cartel Type…………………60 
Table 14. Median Rates of Estimates for Same Episodes by Different Methods………….62 
Table 14A. Median Ratios of Estimates for Same Episodes (Simplified)…………………62 
Table 15.  Average Percentage Cartel Overcharges, by Legal Status and Type of Study…64 







                                                         




                                                                
 
                                                                  5
                                                                 MOTIVATION 
 
Since at least 1888, hundreds of economists, historians, commissioners, and jurists have labored 
mightily to assess the “effectiveness” of cartels.  Various criteria have been applied to evaluate 
cartel performance, including longevity, stability, and efficiency, but by far the greatest attention 
has been lavished on market price effects.
1  The increase in transaction prices by a sellers’ cartel 
is commonly called an overcharge by economists or damages by legal writers.  It is the increase 
in the transfer of income or wealth from buyers to the members of the cartel that occurs as a 
result of a collusive agreement.
2    The overcharge rate is calculated by comparing actual cartel-
enhanced prices to some competitive benchmark (Connor 2004).  When a cartel achieves high 
levels of effectiveness (i.e., longevity, stability, and high overcharges), it generates large 
customer welfare losses.
3  Effective cartels are also viewed as destructive of the competitive 
process in the sense that they weaken the natural effects of demand and supply in price formation 
and cause buyers and sellers to misallocate their spending. 
 
The size of cartels overcharges is an issue at the empirical heart of a number of legal and 
economic controversies.  In the rest of this section, I outline three such issues.  First, I 
demonstrate the importance of knowing the size and distribution of cartel overcharges to justify 
the underpinnings of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for federal criminal violations.  Second, I 
note that similar rules govern the fine-setting criteria employed by other jurisdictions’ anticartel 
sanctions.  Third, I present evidence of differences of opinion among experts on the critical 
legal-economic issue of cartel deterrence.   
 
Other than in economics textbooks, 103 years has passed since the last dedicated survey 
of the cartel literature (Bullock 1901).  To my knowledge no one else has subsequently published 
a work aimed principally at surveying and analyzing cartel overcharges. 
 
Issue 1: The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Twenty years ago the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(USSC), a judicial-branch unit charged by Congress with devising guidelines for sentencing for 
the federal judiciary (USSG Advisory Group 2003).  The Commission was established because 
of Congressional concerns that sentencing was too variable across Circuits and individual judges 
and that average sentences were too low for certain crimes.  The first set of guidelines was 
promulgated in 1987, and after three years of study and public comment was made law in 1989.  
The first guidelines were directed primarily at sentencing applicable to individual defendants 
                                                 
1 Longevity, also called duration, measures the lifespan of a cartel or, if it has more than one, the length of time of 
one episode.  Some researchers use the term stability synonymously with duration, but more commonly it refers to 
the absence of price wars or other reversions to competitive conduct during a cartel’s time span.  Stability is perhaps 
equivalent to low variation in a cartel’s “discipline,” where discipline may be measured by how close a cartel’s 
selling prices are to its desired target price or the theoretical monopoly price.  In the context of commodity 
agreements or marketing orders, stability will show up as lower variation in prices compared to the absence of such 
an agreement.  Efficiency can refer to static allocative efficiency (low net social welfare loss) or, rarely, to technical 
efficiency or dynamic efficiency (rates of technological change).  Allocative inefficiency is smaller than but closely 
correlated with the overcharge.  
2 The overcharge from a buyers’ cartel is similarly defined by a price decrease.  
3 Customers are direct buyers and they are usually industrial buyers, but overcharge pass-on will transfer the losses 
in whole or in part to final consumers as indirect buyers.  If cartels improve technical or dynamic efficiency, this 
may offset the welfare losses.    6
with one sole exception, guidelines for organizations guilty of horizontal price fixing and bid 
rigging (Cohen and Scheffman 1989:332).  Although the Sherman Act of 1890 is a criminal 
statute that encompasses other types of multilateral restrictive business practices as well as 
unilateral monopolistic conduct, by long tradition only horizontal price fixing and market-
sharing agreements have triggered criminal indictments by the Department of Justice (DOJ).
4  
 
During 1987-89, the Commission turned its attention to developing “organizational 
guidelines,” which were effective in 1991.
5 Organizations are corporations, partnerships, 
proprietorships, trusts, or other financial entities.   The reason given for the delay in issuing the 
second set of guidelines was “time constraints and the nonexistence of statistical information” 
(USSG 1989: 1.12).  That is, the USSC apparently believed that, unlike all other corporate 
crimes, it had prior to 1987 sufficient statistical data on price fixing to set penalties at levels that 
would deter price fixing.   
 
  The issue of how high and for how long cartels raise prices was crucial when the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (USSC) established its current fine levels for cartels in 1987.  These 
fine levels are in effect today. The USSC’s cartel fine levels followed from its famous 




Origin and Importance of the 10% Presumption  
 
The Commission explained how it used this estimate to establish cartel fines.  After noting that 
fines should be based on consideration of both the gain to the offender and the losses caused by 
the offender, the USSC noted that it would double the 10% estimate to account for harms 
“inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the 
higher price.”
7  The Commission added: “The purpose for specifying a percent of the volume of 
commerce is to avoid the time and expense that would be required for the court to determine 
actual gain or loss."
8 
 
                                                 
4 Criminal filings are made in cases of per se, covert, intentional conspiracies by participants are aware of the 
probable anticompetitive consequences (Hovenkamp 1999:585-586).  While there are a few exceptions, potentially 
illegal anticompetitive conduct such as information-sharing, signaling, refusals to deal, resale minimum-price 
maintenance, tied sales, exclusive dealing, patent or trademark pooling, mergers, monopolization, and attempts to 
monopolize are treated as civil matters.  More than 90% of all naked cartel cases are brought as criminal actions, but 
a small number of such cases are, at the discretion of the DOJ, filed as civil matters.   
5 The guidelines for criminal price fixing were at that time moved to the new organizational guidelines.  
6 See U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines For the United States Courts, 18 U.S.C. Section 2R1.1, Bid-Rigging, 
Price Fixing or Market-Allocation Agreements Among Competitors, Application Note 3.  The USSC’s use of the 
word “average” is revealing.  It implies that a goal was to design sanctions that would apply to typical 
infringements, rather than exceptionally effective or ineffective cartels.  This criterion may be defended on the basis 
of simplicity and economy of application because it avoids the necessity of estimating overcharges in specific cases, 
but it may be fairly described as a “one-size-fits-all” approach.  Sanctions are adjusted for each cartel participant by 
evaluating its culpability, but the size of a cartel’s damages is not a culpability factor.     
7 The full quotation reads: “The loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain because, inter alia, injury is inflicted upon 
consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the higher price. Because the loss from 
price-fixing exceeds the gain, subsection (d) (1) provides that 20 percent of the volume of affected commerce is to 
be used in lieu of the pecuniary loss under Section 8C2.4 (a) (3).” (ibid.).. 
8 See U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines For the United States Courts, 18 U.S. C.18 U.S.C. Section 2R1.1, 
Bid-Rigging, Price Fixing or Market-Allocation Agreements Among Competitors, Application Note 3.    7
  It is unclear why the Guidelines doubled the assumed 10% loss,
9 although the 
explanation in the Guidelines’ commentary implies that this could be due to such factors as the 
allocative inefficiency harms of market power, the disruptive effects on victims caused by 
antitrust violations
10 and/or the umbrella effects of market power.
11  Regardless, the Guidelines’ 
approach is consistent with the standard optimal deterrence standard promulgated by William 
Landes (1983). Landes convincingly showed that to achieve optimal deterrence the damages 
from an antitrust violation should be equal to the violation’s “net harm to others”, multiplied by 




  The USSC Guidelines therefore start with a base fine double the 10% presumed 
overcharge
14 and use it in conjunction with the assigned base Offence level (of 10) for antitrust 
offenses. They adjust this offense level by a number of factors, such as whether bid rigging
15 and 
other aggravating factors were involved, and by mitigating factors as well.
16 This adjustment 
results a pair of “culpability multipliers” that are between 0.75 and 4.0 and are in a 1:2 ratio.  
The product of the base fine (20% of the affected commerce) and the culpability multipliers 
results in the fine range that is to be imposed on a cartel member. Thus, the fine range 
recommended for convicted cartelists is at its lowest 15% and at its highest 80% of affected 
sales.
17  As the Sixth Circuit noted, the Sentencing Commission “opted for greater administrative 
convenience” instead of undertaking a specific inquiry into the actual loss in each case.”
18   
                                                 
9 Perhaps the doubling can be explained by the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1986, which provides an 
alternative fine: “If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to 
a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or 
twice the gross loss.” Pub. L. No. 100-185, 100 Stat. 1280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1987)) at § 3571(d). 
Perhaps the 20% figure in § 2R1.1 is a “proxy” for this “twice the gain or loss” provision in the Criminal Fine 
Improvements Act of 1986. 
10 This should include he corporate time and disruption caused by private suite to recover damages from cartels. 
11 “Umbrella effects” is the name given to higher prices charged by non-cartel members that were permitted or 
caused by the cartel’s supracompetitive prices. The doubling of the 10% presumed overcharge does not, however, 
given the context, account in any way for the small chances of finding and convicting cartels or the lack of 
prejudgment interest. 
12 In 1986 the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Douglas Ginsburg, estimated that the enforcers catch less 
than 10% of all cartels. See USSG (1986: 15). If he is correct, optimal damages for cartels should be tenfold!  The 
percentage of cartels that are caught and proven probably is much higher today.  See Spratling (2001). There is, 
however, no evidence that it exceeds 1/3, so there is no reason to believe that the treble damage remedy should be 
lowered. See also the discussion in Landes (1983: 115 fn. 1). 
13 Landes (1983: 666-68). 
14 The Guidelines originally provided that “[t]he fine range for an organization is from 20 to 50 percent of the 
volume of commerce, but not less than $100,000.”  18 U.S.C. Appx. § 2R1.1 (1987).   
15  If bid rigging is involved this increases the Base Offense Level by 1, See 18 U.S.C. Appx. Section 2R1.1 (b).   
This indicates the USSC’s belief that Bid-rigging is worse than other forms of illegal collusion. 
16  See Section 2R1.1 and Application Note 1. 
17  These fines usually are adjusted downwards for cooperation or as a part of the Division’s leniency program. The 
USSC’s Commentary also notes that “In cases in which the actual monopoly overcharge appears to be either 
substantially more or substantially less then 10%” they might not employ the 20% assumption. See Application Note 
3. But in practice the DOJ almost always uses the figure of 20% of affected commerce as their starting point in their 
criminal fine calculations.  
 
18 See United States v. Hayter Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1277 (1995). The court noted:” The offense levels are not 
based directly on the damage caused or profit made by the defendant because damages are difficult and time 
consuming to establish. The volume of commerce is an acceptable and more readily measurable substitute...I find 
nothing other than the following commentary language that indicates that the Sentencing Commission adopted the 
theory of optimal penalties: "It is estimated that the average additional profit attributable to price-fixing is 10 percent 
of the selling price.”(ibid.).   8
 
  The USSC appears to have adopted the 10% presumption because its use was advocated 
by the (then) head of the Antitrust Division, Douglas Ginsburg. In a statement to the 
Commission, Assistant Attorney General Ginsburg stated that “the optimal fine for any given act 
of price-fixing is equal to the damage caused by the violation divided by the probability of 
conviction . . . such a fine would result in the socially optimal level of price-fixing, which in this 
case is zero”(USSG 1986:14).  He stated his judgment that “price fixing typically results in price 
increases that has harmed the consumers in a range of 10 percent of the price...” and that these 
violations had no more than 10% chance of detection (ibid. p.15).   
 
  This in turn raises the question of how Ginsburg arrived at his 10% estimate. A 
prominent analysis of the issue by Cohen & Scheffman (1989) published shortly after the 
antitrust sentencing Guidelines were promulgated, states that the economic evaluation of a very 
small number of price-fixing conspiracies was particularly important in shaping the 1986-87 
conclusion of Ginsburg and the Commission that the overcharges from price-fixing conspiracies 
were 10% on the average. The three cases were: United States v. Container Corp. of America
19 
and the subsequent civil litigation; the Federal Trade Commission case involving the Bakers of 
Washington State; and a short survey by DOJ economists of empirical studies of bid rigging in 
the road-building industry in the 1980s (ibid.  pp. 344-345).  Thus, the lynchpin of modern 
criminal cartel fines -- the USSC’s simplifying assumption that cartels raise prices by 10% -- is 
supported by a surprisingly small amount of evidence.  
 
Critiques of the 10% Guidelines Presumption 
  
The USSC’s 10% presumption was attacked as unreliable and overstated almost as soon as it was 
issued. For example, Cohen and Scheffman (1989) concluded that “…there is little credible 
statistical evidence that would justify the Commission’s assumptions which underlie the 
Antitrust Guidelines (p. 333).”  “At least in price fixing cases involving a substantial volume of 
commerce, ten percent is almost certainly too high (p. 343).”   Moreover, the specific data that 
the Commission uses was attacked as unreliable: “later research has cast considerable doubt on 
... these estimates, concluding that the markups, if they existed, were quite small (p. 345).”  
 
  Cohen and Scheffman also argue that the Antitrust Guideline, when coupled with civil 
and marketplace sanctions will cause “a serious overdeterrence problem” (p. 334).  That is, they 
and other critics of the Guidelines believe that there is a disparity between the size of the 
corporate fines mandated for antitrust violations and the amount of the economic injuries caused 
by overt price fixing.  During recent years this criticism has been repeated with perhaps even 
more intensity. These attacks could be due to rising levels of criminal antitrust fines in recent 
years.  
  
  From 1990 to 1999, a series of record corporate fines were imposed for criminal price 
fixing by U.S. courts; a similar upswing may be noted for fines imposed by the European 
Commission from 1995 to 2001 (Connor 2003).  Civil treble-damages cases in the United States 
have seen a parallel, if lagged response in the size of settlements. Not surprisingly, attorneys who 
have defended companies that have been convicted of collusion in a number of highly publicized 
international antitrust conspiracies have claimed that the Guidelines have resulted in penalties so 
                                                 
19 393 U.S. 333 (1969).   9
large that they have resulted in overdeterrence.  For example, just as the DOJ’s campaign against 
international cartels was gathering steam, Adler and Laing (1997) assert that “the fines being 
imposed against corporate members of international cartels are staggering (p.1)”, placing the 
blame on the “uniquely punitive” requirements of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  After viewing 
an intensification of this trend for another two years, Adler and Laing (1999) were even more 
alarmed.  
 
  “What is….troubling is that the company fines...have risen astronomically – to levels far 
  higher than the fines for other serious economic crimes and in amounts that can be 
  unrelated to the economic harm caused by the violations (p.1).” 
 
  
  More recently, Denger (2003) too decries the prevalence of excessive price-fixing fines 
and private settlements.  He places the blame for excessive fines on the Corporate Guidelines 
base fine calculation, which is 20% of the volume of affected commerce (p. 3).  This approach, 
he notes, presumes a pecuniary loss of 10% of sales due to price fixing; unlike all other white-
collar federal crimes, the actual degree of direct harm caused does not have to be proven by 
prosecutors
20.  Denger notes a failure of the economic-legal literature, namely, that “…we have 
little information on what level of criminal or civil exposure is needed to deter most cartels 
(p.4).” 
 
  Concern about the lack of empirical evidence on the actual harm caused by price fixing is 
not confined solely to those sympathetic to the increased exposure of corporate defendants. 
Graubert (2003) notes that the controversy over whether antitrust payments are excessive (which 
on p. 7 he equates with payouts greater than reasonable damage estimates) is largely attributable 
to the “…difficulty of gathering useful data.”  A well known critic of the effectiveness of 
antitrust enforcement, Klawiter (2001) expresses skepticism as to whether the severe monetary 
penalties imposed on cartelists in the late 1990s will in fact deter illegal price fixing. 
 
Issue 2: Global Cartel Fines 
 
The majority of the overcharges generated by cartels in the past 15 years have been international, 
even global in membership and geographic spread (Connor 2001, 2003).  Therefore, non-U.S. 
monetary sanctions must be considered.  U.S. antitrust enforcement has been a model for many 
other countries that have more recently adopted such laws.  In Japan and Germany, U.S. 
occupation authorities imposed competition laws after World War II (Wells 2000).  Germany’s 
revised competition law implemented in 1958 became one of the principal influences on the 
adoption of such statutes by the original six members of the European Economic Community 
(Goyder 1999:18-33).  After four years of political discussions within the EEC’s Commission, 
Regulation 17 was passed and came into force in march 1962; its Article 15 lays out the powers 
of the Competition Directorate General (DG-COMP) to fine companies for competition-law 
infringements (ibid. p. 45).  That rule sets a maximum corporate fine of 10% of the company’s 
                                                 
20 Denger appeals primarily to an increase in settlement rates in treble-damage direct-purchaser suits to establish the 
unfairness of the high fines imposed on corporate price fixers, an increase that, he believes, cannot be explained by 
increases in overcharge rates.   He cites about 8 domestic U.S. law cases that settled for 2 to 4 % of sales in the 
1970s and one international case in 2001 that settled for 18 to 20% (pp. 3-4).  It is argued below that settlements are 
inappropriate evidence in this context.     10
total sales in the year prior to the Commission’s decision and specifies that the specific fine will 
depend on the duration and seriousness of the offense. 
 
  Methods of calculating cartel fines are explained in a 1998 Notice and in each price-
fixing decision of the EC (Connor 2005:14-15). Yet, authorities on the EU’s competition laws 
are silent on the origins of the 10% rule.   Harding and Joshua (2003) state that EU fines are 
supposed to incorporate both compensatory and punitive components, the latter to serve 
deterrence (p. 240).  EU fines are calculated in six steps. First, the EC considers the “gravity” of 
the offense. Although a matter of discretion, cartels are usually placed in the “very serious” 
category, which is the highest of three levels of antitrust infringements.  Cartels with large 
damages that are geographically widespread add to the gravity.  The fine calculations base for 
the most serious infringements start at €20 million.  Second, to account for disparities in the 
power of fines to deter, relatively large companies are fined more than smaller participants: in 
several global cartels, companies in the upper half of the cartel’s size distribution had their fines 
doubled.  Third, fine amounts are increased by 10 percentage points per year for each year the 
cartel is effective.  Fourth, these three factors result in a base fine (called a “basic amount”) for 
each company that is adjusted for culpability; upward for cartel leaders and downwards for 
various mitigating factors.  Fifth, under the EU’s Leniency Notice, violators are given 10% to 
50% discounts for their degrees of cooperation.  In a few cases, amnesty has been granted.  
Finally, after applying the last four steps, the Commission ensures that fine amount does not 
exceed 10% of global sales in the year prior to the date of the decision.  Rarely does the EC need 
to worry about reaching the 10% cap (Connor 2003). 
 
  Although the fine-setting process is somewhat transparent, why the base fine is €20 
million and the basis of the other adjustments is not known.  It is clear that for a single-product 
firm that participates in a cartel with a 10% overcharge for one year, there can be no punitive 
component to EU fines. For more effective cartels, an EU fine cannot even be compensatory.  
Moreover, if the probability of detection and conviction is less than 20%, then any specialized 
member of a one-year cartel with a 2% overcharge or bigger will not be deterred.  However, 
most companies that engage in cartel behavior are large diversified firms; for them, EU fines can 
come closer to optimal deterrence levels.
21 
 
  Canada is another jurisdiction with relatively tough sentencing for cartels. The Canadian 
Competition Bureau (CCB) uses a fairly simple standard for setting fines.  Although not spelled 
out in any administrative guidelines, decisions of Canadian courts have, in the absence of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, imposed fines close to 20% of Canadian affected sales 
(Low 2004, Connor 2003).
22  A former Canadian prosecutor comments that “there has not been 
any economic or judicial analysis of the assumptions behind this proxy for harm that this 
represents…” (Low 2004:19).  Cooperating firms get discounts, and recently recidivists have 
paid fines as high as 45% of affected sales.  The Canadian 20% rule seems to mimic the base fine 
of the USSGs.  If Canada intends to punish cartels, then the presumed overcharge may also be 
10%; if only compensation is the aim, then a 20% overcharge is assumed.  
 
 
                                                 
21 If the cartelized product line accounts for 10% of total company sales, then the duration or the overcharge level 
can be 10 times greater to achieve compensation or deterrence.  
22 Under Section 45 of Canada’s Competition Act, fines are limited to C$10 million, but foreign price-fixing 
conspiracies can be prosecuted under Section 46, which has no fine limit (Low 2004:17).   11
Issue 3: Cartel  Deterrence 
 
Concerns about the inadequacy or excessiveness of antitrust sanctions are part of the larger issue 
of the effectiveness of antitrust interventions.  To make any headway in assessing empirically the 
adequacy of anticartel enforcement, it is necessary to have reliable information about the degree 
of harm generated by private cartels. Cartel injuries to purchasers are positively related to three 
economic factors: the size of the cartel’s market, the duration of the conspiracy, and the 
percentage overcharge.  Antitrust sanctions should be calibrated to a cartel’s affected sales and 
overcharges; investigation procedures can reduce the probability of cartel formation or the 
duration of cartels.  
 
  Those critical of aggressive antitrust policy have often embraced the comforting notion 
that cartels are fragile coalitions. When the OPEC cartel began to have an impact on petroleum 
prices in the early 1970s, several leading economists predicted its imminent demise.  Morris 
Adelman (1972) wrote that  
 
  “Every cartel has in time been destroyed by one and then some members chiseling and 
 cheating…”(p.71). 
 
In 1974, in a now infamous news-magazine article, Milton Freedman predicted OPEC’s 
imminent collapse. However, research by Eckbo (1976) and Suslow (2001) finds that the mean 
duration of discovered cartels is around five or six years. The (unknown) duration of 
undiscovered cartels is likely to be longer.  OPEC may be less powerful than in the 1970s, but its 
production decisions continued to roil the petroleum market through at least 2004.  
 
  In a provocative essay that quickly drew rebuttals
23, Crandall and Winston (2003) argue 
that extant empirical evidence demonstrates that antitrust policy has been ineffective in either 
raising consumer welfare or in deterring anticompetitive conduct:   
 
  “We find little empirical evidence that past [antitrust] interventions have provided much 
  direct benefit to consumers or significantly deterred anticompetitive behavior” (p. 4).  
 
The great majority of their criticisms are directed at monopoly and merger enforcement, 
but remedies in collusion cases also attract their disfavor.  To support their view that the 
prosecution of overt price fixing is misdirected, they cite five empirical studies of overt collusion 
that find no upward effects on prices of conspiracies convicted in U.S. courts
24.  While Crandall 
and Winston later admit that there are some “examples” of successful collusion, no studies are 
                                                 
23 See Baker (2003), Werden (2003), and Kwoka (2003).  According to Kwoka (2003: note 2), Crandall and 
Winston’s earlier drafts “… endorsed consideration of outright appeal of the antitrust laws”. 
24 I judge that space constraints do not appear to be responsible for such a skimpy treatment of this topic, for they list 
59 references.  The choice of two of the articles is unfortunate, because both are methodologically deeply flawed.  
Newman (1988) is discussed later in this paper; Sproul (1993) is criticized by Werden (2003).  Both articles appear 
in journals managed by University of Chicago economists.  Two other studies focus on an odd alleged episode of 
price fixing, the so-called Overlap group of 23 elite U.S. universities that met regularly to allocate needs-based 
graduate scholarships; this practice was permitted to continue under a consent decree that limited the degree of detail 
shared.   12
cited that support the positive effect on prices
25.  As for deterrence, Crandall and Winston rather 
grudgingly admit that the large DOJ fines meted out to cartels in recent years possibly deterred 
the most harmful cartels
26. This grudging admission is immediately tempered by a citation to an 
entirely theoretical analysis of the dangers of overdeterrence. 
 
  In his comment on Crandall and Winston, Kwoka (2003) faults them for their “startlingly 
selective” body of evidence.  He suggests that they should have included “… studies from any 
source with appropriate evaluation of their credibility” (p. 4). Kwoka is hardly the first specialist 
to lament the absence of quantitative estimates of the price effects of overtly collusive 
arrangements.   
 
  In sum, there does indeed seem to be a broad consensus among legal and economic 
writers that the question of the optimality of price-fixing penalties turns mightily on the actual 
degree of harm caused by cartel conduct, and that not enough is known about this issue. 
Moreover, even if the creators of the USSC Guidelines were correct that in the 1980s cartels 
generally raised prices by 10%, the harsher cartel sanctions imposed more recently could mean 
that this presumption is no longer justified. This is a gap in the literature that I hope this paper 
will remedy. 
 
              LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
This survey has been prepared by checking more than 500 social-science publications and 
reading more than 100 official decisions of antitrust authorities.
27  The major portion of the 
overcharge estimates included in the present analysis is taken from books, book chapters, 
conference proceedings, or papers published in economic, historical, and legal journals whose 
readers and contributors are mainly academics.
28  The great majority of these publications are 
peer reviewed.  In addition, a minority of the estimates are taken from newspapers, magazines, 
and similar journalistic outlets; from reports issued by governments; from academic working 
papers; and from decisions rendered by courts or antitrust commissions.   
 
Early Monographs on Cartels  
 
Interest in collusive organizations began well before industrial-organization economics was 
recognized as a distinct discipline.  Prior to World War II, relatively few archival articles treat 
the economics of cartels, but scores of books were published on the economic and political 
                                                 
25 They say that the lysine, citric acid, and vitamins cases are “Ill known,” but provide no citation for this assertion.  
There appears to be only one publication that covers the price effects of all three of these three cases with a degree 
of depth, viz., Connor (2001).  
26 Their reasoning is obscure.  Perhaps they are referring to international cartels, cartels with absolutely large 
overcharges, or conspiracies with high percentage overcharges.  In any case, why they expect the probability of 
discovery or relative size of expected sanctions to be greater in such cases is not clear.    
27 The References section below lists about 350 sources with useful information about the private cartels in this 
paper’s sample.  Only about 200 contained usable quantitative overcharge estimates (shown in the last column of 
Appendix Table 2).  The remaining studies in the References were consulted to confirm that for some alleged cartel 
tacit collusion prevailed or government power protected the cartel.  See also table 11 below. Prof. Robert Lande 
searched for final published decisions of U.S. courts. I searched the EU web sites for all full decisions of the 
European Commission that found violations of Article 81 (formerly 85) of the Treaty of Rome. 
28 Prior to the 1970s, the majority of quantitative overcharges estimates are found in books and monographs; 
beginning in the 1970s, most of the estimates from the social science literature are found in journal papers.   13
aspects of “pools,” “trusts,” “combines,” “syndicates,” and all the other terms that were used at 
the time to encompass what are generally monopolistic arrangements. The distinction between 
these terms was not well understood until the early 20
th century.  Bullock’s (1901) seminal paper 
tends to regard all of them as roughly equivalent terms for monopolistic business entities with 
market power over price (p. 183).
29  But by 1916 Ripley could differentiate the terms in a 
manner that has endured.  Pools or corners were contractual joint-profit-increasing agreements 
by independent sellers over prices or quantities; today these are called cartels (Ripley 1916: 
xiv).
30  Ripley cites the U.S. cordage cartel, formed in 1860, as the first documented pool.  Other 
19
th century cartels include cotton bags, distilling, iron pipes, steel, salt (Jenks 1888), wire nails 
(Edgerton 1997), and a patent pool for porcelain bathtubs. 
31  
 
  Trusts proper were legal instruments used in the United States from 1882 to 1902 for 
combining companies under a single board of directors; this legal form was supplanted as a 
means of industrial merger with the holding company beginning in the late 1890s (Ripley 1916).  
Thus, trusts, combines, and holding companies refer more to mergers and acquisitions than to 
cartels. Yet the word “trust” was used loosely and popularly to cover both cartels and mergers 




  Bullock (1901), a professional economist and author of an early American economics 
textbook, wrote the first survey of cartels and trusts in the social-science literature.  After noting 
that there was a near absence of publications on the topic during 1890-1896, he finds an 
astonishing outpouring of 34 books and 48 serious articles in 1897-1900.
32   Interest in the 
subject continued in the early 20
th century, with most of the cartel literature from 1900 to 1940 
appearing in books.  Among the earlier monographs with significant economic content are books 
by Liefmann (1897, 1932), Jenks (1900, 1907, 1911), Jenks and Clark (1917, 1929), Hirst 
(1905), Jones (1914, 1921), Levy (1927, 1968), Michels (1928), Seagar and Gulick (1929), 
Domeratsky (1928), Notz (1929), von Beckerath (1930), Piotrowski (1933), and Plummer (1934, 
1951).
33  Some of these works were written by historians and others by some of the earliest 
practitioners of the emerging field of industrial economics.  With the exception of Jenks’ books, 
most of these studies contain little or no quantitative data.  Bullock opines that the quantitative 
measurement of the effects of cartels and trusts is not possible.   
 
                                                 
29 In a footnote on p. 184, Bullock quotes with approval Jenks observation that trusts and cartels also aim “to check 
competition,” that is to monopolize industries or prevent entry. 
30 “Cartel,” from the German synonym Kartell,, came into general use in British writing in 1902 (Connor 2001:20). 
Cartels do not usually endow a joint venture with capital contributions, though they may set up a sales office or 
secretariat.  The first work in the United States that I have seen referring to German cartels is to “combinations” that 
“regulate” industries (Bullock 1901:207).  Ripley (1916: xiv) cites German kartells.  On the continent of Europe, 
“syndicate” or comptoirs was often used to describe a cartel, with a joint sales agency often implied.  
31 Other early examples (1908-1915) of convicted cartels based upon patent pooling are paper(1908), electrical 
equipment (1911), umbrella frames (1907), bicycle coasters (1912-13), shoe machinery (1914), cash registers 
(1915),  harvesters (1914), and watch cases (1915) (Ripley 1916: 604-605).  
32 The books include a couple of government reports of investigations and proceedings of major conferences.  
Moreover, there was no sharp distinction between academic journals and serious pieces in intellectual magazines 
like The Atlantic at the time. Bullock includes one book written in French, but none of the large German literature. 
33 Levy (1968), a careful scholar, cites about 30 books on cartels and closely related subjects published before 1927, 
the great majority in German.   14
  Liefmann (1897) published one of the first economic monographs that contained the 
word Kartell in its title.
34  The book appeared in five editions in German from 1897 to 1929. The 
last edition was updated, translated into English and published in London in 1932; the Oxford 
University economist who wrote the book’s Introduction hailed it as the best known study of 
cartels and trusts “from a German perspective.”  In many ways he was leagues ahead of his 
contemporaries in the analysis of the cartel phenomenon.  Liefmann (1932) devised one of the 
most cited and pithy definitions of cartels: “free [voluntary] associations of producers for the 
monopolistic control of the market (p. ix).”  By this definition he meant to include only 
arrangements by independent companies linked by formal of informal contractual agreements; 
compulsory commodity schemes enforced by government decrees or parliamentary statutes are 
not true cartels by his definition, though international agreements negotiated between 
compulsory national cartels would qualify if the negotiated agreement did not require statutory 
enforcement.
35  He dismisses the widely accepted view of the time that cartelists are merely 
aiming to achieve a “reasonable profit,” insisting that cartels are instruments for maximizing 
profits.  Liefmann assembles a great deal of information on German cartels and limited 
information on other cartels that were organized before 1929, but with one exception he includes 
no useful price series that could be used to compute price effects.
36 
 
  Liefmann’s positions continued to influence German economists for decades to come. 
Beckerath (1930) opined that cartels were motivated primarily by a desire to reduce fluctuations 
in output or prices.  To do so, durable cartels typically used their power to raise prices during 
slumps and restrain prices during booms.  While he admits that raw-materials cartels and patent 
pools were successful in raising prices above competitive levels in the long run, he believed that 
for other types the evidence was lacking (p. 262).  “…[I]t can only rarely be proved that a cartel 
is the only reason behind a price rise” (p. 263).  Indeed, the book contains no price data.   
However, Beckerath undercuts his agnostic position by noting that most cartels have members 
with varying costs and set their common price so as to allow its highest-cost member to make a 
profit (p. 265); it follows that at such a price all the others are making economic profits. 
 
  Herman Levy was a contemporary of Liefmann. Levy was a prolific writer of books on 
economic history.  Not counting revised editions, he authored ten books between 1900 and 1927, 
eight in German and two in English.  While indebted to Liefmann’s concepts and definitions, 
Levy covers different ground than Liefmann. Unlike Liefmann, Levy is eager to quantify the 
economic impacts of cartels and trusts. Levy (1968) is a reprint of the second (1927) English-
language edition of his book on British cartels, monopolies, and oligopolies. This work is 
concerned about why the British cartel movement was weaker and slower to develop than on the 
Continent of Europe.  It contains unique information on 18
th and 19
th century British cartels.  
                                                 
34 The first appears to be Kleinwächter (1883), but this author was not as influential as Liefmann. Hirst (1905) seems 
to be the first book in English to have Kartell or Cartel in its title. 
35 That is, if two or more national cartels are joined by a government-to-government treaty, the result is not a cartel 
proper.  It is the voluntary nature of the agreement that is the defining characteristic of true cartels, according to 
Liefmann.  This distinction is a useful one for the present survey, because I wish to focus “private” cartels that are 
indictable under U.S. antitrust law.  Private cartels may contain state-owned companies or legal export cartels as 
members, but if the arrangement is sanctioned by national laws, protected by national sovereignty, or the result of 
international treaties, I deem them “public.” Compulsory cartels, a type popular in Europe in the 1930s, are a special 
type of public cartel.  
36 Liefmann (1932) has no doubts that cartels frequently raise prices (or prevent them from falling during 
recessions), but he is a bit of a perfectionist, insisting that “…it is impossible to say what the prices would have been 
if there had been no cartel (p. 104).”   15
 
  Another early European writer who was concerned about the lack of concrete measures 
of market power is a then young lawyer and economics lecturer, Hirst (1905).  His book grew 
out of an 1899 Oxford essay that attempted to develop price-based indicators of the price effects 
of cartels.  Noting that German cartels frequently exported surplus output to other countries at 
lower prices than their fixed domestic prices, he proposes using the export prices as a yardstick. 
Although there is some danger of overstating the domestic overcharge if the cartel is dumping 
product at predatory prices, he applies this method to six German cartels using 1900-1902 prices.   
 
  Jeremiah W. Jenks was a political science professor at Cornell University in 1900 when 
the first of his five editions of The Trust Problem was published, though he had already been 
researching pools, trusts, and monopolies for 20 years by that time. Jenk’s 1888 study of the 
Michigan salt cartel seems to be the first economic study of cartels to appear in a peer-reviewed 
professional journal. A later edition of his book, Jenks (1921), received a glowing review by a 
well known cartel economist (Dana 1922).  His publications display a strong empirical bent and 
show a deep interest in gauging the economic effects of cartels.  Unusual among academics of 
the time, his commitment to the study of trusts seems to have been cemented by his extensive 
work as an advisor for the U.S. Industrial Commission, which held a series of public hearings in 
1898-1899 on conditions in several oligopolistic industries.  His books contain carefully 
constructed series of wholesale prices for refined sugar, whiskey, wire nails, barbed wire, steel, 
and other products controlled by cartels or dominant firms.  Among his analytical advances was 
the creation of coterminous price series for the principal inputs for the final products (corn for 
whiskey, steel for nails, etc.).  By correcting for changes in product prices due to input prices, he 
was able to determine more precisely when and how strongly prices were affected by a cartel.  
 
  Harvard University seems to have been the leading campus for economic and legal 
studies of cartels in the early 20
th century.  One indication of its preeminence is the publication 
of what is probably the first textbook on cartels, mergers, and monopolies in 1905.  The revised 
edition is a huge (872 pages of small print) compilation of reprints from professional journals of 
law and economics, excerpts from briefs and court decisions, and legal commentary (Ripley 
1916).
37  Ripley, himself the author of an important study of the railroads, aimed at applying the 
case-study method pioneered by Harvard Law School into advanced economics courses. 
 
  Eliot Jones wrote a Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard University on several episodes from 
1871 to 1914 of cartelization of the U.S. anthracite coal industry, the largest U.S. mineral 
industry of the early 20
th century.  His dissertation won a University prize and was published by 
Harvard University Press in 1914.  Jones’ first book is for its time one of the best analyses of the 
economic history, market structure, collusive conduct, and price effects in any industry.  It may 
be one of the first books to combine an empirical interest in industrial concentration with 
attention to the antitrust laws.  This industry case study illustrated how a concentrated, 
technologically dynamic industry with extensive network economies, the railroads, could 
leverage its market power in transportation through backward vertical integration and collusion 
in the coal industry; after the Sherman Act was passed, the railroads adopted new strategies 
(mergers, cross-ownership, and interlocking directorships) to maintain their market power in 
coal.  Along with papers in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, his writings received extensive 
peer review that was unusual for the period. In addition to detailed ownership and price data 
                                                 
37 A similar book was edited by Curtis (1931).   16
from industry trade sources, Jones had available testimony and exhibits from one of the early 
U.S. antitrust trials.  
 
  Jones’ interest in competition and antitrust laws was extended in his 1921 book. Jones, a 
Stanford University economist at the time, was a contemporary of Jenks, but better versed in the 
still-emerging concepts of industrial-organization economics. Despite his evident interest in the 
price effects of cartels, in his second book quantitative data were presented on price effects for 
only three cartels. Both Jenks and Jones share an interest in organizations that have market 
power, but like most American and British social scientists writing in the first half of the 20
th 
century, they are vague or inconsistent in distinguishing cartels from other powerful economic 
groupings.  Pools, trusts, combines, monopolies, trade associations, conventions, comptoirs, 
ententes, syndicates, intergovernmental commodity agreements, and cartels were terms often 
used interchangeably by those writing in English or French (Plummer 1936, Curtis 1931).  Curtis 
considered cartel to be a term used mainly in Europe.  His preferred terminology was pools for 
more informal and unstable cartels and trusts for cartels with strong central direction and control.  
In fact, true trusts as legal vehicles for combining the assets of rival firms for market control 
lasted from only 1879 to the mid 1890s. 
  
  Seagar and Gulick (1929), academics at Columbia University and the University of 
California, authored a long book that focused primarily on trusts and the first three decades of 
enforcement of the Sherman Act. They illustrate the ill effects of price fixing by recounting the 
research of others on several examples of U.S. and European cartels. They trace the earliest of 
the U.S. pools to the cordage industry, which began making agreements on prices at least as 
early as 1861; manufacturers formed a formal association in 1878.  The Michigan Salt 
Association, formed in January 1876, may be the first recorded formal U.S. cartel.  Because of 
the high costs of transporting salt, an elaborate organizational structure, and the highly inelastic 
demand for salt, this cartel was successful in dominating the Midwest market for 25 years
38.  As 
good as it is, this book contains only one fleeting reference to price effects. 
 
  Two lengthy reports from analysts in the U.S. Department of Commerce presage the 
triumph of the more precise German usage of the term cartel (Domeratsky 1928, Notz 1929).  
Notz (1929), for example, delineates in a modern manner those characteristics that are essential 
to a cartel and those features that may vary from cartel to cartel.  Basically he accepts 
Liefmann’s classic definition of a private cartel: a voluntary association of two or more 
independent business organizations in the same line of business with the aim to control markets 
or reduce competition
39.  The essential feature is an overt agreement to divide market territories, 
set or stabilize prices, limit or allocate industry supply, establish a common sales agency, pool 
intellectual property, or some combination of these five strategies. The business organizations 
may be private corporations, state enterprises, or national cartels.  If the organizations are 
registered in at least two countries, then it is an international cartel.  The legal organization of 
cartels ranges from informal committees that meet on no fixed schedule to formal secretariats or 
administrative units that may hold significant assets.  However, Notz specifically excludes trusts, 
combines, joint ventures, holding companies and the like, because the economically distinctive 
                                                 
38 Salt was sold in barrels of 280 pounds at prices of $0.50 to $1.00 per barrel in the 1870s.  The National Salt Co., 
formed to control the salt fields of New York State, purchased the Michigan and Ohio fields in 190, giving it a 73% 
share of the evaporated salt market east of the Rocky Mountains (Seagar and Gulick 1929: 87).  
39 Notz dwells on private cartels because compulsory cartels were mostly a phenomenon of the 1930s.  However, he 
does briefly mention a phase of the German potash cartel that was nationalized during the Weimar Republic.   17
characteristic of cartels is that its members retain legal independence in production and 
marketing decisions while at the same time subjugating their decisions for the “common good,” 
that is, an increase in the pool of profits generated by their cooperative actions.  While the 
Department of Commerce reports are strong in detailing cartel membership and industry supply 
conditions, they have little to offer by way of price effects. 
 
  Cartels, mergers, trade, and foreign direct investment were major concerns of the League 
of Nations, which sponsored a major conference on the subjects in 1927.  Papers prepared by 
some of the leading European cartel scholars of the day were published as part of the conference 
proceedings (de Rousiers 1927, MacDonald 1927, Wiedenfeld 1927, Economic and Financial 
Section 1927)
40.  These papers dwell on conceptual and organizational issues surrounding cartels 
and contain little of interest on price or welfare impacts. Indeed the near absence of empirical 
detail in these reports and other studies by European scholars active in the interwar period 
provide a striking contrast with the industrial analyses emerging in the United States. The final 
report of the 1927 conference revealed a deep split between those participants who believed that 
cartels harmed national economies and international trade and those who believed that cartels 
stabilized prices, investment, and employment.  Perhaps to rectify these ambiguities, the League 
later sponsored cartel studies with more empirical content (Benni et al. 1930, Oualid 1938).     
 
  Relatively few books were written about cartels in the 1930s, a period during which 
antitrust was in eclipse in the United States and cartels took on distinctly political roles as tools 
of economic planning in Europe. In this decade cartels were often embraced because they were 
perceived as antidotes to the word wide depression and, in some industries, deflation. From 
about 1933 to 1937 the U.S. antitrust laws were effectively appealed by federal government 
industrial planning experiments. Indeed, the Brookings Institution sponsored a series of books 
during this time to assist policy makers in implementing the National Recovery Act.  
 
  One of them was a survey of cartels as instruments for national economic recovery and 
stabilization (Pribram 1935). However, U.S. Supreme Court decisions quickly restored the 
antitrust laws by 1938 (Wells 2002).  In Europe and Japan, cartels became instruments of 
government policies to reduce excess capacities, raise prices for certain raw commodities, or 
extend the power of authoritarian regimes over labor and industrial production. When President 
Roosevelt and his advisors became apprised of the intimate connections between national 
socialism and compulsory cartels in Germany in the late 1930s, they rejected the cartel as an 
instrument of economic recovery.   
 
  Perhaps the most important U.S. study of cartels to appear in the 1930s was a long 
monograph on seven international cartels or dominant firms in markets for nonferrous metals: 
nickel, platinum, aluminum, tin, copper, lead, and zinc (Elliott et al. 1937).  This book was the 
result of a multiyear project by several economists working at Harvard University and Radcliff 
College.  Each cartel study was authored by a different member of the project team. Monographs 
on cartels published by European economists at this time tended to continue to focus on the 




                                                 
40 The United States was not a member of the League of Nations and sent only observers to the 1927 conference.   18
Although most books written prior to 1945 lacked empirical analyses of cartel performance, a 
small number of U.S. economists published a few well documented case studies of price effects.       
Many were written during the heady times (1885-1920) during which state and federal antitrust 
laws were being debated and first enforced, though none of these works suggested that their 
approaches had forensic value.
41  Among the most useful papers for overcharges are Jenks 
(1888), Andrews (1889), Edgerton (1897), Hudson (1900), Walker (1906), Stevens (1912), 
Tosdal (1916), Ripley (1916), and Allen (1923).  
    
  Jenks’s study of the Michigan Salt Association of the 1880s is a classic example of a 
well researched history of the methods used by a mining cartel to control a market that 
incorporates substantial information on costs and prices. Andrews (1889) drew upon 
contemporary business publications to recount what is quite possibly the world’s first global 
cartel, the infamously scandalous Secrétan copper syndicate of 1887-1889.    Edgerton’s paper 
on the U.S. Wire Nail Association is a superb analysis of the evolution, operation, and price 
effects of a short-lived but tightly structured, highly effective manufacturers’ cartel which was 
written with the help of insider interviews just a year after the cartel dissolved.  This study is 
notable because the conspiracy is the first U.S. work on a U.S.-based international conspiracy; 
moreover, despite the well publicized nature of the episode, the paper contains no reference to 
the seven-year-old Sherman Act.
42  Stevens’ 1912 study of the gunpowder trust is notable for 
focusing on what was believed to be the longest-running discovered cartel in the Nation’s 
history; Stevens carefully delineated three distinct phases of the cartel, and he drew upon the 
records of a 1911 antitrust trial to document the final episode.  Tosdal (1916) and Walker (1906) 
provide competent analyses of the earlier episodes of two highly durable domestic German 
cartels, potash and steel, respectively; subsequent scholars have repeatedly returned to these 
cases. Ripley (1916) reprints a fascinating court decision of the U.S. enameled bath tub cartel, 
which used patent licenses on a new machine to achieve effective collusion.  Allen’s account of 
the 18
th century English copper-smelting cartel is the first quantitative assessment of cartel 
effectiveness by a European economist to appear in a peer-reviewed academic journal. 
 
  The absence of cartel studies in professional journals in the 1920s and 1930s is striking. 
 
Post-World War II Cartel Studies  
 
  During and immediately after World War II, a surge in publications examined the roles 
of cartels in international trade and in war production.  Ervin Hexner (1946) produced the most 
comprehensive economic study of international cartels yet published.  Hexner, a Czech 
businessman and refugee from the German invasion of his home country, had an insider’s 
knowledge of cartels.  He had served as secretary of the Central European group in the 
international iron and steel cartel (Barjot 1994:65).  Louis Marlio (1947), a French economist 
                                                 
41 These years bracket what is generally called the Progressive Era in American history. Some historians limit the 
period to the beginning of the first T. Roosevelt administration in 1901 to the late Wilson administration ca. 1919. 
42  The paper contains an intriguing hypothesis about the optimality of price fixing. The cartel’s organizers were well 
aware that most U.S. pools at the time were ephemeral because most manufacturing processes permitted quick entry, 
about six  months in this industry. To discourage entry, the perpetrators consciously decided to raise prices higher 
than the monopoly level within a few months.  They reasoned that potential entrants would view such unsustainable 
prices as evidence that the members were irrational and that the pool would quickly crash before the outsiders could 
start production.  This information-obfuscation tactic worked because large-scale entry was thwarted for a year, 
which allowed the cartel to operate successfully for 19 months, about 12 months longer than if a more moderate 
pricing policy had been adopted.                  19
who wrote a detailed account of the international aluminum cartel, had a similar background.  He 
had been president of one of Europe’s largest aluminum manufacturers and had been appointed 
to represent the views of the International Association of Chambers of Commerce on the Cartels 
Commission of the League of Nations (ibid. p. 66).  Both of these authors found much to admire 
in the effects of international cartels, whereas works by American authors tended to be distinctly 
more skeptical, if not hostile concerning the economic and political effects of the interwar cartels 
(e.g., Berge 1944, Edwards 1946).  
  Although they may overstate the issue, Harding and Joshua (2003) draw sharp a 
distinction between the views toward cartels of North American lawyers and lawmakers and 
those in Europe: 
 
  “…the North American approach has been, since the end of the nineteenth century, one 
  of categorical censure [and] recourse to criminalization of antitrust violations as a central 
  plank of legal control… On the other hand, the general European approach …has been 
  altogether more tentative, more agnostic…and only in recent years moving towards an 
  uncompromising condemnation of cartel activity…” (p. 40). 
 
One finds these views and changes in these views reflected in the social-science literature on 
cartels.     
 
  More useful for the purposes of this survey are books and reports that have focused on 
the effectiveness of international cartels, examining such elements of effectiveness as duration, 
profitability, or price effects.  Perhaps the first publications to attempt to quantify systematically 
the price effects of cartels were a pair of books produced by a team of economists that had access 
to information handed over to investigators of Congressional committees and to the results of 
grand-jury antitrust investigations (Stocking and Watkins 1946, 1948).
43  These books set a new 
standard for rigor and detail in the economics literature on cartels, and they have provided a 
dozen or more overcharge estimates for this survey.  In my estimation, Stocking and Watkins 
(1946, 1948) represents a new era in the economic literature on cartels, because they were the 
first to apply rigorous modern concepts of the emerging field of industrial economics; moreover, 
because of access to the information spawned by numerous Congressional investigations and the 
first antitrust prosecutions of international cartels in the 1940s, they were among the first to 
focus on the market effects of international cartels. Numerous and continuing citations to their 
books by leading scholars attest to their status as classics in the field.  
 
  The negative impacts of cartels during 1920-1945 began to bring about a reappraisal of 
the welfare impacts of cartels among Europeans just after World War II.  In Germany there was 
a healthy parliamentary debate over its cartel laws in 1951-57 (Wells 2002:165-74). The German 
cartel law, although based on a rule-of reason approach, proved to be quite effective in purging 
most of German industry of cartels.  The UK had a common-law tradition against monopolies, 
but this law did not discourage price fixing by trade associations.  Through the early 1950s, a 
majority of the UK’s manufacturing output was affected by cartels (Symeonidis 2001, Swann 
1974). The reconsideration of the benefits of cartels began around 1950 with a series of 
empirical studies by the Monopolies Commission, which investigated the structure and 
                                                 
43 Stocking and Watkins had access to the results of a number of major investigations. The Temporary National 
Economic (or “Kilgore”) Committee published its hearings a few years before their books were published (U.S. 
Congress 1938-1940).  Other Congressional committees investigated the munitions industry and patent pools.  The 
authors also had information on U.S. prosecutions of more than 40 international cartels.   20
performance of British industries and made recommendations to the government about 
restrictive practices, dominant firms and mergers.  By the late 1950s, anticartel legislation had 
been adopted that placed the burden of proof on cartels to prove the economic benefits of their 
price fixing and related conduct.  Germany and the UK were the prime movers behind the 
adoption of tough anticartel provisions in the Treaty of Rome, which solidified the antitrust 
tradition in the EU and its Member States.     
 
  There was a short lived U.S. interest in domestic cartels when the “Great Electrical 
Equipment Conspiracy” burst onto the Nation’s consciousness in 1960-1961.
44 The great 
electrical equipment conspiracy resulted in the publication of more books in a few years than any 
other single historical event since the beginning of cartel literature.  The unsurpassed scope of 
the conspiracy, the fame of the leading companies involved, and the U.S. Government’s 
aggressive prosecution of the violators – all these factors lead to a degree of public fascination 
and publicity about an antitrust action not seen since the Supreme Court decisions against the 
Standard Oil and American Tobacco trusts in 1911.  The books written about the heavy-
electrical-equipment conspiracy include at least six monographs documenting the complex 
organizational details of these long-lasting and widespread bid-rigging conspiracies (Herling 
1962, Smith 1963, U.S. Congress 1965, Sultan 1974, Sultan 1975, and Bane 1973).  Sultan’s 
books are by far the most quantitative; he was a business-school student at the time of the 
prosecutions writing case studies of the industry and subsequently consulted for industry. Sultan 
is perhaps the only writer to accept the defendants’ arguments about the ineffectiveness of the 
conspiracies. In addition to the books, three economic studies were devoted to the cartels 
(Kuhlman 1967, Finkelstein and Levenbach 1983, and Lean et al. 1985).  These studies have 
become staples of textbooks in industrial organization (e.g., Carlton and Perloff 1990). The 
conspiracies are notable for their duration (up to 40 years), the as yet unsurpassed size of the 
sales involved ($7 billion per year in the late 1950s), the large number of well known companies 
involved (General Electric, Westinghouse, etc.), the size of the fines imposed (over $2 million), 
the size of the damage awards in three trials and private settlements ($400 to $500 million) from 
more than 1900 suits, and the imposition for the first time of significant prison sentences for 
several top executives.     
 
  There was a brief revival of interest in international cartels after 1973 when the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) first used its power to raise crude 
petroleum prices.
45  Many books and articles were written about the cartel, and two economic 
studies tried to predict OPEC’s staying power by surveying the international cartel literature of 
the time. First, a chapter of a book by Eckbo (1976) has been widely cited.  It originated as an 
MIT Ph.D. dissertation, and came out soon after the OPEC cartel was roiling world petroleum 
prices for the first time.  Eckbo’s work is notable for its effort in classifying cartels according to 
a large number of potentially significant economic dimensions. One dimension is a binary 
variable that separates cartels with significant price effects from those that were ineffective in 
this respect.  In fact, Eckbo depends heavily on the data in Stocking and Watkins (1946) to make 
these determinations. He defines an effective price effect as a price that is “three times unit costs 
of production and distribution” (p. 26).  It is not clear whether Eckbo refers to total costs or 
                                                 
44 When the guilty pleas were receive in the Philadelphia U.S. District Court in early 1961, nearly every daily 
newspaper in the United States placed the events on their front page.  
45 I do not include OPEC’s price effects in this survey because it was created and enforced by what amounts to a 
multilateral treaty organization.    21
variable costs, so to be conservative I assume he means average variable costs.  I have coded 
Eckbo’s 17 effective private cartels as having achieved a 50% overcharge.
46  
  
  The second OPEC-inspired study attempted to use econometric models to predict more 
precisely the economic performance of international cartels, including many commodity-
stabilization schemes that were fostered and enforced by sovereign governments.
47 Even the 
private cartels were chosen because they were extra-legal.  Griffin (1989), who has several cartel 
studies to his credit, specifies a formal cartel model which allows for a fringe of competitive, 
non-cooperating producers outside the cartel.  From this theoretical model, Griffin derives a 
simple empirical model that explains variation in the Lerner Index of market power with three 
factors: intracartel concentration, the share of cartel market control, and a subjective index of the 
degree of the cartels’ cohesion and monitoring methods.  The model was fitted to data on 54 
cartel episodes, most of which operated during the interwar period.  Each of the three factors is 
found to be positively significantly related to their Lerner indexes, though the model’s fit is 
modest, probably because of measurement error in the indexes. Griffin finds that the mean 
Lerner Index for the 54 cartel episodes is 0.31, which is equivalent to a 44.9% overcharge.
48  
Eliminating the 16 episodes that were government-sponsored, the mean overcharge for the 38 
private cartels is 45.6% and the median is 43.9%.
49 
 
  Relatively few books were written about cartels from the early 1960s until the 
revelations about the international lysine, citric acid, and vitamins cartels began in the late 
1990s.  Four books, only one of which attained large sales, may be traced to high profile U.S. 
and EU prosecutions that began in late 1996.  Three were prompted by a well publicized 1998 
criminal trial of three executives involved in the lysine cartel, the record of which provided a 
degree of testimonial evidence which is unique for international cartels discovered after World 
War II (Lieber 2000, Eichenwald 2000, and Connor 2001). Harding and Julian (2003) provide a 
legal overview of mainly EU cartel enforcement.  Only Connor (2001) contains empirical 
overcharge data. 
 
Quantitative Estimates of Cartel Overcharges 
 
                                                 
46 This is a conservative assumption.  I reason as follows.  In the manufacturing industries studied by Eckbo, fixed 
costs are unlikely to exceed half of average variable costs.  Substituting LRMC = FC + AVC = 1.5 AVC into the 
Lerner index formula yields a value of at least 0.50.  Because price is greater than or equal to LRMC, the overcharge 
is greater than or equal to the Lerner Index of 50%.  In fact, Griffin (1989) interprets Eckbo’s “effective” cartels as 
achieving a 100% increase in price (p. 182). 
47 Besides the price effects discussed here, Griffin analyzes the sources of cartel duration. 
48 Four of Griffin’s point estimates are slightly below zero; I convert these to zero.  The Lerner Index is L = (P-C)/P, 
where P is the observed market price and C is the but-for or competitive price.  Because C is equal to marginal cost 
in competitive equilibrium, L is also a profit margin on sales. L is zero in perfectly competitive markets and has a 
maximum value of one. The monopoly overcharge is a mark-up: MO = (P-C)/C. MO is also zero in perfectly 
competitive markets, but can approach positive infinity when C is very small. Because P is always greater than or 
equal to C, MO is greater than L whenever L is positive.  Simple algebraic substitution allows one to express MO as 
a function of L, viz., MO = L/(1-L). 
49 Somewhat surprisingly, government-sponsored cartels in this period had mean overcharges virtually the same as 
the private schemes.   22
Given the importance of the topic for legal-economic discourse, there have been surprisingly few 
surveys of the empirical findings of cartel overcharges.
50 I have been unable to find any research 
that has as its principal aim collecting or analyzing information on the price effects of overt 
collusion.
51  Indeed, the only work I have been able to locate that purports to survey cartels is a 
very early paper by Bullock (1901).   However, I have found six works that include surveys of a 
significant number of studies of mark-ups due to overt collusion.
52 The overcharges cited are in a 
sense byproducts of scholarly research; none claims to be a comprehensive survey. The six 
studies collect samples of five to 22 estimates. Only one appears in a peer-reviewed journal.   
 
  Cohen and Scheffman (1989) recognize that the average size of price-fixing overcharges 
generated by overt collusion is a critical issue in evaluating the USSGs and assert that there is a 
sparse economic literature on the topic.
53  Their survey cites only five publications providing 
such estimates for price-fixing cases not involving bid rigging, one of which is questionable
54.  
Cohen and Scheffman defend their decision to limit their survey to a few studies on the grounds 
that the 1987-89 deliberations of the Commission on the Antitrust Guideline focused on two 
particularly important cases, Bakers of Washington State and Corrugated Containers. They cite 
one short survey of empirical studies of bid rigging in the road-building industry in the 1980s 
(Werden and Simon 1987). Although supported by only one fairly narrow review, Cohen and 
Scheffman seem prepared to accept that bid-rigging conspiracies in general generate average 
mark-ups of around 10% (p. 345).  This, in turn, accounts for their support for significantly 
higher fines for bid-rigging conspiracies than for more straightforward price- or quantity-setting 
conspiracies.     
 
  A working paper by Werden (2003), though not intended primarily to be a survey of the 
issue, cites 14 studies of cartel overcharges.
55 All of his sampled studies were published since 
                                                 
50 Of the leading textbooks in industrial organization, Carlton and Perloff (1990) devote more space to cartels than 
most – almost 50 pages out of 852 total pages.  This work mentions by name 60 cartels, most of them interwar, 
international cartels.  Other textbooks have far fewer numbers of cartels cited. 
51 Hay and Kelley (1974) authored a classic review of 65 U.S. price fixing conspiracies, which Fraas and Greer 
(1977) extended to 606 cases from 1910 to 1972. Both studies contain a wealth of information about the number of 
conspirators, duration, industry, and specific collusive methods employed. However, neither survey covered the 
topic of price effects, presumably because of the paucity of such data. 
52 Froeb (1995) constructed a popular internet site for antitrust economics, and four pages contained a partially 
annotated bibliography of empirical studies of the price effects of conspiracies.  The internet page is 
http://www.antitrust.org/economics/conspiracy effects.html ; it was downloaded on Feb. 24, 1999 but no longer 
appears on the site with its former content [ see http://www.antitrust.org/cgi-bin/showcase.pl?casetype=Collusion].  
“Antitrust.org” is now maintained by the graduate business school of Vanderbilt University 
[http://www.antitrust.org/index.html]. He lists 14 published studies published between 1976 and 1994.  Of the 14, 
nine contain remarks about the studies’ findings, and all but one is interpreted as showing a significant relationship 
between collusive behavior and prices.  Froeb does not attempt to provide numerical impacts.     
53 There are several hundred published economic studies that try to measure the degree of market power observed in 
specific industries, in small of large samples of industries, or attained by a single firm or brand.  In most cases these 
studies are unable to or do not attempt to distinguish whether the measured height of market power is derived from 
the exercise of unilateral, tacit-collusive, or overt-collusive market power.    
54 One of them (Block et al. 1981) is irrelevant because it quotes the ratio of out-of-court settlements to annual sales 
for several U.S. bread price-fixing cases.  As Cohen and Scheffman recognize in a footnote, both the numerator and 
denominator of this ratio are inappropriate indicators of an overcharge; nevertheless in the text of there article, they 
persist in quoting with approbation the “suggestion” that price-fixing mark-ups of under 1% of sales are accurate for 
this industry. 
55 Irden’s paper is a critique of Crandall and Winston (2003).  Another critique is by Kwoka (2003).  Both comments 
are unusual in that they were written prior to the publication of Crandall and Winston’s paper in December 2003.  
Baker (2003) is also largely a response to Crandall and Winston.    23
1991, because he wished to limit the cartels under study to conspiracies that operated after 1974, 
the first year in which cartels could be prosecuted as felonies; three studies examined 
international cartels prosecuted by the DOJ in 1996-97. One of these is judged to be 
methodologically flawed (Sproul 1993); another methodologically sound study, while it finds 
significantly lower collusive prices in rigged bids than in noncollusive bidding, cannot be 
converted to a numerical price change from the results as published (Pesendorfer 2000).  Three 
of the studies looked at a total of seven distinct instances of price fixing, thus yielding 14 usable 
observations, some of which are ranges. The mean overcharge was 18.6% to 27.1%.  
 
  The most comprehensive quantitative study of cartel price effects appears in a chapter by 
Griffin (1989)
56. He derives a simple a simple empirical model that predicts the Lerner Index of 
market power using three factors.  The model was fitted to data on 54 cartel episodes, most of 
which operated during the interwar period and all of which operated in a legal environment.  All 
but four of the cartel episodes were effective at raising price.  If the but-for price is the purely 
competitive price, then the Lerner Index is the same as the overcharge, except that it is measured 
by dividing by the monopoly price instead of the competitive price
57.  That is, the Lerner Index 
is a margin on the collusive selling price, while the overcharge is a mark-up on the competitive 
price. Thus, for the same cartel the Lerner Index is a smaller number than the overcharge, though 
the difference is small for small overcharges
58.  If, on the other hand, the but-for price is 
supracompetitive, then the Lerner index might overstate the overcharge.  Griffin (1989: Table 1) 
concludes that the mean cartel margin was 0.31, which is equivalent to a 45% price increase; the 
median increase was 39%. Excluding 14 government-sponsored cases made little difference; the 
respective averages were 46% and 44%. 
  
  Posner’s (1975, 2001) treatise on antitrust law is an avowedly economic treatment of the 
subject.  An important issue for Posner is the importance of antitrust law to ameliorate the social 
costs of monopoly in the economy.  To illustrate the social costs of cartelization, Posner 
assembles data on 12 “cartel price increases” in “…industries having well-organized (mainly 
international) private cartels” (Posner 2001:303), which he admits are “crude and probably 
exaggerated” (ibid. p.304). In the 2
nd edition, seven of his estimates are based on his reading of 
Stocking and Watkins (1946, 1948), one is an old Supreme Court case, and four are modern 
quantitative studies of the price effects of market power in major U.S. industries that he assumes 
are collusive: petroleum, automobiles, cigarettes, and soft drink bottling.     
 
  Valerie Suslow and Margaret Levenstein are authors and co-authors of a number of 
important analyses of international cartels.  Levenstein’s (1997) oft-cited quantitative-historical 
study of the bromine cartel yields four estimates of mark-ups for its three episodes. Suslow’s 
(2001) paper on the duration of the interwar international cartels also analyses annual prices for 
17 products that were cartelized.  Levenstein, Suslow and Oswald (2003) profiles three postwar 
cartels and has usable price data for two of them. Finally, Levenstein and Suslow (2002) focus 
                                                 
56 Eckbo (1974) comes close.  Eckbo studies 51 episodes in 18 markets, but does not really calculate overcharges so 
much as place them somehow in high/low categories; Griffin terms Eckbo’s approach “subjective.”    
57 If P is the collusive price and C is the competitive price, then the Lerner Index is (P-C)/P, whereas an overcharge 
is (P-C)/C. That is, the Lerner Index is a margin and the overcharge is a mark-up. 
58 Suppose the competitive benchmark price is $1.00 and the cartel mark-up (or overcharge) is 5%. Then the Lerner 
Index L is (1.05 - 1.00)/1.05 = 0.0476 = 4.76%. However, if an overcharge is 25%, L =  (1.25 - 1.00)/ 1.25 = 0.20 = 
20%.  One can derive algebraically a one-to-one linear functional relationship between the overcharge and L; it 
equals L/(1-L). In this paper, I convert estimates of the Lerner Index of monopoly to the overcharge.   24
on the determinants of success for both the interwar and more modern cartels.  The paper aims at 
assessing three dimensions of cartel performance, stability, duration and “profitability,” the last 
equivalent to overcharges.  Although the authors are modest about their accomplishment, this 
paper contains the fullest accounting of overcharges of any source.
59    They collect price-effect 
information on five cartels (their Table 8) and 16 price increases for 12 international single-
episode cartels prosecuted since 1990 (Table 15).  Thus, this paper provides a total of 21 
estimates of price effects for international cartel episodes. They conclude that the median cartel 
price increase was 25% (ibid. p.20).  
 
  
   Table 1. Summary of Six Economic Surveys of Cartel Overcharges 
 
  Reference     Number  of     Average  Overcharge 
      C a r t e l s  
                         Mean          Median 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
          Percent 
 
1. Cohen and Scheffman (1989)                               5-7          7.7-10.8           7.8-14.0 
   
2. Werden (2003)                  13    21    18 
 
3. Posner (2001)                  12    49    38 
 
4. Levenstein and Suslow (2002)                        22    43    44.5 
 
5. Griffin (1989), private cartels                        38    46    44 
 
6. OECD (2003), excluding peaks                        12            15.75           12.75 
 
Total, simple average                      102-104              30.7    28.1 
Total, weighted average                     102-104              36.7    34.6 
 
 
  The OECD (2003) report on private “hard-core” cartels contains a summary of a 2001-
2002 survey of its government-members on the economic harm caused by cartels recently 
prosecuted by the European Commission and other national antitrust authorities.
60  Presumably, 
the examples chosen to be included are among the best documented examples of the degree of 
harm available to the authorities. The 38 responses to the survey are summarized in Annex A of 
OECD (2003).  While not all of them can be converted to overcharge percentages, the usable 
responses represent an unusually authoritative compilation of data on mark-ups by contemporary 
                                                 
59 “I have very little evidence on the excess profits … [from] cartelization.  For fifteen cartels … I have anecdotal 
evidence of price increases…” (p. 20). 
60 A few non-members that participated in an OECD-sponsored “Global Forum on Competition” also submitted 
responses to the survey. “Hard-core” is a European term that refers to conspiracies that fix prices and/or quantities. 
Other cartels (soft core?) cooperate on information, technology, marketing, and the like.  The distinction seems 
roughly to correspond to criminal versus civil violations under U.S. law.     25
cartels that have been prosecuted by courts or commissions.
61  The six surveys just discussed are 
summarized in Table 1.  
 
  The last major source of data is a working paper that attempts to compile data on the 
price effects of 167 private international cartels that were discovered by antitrust authorities only 
since 1990 (Connor 2003).
62  The cases covered in that paper include fully prosecuted cartels and 
a few still being investigated of prosecuted as of mid 2004.  A minority of these international 
cartels yield overcharge estimates.  All the overcharges in Connor (2003) are incorporated into 
this paper. 
  
  I have examined scores of journal articles, working papers, and other short analyses of 
cartel price effects.  Many were written primarily as historical case studies and mention price 
effects only in passing; most such papers contain no references to price changes but are valuable 
because they are based on primary documents that give details about internal organization.  The 
majority of the short cartel studies were written by economists; the focus in these studies is on 
testing hypotheses or an improved estimation method for overcharges, so much so that they 
sometimes do not contain enough information to derive point estimates of the overcharge rate.  
Nearly all economic articles are written by North American academics using cartel episodes that 
affected commerce in the United States or Canada
63.  The absence of empirical studies by 
European or Asian academics is striking.  One might speculate as to why this is so.  The supply 
of well trained industrial economists in Europe is unlikely to be an explanation
64.  However, the 
structure of academic departments at European and Asian universities may explain the paucity of 
useful studies.  Compared to U.S. departments of economics, European departments tend to be 
smaller (perhaps falling below the threshold necessary for collaborative teamwork on large-scale 
data sets), more focused on IO theory, and have different expectations for Ph.D. dissertations. 
Perhaps a more important factor is the inability of academics to obtain access to the structural 
and price data needed to calculate overcharges.  Civil cases are unusual in Europe, so the little 
work being done on cartel overcharges is done in-house by antitrust authorities. Unlike North 
America, there is little mobility between the staffs of European antitrust authorities and 
universities or think tanks. Finally, a survey of European and North American industrial-
organization economists reveals that there are very few attitudinal differences between the two 
groups on economic theory, but the former were less likely to expect economists to influence 
competition policies (Aiginger et al. 2001). 
 
  
                                                 
61 In a few cases the harm was reported as a monetary value and the size of affected commerce was missing, but I 
was able to find a reasonable estimate of the affected commerce from an alternative source.  For example, the U.S. 
DOJ provided a monetary estimate of the U.S. harm caused by the international lysine cartel of 1992-1995, and I 
found the value of affected commerce in a sentencing opinion written by a federal judge in a criminal jury trial that 
convicted three of the cartel’s managers.  I was able to derive 16 overcharge percentages, of which 12 were long-run 
and 4 were peak. 
62 The working paper incorporates a series of studies on the same subject that commenced in the mid 1990s (Connor 
1997, 1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2004).  The author has continued to add cases as they appear. 
63 Several historical studies of cartels were authored by Europeans or Japanese scholars.  A few economic studies of 
cartels were written by UK or Australian economists (Evenett, de Roos), but even these spent significant shares of 
their careers in U.S. universities.  
64 The principal European organization for industrial economists (EARIE) was more active in sponsoring meetings 
the past decade than its U.S. counterpart (IOS), and the EARIE meetings had a good proportion of empirical and 
legal-economic papers.                     26
   DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION METHODS 
 
 
  I have made every attempt to identify and collect all useful information on private, hard-
core cartel overcharges available from public sources.  A private cartel is one that by 
contemporary U.S. standards could be criminally indicted under the Sherman Act.
65  Export 
cartels that fix prices are also included because such cartels are not explicitly legal in most 
jurisdictions (Levinstein and Suslow 2004).
66  
 
  Some cartels operated prior to the 1890 Sherman Act made participation by U.S. 
companies illegal, but many cartels headquartered in Europe predate the beginnings of antitrust 
law there (the late 1950s in the UK, Germany, and the European Economic Community).  If 
these cartels were not formed by means of a legally enforced government monopoly, they are 
generally considered private schemes.
67 However, if a government simply required registration 
or chartering of a cartel but left its management in corporate hands, they are included in the data 
set.  Beginning in 1918 in the United States and in most European countries in the interwar 
period, domestic producers were permitted to register and operate export cartels with no or 
minimal supervision; I consider these private cartels. Similarly, if a government-owned national 
monopoly or commodity association voluntarily joins an international cartel, that too may be a 
private cartel.  Thus, the mere fact that governments tolerated or turned a blind eye to cartels 
does not disqualify them from inclusion in the data set.  
 
  Because of this paper’s antitrust orientation, commodity agreements known to have been 
initiated, actively sponsored, or overtly protected by national sovereignty are not included.
68  In 
these cases the active involvement of governments are signaled by the signing of a treaty, 
government ownership of commodity stocks, or the appointment of civil servants to cartel-
management positions.  There are many fine studies of such agreements, but the inclusion of 
government-sponsored or -enforced cartels would tend to bias upward the overcharges in the 
sample (Suslow 2001).  In general I aim to follow procedures that yield conservative results.  
 
  Hard-core or “naked” cartels are those that made explicit agreements to control prices or 
limit quantities to be produced or sold.  Price agreements may cover list prices or transaction 
prices; the transactions prices may be floor prices, target prices, or, if a common sales agency is 
employed, actual transactions prices.  Prices may refer to sales of goods or services, procurement 
of inputs, or bids in auctions or tenders. Quantity restrictions most commonly involve fixed 
market shares for each participant, but may also include territorial exclusivity, customer 
                                                 
65 Criminal indictments for only hard-core cartels is a matter of custom, not law.  The 5 to 10% of U.S. DOJ 
horizontal or vertical conspiracy cases handled through civil indictments could be criminally actionable.  
66 Out of 56 antitrust regimes surveyed, 30% explicitly exempted export cartels and 59% are silent on them. There 
appears to be some movement in the United States and elsewhere to make export cartels illegal once again.  
67 Wallace and Edminster (1930: Appendix A) provide a convenient chronology of most government-sponsored 
export-control monopolies: the Japanese camphor monopoly of 1899, the Italian citric acid monopoly of 1910, the 
Greek currant monopoly of 1895, and the New Zealand kauri-gum monopoly of 1927 are examples of clearly public 
cartels. 
68  In some cases particularly in the early 1930s, the earlier phases of an international cartel were controlled by 
national producers’ organizations that negotiated voluntary quota reductions; when cheating threatened the 
effectiveness of the cartel, colonial or metropolitan governments stepped in to pass mandatory supply-control 
legislation.  The early phase of the cartel I deem private, but not the latter.   27
allocations, or production-capacity agreements. Cartels that focused exclusively on advertising, 
patent pooling, setting technical standards, R & D and the like are excluded. 
 
  The sources fall into two major categories:  published estimates contained in studies by 
economists, historians, or other serious students of the subject and decisions of judges, juries, or 
commissions in formal criminal or civil proceedings. 
 
Social Science Studies 
 
The first major source consists of books, monographs, reports, and refereed journal articles 
written by specialists in many fields: economists, historians, political scientists, lawyers, and in a 
few instances journalists
69.  Newer publications were located by using various bibliographic 
search engines, by noting the references cited by authors in the works themselves, and by 
searching on-line library catalogs.  These studies vary substantially in terms of depth and the 
degree of professional commitment to the study of cartels.  I examined a number of monograph-
length studies that took a cross-sectional approach.
70  There are also several books that study one 
cartel: for example, Eliott (1937) on nonferrous metals; Marlio (1947) on aluminum; Blair 
(1976) on oil; Taylor (1979) and Gray (1982) on uranium; and the most heavily studied cartel of 
all, heavy electrical equipment (Herling 1962, Smith 1963, Bane 1973, Sultan 1975, and Epstein 
and Newfarmer 1980).  Some economists and historians have spent substantial portions of their 
careers specialized in cartel analysis (Levenstein, Suslow, Barbezat, Griffin, Schroeter, and 
Connor, among others), but most of the publications quoted herein are by social scientists for 
whom cartels were just a passing interest.  Other sources of information include the Web pages 
of scores of antitrust agencies, lists of court and commission decisions, and multilateral 
organizations.    
 
  There are varying methods used to derive the effects of cartels on prices.  In economics, 
older studies tended to use a rather informal method of price analysis that now comes under the 
rubric of the “before-and-after method” (Connor 2004). That is, armed with knowledge of when 
overt collusion occurred, the author would compare prices during the affected period with prices 
before the cartel began or after it ended; in some cases, the basis of comparison would be a price 
war that erupted during the affected period.  The collusive prices could be figured two ways, 
either by averaging prices over the entire collusive period (preferably weighted by the quantities 
sold in each sub period, but often just a simple average of the available collusive price 
observations) or by choosing a single, peak price.  Averaging revealed how effective a cartel was 
in controlling prices throughout a conspiracy that normally varied in its degree of cohesiveness, 
whereas the peak price would reflect how close a cartel had come to achieving the theoretical 
                                                 
69 I have confined journalists’ accounts of cartels to book-length treatments of cartels, in the belief that such 
monographs are in-depth accounts of a cartel collected from many sources, some of them anonymous, over a period 
of time sufficient for the author to provide a balanced account of conflicting claims.  Books by journalists typically 
do not focus on the quantitative economic aspects of the case at hand, so in practice there are relatively few 
overcharges drawn from these sources in the present study.  I do not include overcharge estimates embedded in 
newspaper or magazine articles, though some specialists may judge such assertions to be sufficiently reliable to 
include in their published studies.  
70 Liefmann (1897) wrote one of the first; Jenks (1900) and Jones (1921) were early writers.  The interwar cartels 
received a great deal of attention from Pietrowsky (1933), Plummer (1934), Hexner (1946), Edwards (1946), Eckbo 
(1976), Suslow (2002), and the classic studies by Stocking and Watkins (1946, 1948); the post-World War II studies 
were more quantitative than their predecessors.  More modern studies include Heath (1963), Levy (1968), Maurer 
and Mirow (1982), Spar (1994), Lanzillotti (1996), Levenstein and Suslow (2002), and Connor (2001).       28
maximum, the monopoly price.  The base price was typically assumed to be the long-run 
competitive equilibrium benchmark price (now rather succinctly, if inelegantly, termed the “but-
for price”).  Although some were careful to take such factors into account, in many cases the 
possibility that shifts in demand or supply conditions could have caused the benchmark price 
during the affected period to depart systematically from the before or after price was ignored; 
moreover, the idea that price wars could generate unsustainably low prices was not often 
recognized.  Some economists of the time realized the importance of averaging before or after 
prices for periods long enough to eliminate the influence of transitory disturbances in markets, 
but others were satisfied to identify one month’s or one day’s price  as the but-for price.  
 
  A second way of calculating a benchmark price is the yardstick method. In this type of 
analysis, an economist would collect prices for analogous markets that were believed to be free 
from cartelization.  For a localized conspiracy, the competitive yardstick could be prices in a 
nearby city or an adjacent state with similar demand or cost conditions; the trend in cartel prices 
could then be compared to the trend in the yardstick during the collusive period. Yardstick price 
movements can also be constructed for a noncartelized product made in the same region that is 
made with the same inputs, utilizes a similar technology, and is consumed by the same 
customers.  If a cartel colludes against only some of its customers, then the discounts offered to 
other similarly situated customers could yield a yardstick.  Sometimes, the costs of production 
and the margins earned by firms in the relevant lines of business may provide collateral 
indicators of variations in the degree of competitiveness of a firm or market.  Both the before-
and-after and yardstick methods require expert judgments about the market in question, but both 
remain the leading methods used in courts of law or commission hearings to determine the fact 
of injury or the amount of damages.    
 
  Since the 1970s, the rigor and precision displayed in deriving estimates of cartel 
overcharges have made several advances. Driven by developments in oligopoly theory, statistical 
methods, and the increasing availability of detailed company and market data, increasingly it is 
econometric models of the alleged collusive market that are specified and fitted to the available 
data.
71   An essay by Werden (2004) traces the influence of modern oligopoly theory on forensic 
economic analysis of collusion. Werden considers modern oligopoly theory to be essentially 
equivalent to game theory, the most useful of which are models based on Cournot and Bertrand 
games.
72  Game theory has influenced contemporary concepts of collusion, the design of 
competition policies, and empirical modeling of oligopolies. Modern oligopoly theory has 
reinforced the importance of small numbers of buyers and sellers as explanations of collusive 
behavior; it has provided a rational basis for laws that prohibit agreements (“conscious common 
schemes”) between rival sellers and has given more precision to what constitutes tacit 
                                                 
71 These data are often proprietary facts revealed during the discovery phase of litigation or submitted to an antitrust 
authority under compulsory legal processes.  In addition to transaction prices of the defendants, production and 
marketing costs of details of business contracts may be handed over on a confidential basis. 
72 He notes that Cournot quantity-setting games appear to be different from Bertrand price-setting games.  Cournot 
models are typically thought to apply to homogeneous-product industries; Bertrand models are the basis of models 
that apply to markets with heterogeneous or differentiated goods and to auctions.  However, theorists have proven 
that under certain reasonable conditions (a two-stage decision process in which firms first choose to invest and later 
choose output or price levels, the firms have capacity constraints, and consumers with the greatest willingness to pay 
buy up the low-priced firm’s output first), the two models predict exactly the same equilibrium quantities and prices. 
Infinitely repeated games are not useful in forensic settings, if only because they generally fail to generate unique 
equilibria.     29
agreements and conscious parallelism
73; and it has overturned some previously influential 
concepts of collusion.
74   The game-theoretic idea of the prisoners’ dilemma has been the basis 
of highly effective leniency and amnesty programs for cartel participants.  Finally, game theory 
has been used to justify the shape of behavioral models that can be tested statistically.  
 
  In a sense, econometric modeling is an elaboration of the before-and-after method.  These 
models usually specify the demand and supply conditions in the relevant market, and then 
investigate through statistical tests whether and to what extent changes in prices or output fail to 
respond to normal, competitive market forces.
75  Because these models can simultaneously 
incorporate multitudinous factors, economists tend to regard overcharge estimates from such 
models as more credible than analyses that depend on more informal accounting for such factors.  
On the other hand, if a cartel operated during a span in which cost conditions (input prices, 
expansion of capacity, inventories, and technology) were steady and demand conditions 
(consumer preferences, disposable income, available substitutes, and the like) did not shift, then 
fancy econometric models and the more traditional methods will yield the same overcharges.  
For durable cartels, constancy of all these factors is unlikely. 
 
  In short, the economics literature on overcharges has evolved in many ways since the 
first cartel studies first appeared in the very late 19
th century.  This evolution might affect the 
way that readers regard the reliability of the overcharge estimates assembled for the present 
paper.  Therefore, this study tries to be careful to annotate the type of study, the method of 
analysis (if known), the data available to the author, and whether the estimate is an average one 
or a peak overcharge (see Appendix Table 1). Differences in overcharges may be related to 
method.  Moreover, alternative estimates are sometimes available for the same cartels; the 
differences will be analyzed. 
 
  Consistent with most previous studies of cartel effectiveness, each cartel episode is 
treated as a unique observation.  Most cartels are organized and fall apart only once; not 
counting brief disciplinary price wars, this describes one episode. However, many cartels are 
formed, disband, reform, and disband several times; each cycle is an episode. The reasons for 
analyzing episodes rather than one cartelized market over time are fairly straightforward.  Each 
time a new collusive episode begins, chances are that the methods and membership composition 
have changed; pauses between episodes are often quite lengthy.  Because the agreement and the 
players are different, a new cartel is launched.  
 
                                                 
73  Werden asserts that actionable collusion may be either spoken (classic overt communication) or unspoken 
(communications effected purely by means of marketplace actions).  “Tacit” collusion is an ambiguous term because 
it may refer either to unspoken agreements (e.g., the sudden, simultaneous adoption of basing-point pricing) or to 
conduct unrelated to any kind of agreement (e.g., barometric price leadership).  Similarly, developments in game 
theory have supported making illegal consciously parallel behavior if it is accompanied by certain “plus factors” (a 
close correspondence between meetings and bids; a pattern of close advanced price announcements; conduct that is 
multilaterally rational but unilaterally irrational; and certain facilitating practices such as detailed information 
sharing, bet-price policies, meeting-the-competition clauses, and basing-point pricing. 
74 Werden argues that Chamberlin’s small-numbers case, which predicts a “spontaneous” (tacit) shift to monopoly 
prices when the number of sellers contracts, is inconsistent with noncooperative oligopoly models that predict prices 
lower than monopoly.  
75 The most common econometric models insert a zero-one (“dummy”) independent variable to represent the price 
effect during alleged or stipulated conspiracy period.  An alternative model fits data exclusively to the pre-cartel (or 
post-cartel) period, and then employs the fitted equation to forecast (or backcast) the but-for prices during the 
conspiracy.   30
U.S. Antitrust Court Verdicts 
 
  In theory one should be able to determine how high cartels raise prices by a straight-
forward examination of a statistically significant sample of the many antitrust cases that involved 
cartels.  However, the amount that prices changed, or even whether prices were affected at all, is 
not relevant to the issue of whether a cartel violated the antitrust laws.
76 It therefore is 
unnecessary for the court in criminal antitrust cases to calculate the extent of any overcharges or 
undercharges.
77  In civil cases, however, the damages awarded to a successful plaintiff are equal 
to three times the overcharges,
78 so in these cases plaintiff must demonstrate how much prices 
increased or decreased due to the actions of the cartel. 
 
  The necessary research has proven to be extremely difficult to undertake, however, 
because almost every private antitrust suit for damages settles or is dismissed before an 
overcharge can be calculated by a neutral observer and made part of the public record of the 
case. As a consequence, final verdicts involving cartels where a judge or jury
79 calculated an 
overcharge are surprisingly rare. As an example of their scarcity, there apparently has never been 
even a single final verdict in a damages case involving indirect purchasers, even though this is a 




  The reasons for this high settlement rate are not completely clear.
81  One reason is 
because the litigation is so risky and expensive that settlement often is the most logical 
                                                 
76  See the discussion in Sullivan and Grimes (2000:165-233), which shows that in per se cases the plaintiff does not 
have to prove whether prices rose (or even whether defendants had market power). The issue of whether prices rose 
can be an element of a rule of reason case, but rule of reason cases do not give rise to criminal fines, so are not the 
subject of this paper. 
77  Normally the government simply relies upon the 10% overcharge presumption. On this basis the prosecutors and 
the defendants typically settle upon a criminal fine without calculating the actual overcharges involved. 
     The first time in which the federal government attempted to prove the size of cartel overcharges was in the 
sentencing phase of United States v. Andreas, in which defendants were convicted of conspiring to fix the price and 
allocate the sales of lysine.  The Department of Justice ("DOJ") recommended that the court apply the alternative 
sentencing provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d).  The court conditionally denied the defendants’ motion to reject the 
sentencing provisions, and granted the parties’ motion for an evidentiary hearing to present economic evidence 
regarding the gains or losses attributable to the conspiracy. 
     The DOJ retained the expert opinion of an economist, who based his estimate of the defendants’ gains on a 
hypothetical "but-for" price.  When the defendants requested more time to research and respond to the expert’s 
opinion, the court ordered DOJ to assist the defendants to obtain the necessary sales, price, and volume information 
from other lysine producers.  The court later opined that DOJ’s production of economic data was insufficient, and 
therefore granted the defendants’ motion to bar imposition of the alternative fine provision. 
78 15 U.S.C. Section 15 (Supp 1992).  The Statute also provides that successful plaintiff will recover reasonable 
attorney’s fees and expenses. 
79 Although there have been cases where its staff entered into agreements with defendants over the size of the illegal 
overcharges, I know of no cases where the Federal Trade Commission calculated the actual size of a cartel 
overcharge. 
80 See Lande (2004). For example, a reliable source reported that in recent years at least 137 antitrust cases alleging 
overcharges were filed against Microsoft alone, involving both Sherman Act Section 1 and Sherman Act Section 2 
allegations (Groner 2004). As of July 2004 almost all had been dismissed or settled, and there have been no final 
verdicts.  
81  Most civil cases of all types settle or are dismissed. I have no information as to whether cartel cases are more 
likely to settle or be dismissed than are other types of antitrust or non-antitrust cases. However, the fact that so few 
final cartel verdicts can be found suggests that it may be lower. Unfortunately, these settlements virtually always 
provide little useful public information. Bentson in Salop and White (1988: 318) notes that the most ambitious   31
alternative for both parties.
82 Rather than incurring substantial litigation expenses,
83 risking 
personal and corporate time, expenses, and disruption for clients,
84 and face an uncertain 
probability of an uncertain magnitude of gains (or a total loss
85), counsel for all parties often 
recommend and negotiate a compromise. 
 
  It might instead be useful to ask why some cartel cases do not settle. One possibility is 
that the non-settling cases are most likely to be those where the parties have different beliefs as 
to the likelihood of victory. Settlement is very difficult if plaintiffs are optimistic that they will 
prevail and the award will be large, while defendants believe the opposite. For this reason non-
settling cases might be those in which liability and damages are least susceptible to prediction, 
and in which the expected likelihood or magnitude of liability cannot be predicted with even a 
small amount of confidence.
86 
  
  Since most cartel cases settle, it might be desirable to survey settlements as one way of 
determining the size of the cartel overcharges.
87 However, settlement amounts are too frequently 
an extremely unreliable guide as to the size of the underlying cases’ overcharges. Settlements are 
by no means likely to be compromises for half of the overcharges.
88 A risk-averse plaintiff with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
empirical study of private antitrust cases yielded too little publicly available information on settlement amounts to 
justify analysis. 
82  This type of complex litigation that goes to final judgment has sometimes colloquially been termed a “mutual 
suicide pact” because of the ardor involved for all concerned. 
83 Salop and White (1988) calculated that attorneys’ fees average 30-50% of the overcharge amount. Elzinga and 
Wood (1988) calculate attorneys fees as being 58%-102% of the overcharge. 
84 The cost of this disruption to the affected firms can be tremendous. See the discussion in Lande (2004: 142-144) 
in which James T. Halverson was reported to have recommended “that a defendant take exhaustive discovery, 
particularly if it has an advantage over the plaintiff in terms of resources.  Halverson also suggested that any 
defendant show the plaintiff that it is not costless to sue. Thus a defendant should counterclaim. Halverson bluntly 
suggested that private plaintiffs look at their pocketbooks rather than the so-called “public interest,” so defendants 
should make plaintiffs worry about their pocketbooks.  He also suggested that if more than one private suit is filed, 
the defendant should get the weak suit to trial first....[after] the plaintiff’s board of directors has seen months of 
attorneys’ fees and corporate disruption, the plaintiff’s board will work in the defendant’s favor and nudge its 
lawyers toward a compromise.... In sum, he stated, settle strong cases and try the Iak cases, always while delaying 
the Government.”  
85 Both parties have a special incentive to settle cases that, if plaintiff prevails, would bankrupt defendant. 
 
86 Other factors could include lawyer or client stubbornness, irrationality or denial of the likely impending reality of 
the court’s verdict. Another possibility is the unethical resistance by counsel to accept a settlement that would be 
good for their clients but would generate fewer legal fees than litigation. This could be especially likely to occur in 
class action cases since class members cannot effectively supervise their attorneys. It also is possible that as a case 
develops, plaintiffs are more likely to settle to the extent they come to believe that its potential rewards are likely to 
be less than the expected payoff. However, since the costs of litigation are automatically recovered by prevailing 
plaintiffs (See 15 USC Section 15 (1992)) this factor is less important than in other fields.  
87  One might believe, for example, that a settlement represents the lower bound on the expected recovery if the case 
would go to trial (the present value of three times the overcharge plus attorneys’ fees) since a risk-neutral defendant 
would be unlikely to settle for the entire expected verdict. 
     One might also believe the supposed rule of thumb that good antitrust cases usually settle for single damages, 
perhaps on the dubious theory that the trebling (which produces a higher number) and the lack of prejudgment 
interest (which produces a lower number) would roughly usually cancel one another. I have no evidence as to 
whether this is the way that plaintiff and defendants, or their attorneys, typically behave. I have, however, heard 
trustworthy plaintiff and defendant attorneys tell us, anecdotally, they have settled cartel cases for single damages. 
88  If plaintiff and defendant each had, and knew that they had, a 50% chance of winning, then the settlement might 
Ill be for 50% of the present value of the automatically trebled overcharges. But this would not be true if plaintiff’s 
chance of prevailing was not 50%, if one party was a better bargainer, or if parties were unduly optimistic or   32
strong case might settle for very little if it needs the money quickly and consequently is in a 
weak bargaining position.
89 Conversely, a risk-averse defendant with a strong case might settle 
for what might seem like a overly generous amount to avoid even a small probability that an 
irrational judge or jury will award an amount large enough to cripple the company.
90 Legal 
writings are replete with such a wide variety of claims from both plaintiffs and defendants
91 as to 
settlement motivations that it appears that an analysis based upon average settlements would not 
be very meaningful.
92   
 
  Data collection aimed at obtaining the largest possible sample of verdicts in collusion 
cases, namely, final decisions in United States antitrust cases involving horizontal collusion, 
broadly defined to include bid rigging and related practices, where a judge, jury, or commission 
calculated the damages.
93  Three sources were explored: computer assisted searches of data 
bases,
94 reading through a large number of articles and treatises on cartels and on antitrust 
                                                                                                                                                             
pessimistic about their chances of prevailing. Suppose, for example, that difficult class action certification problems 
reduced plaintiffs' chances of winning to 25%. And, even if defendants really did raise prices by 30%, this often can 
be very difficult for plaintiff to prove.  If plaintiff only has a 25% chance of obtaining class certification and 
subsequently proving the damages, a settlement should be at far below the level of 50% of the discounted present 
value of three times the overcharges.  Moreover, publicly available settlements typically contain very little usable 
data.  Often they do not even include the size of the affected commerce, making the calculation of the overcharge 
percentage highly speculative.  
89  Plaintiffs’ counsel typically asserts that defense counsel are able to find barely ethical ways to delay meritorious 
claims for years. Since antitrust awards do not contain pre-judgment interest (15 USC Section 15), and plaintiffs 
often need the money in the short term, these delays harm plaintiffs’ bargaining position significantly. Plaintiffs’ 
counsel also asserts that defendants often are able to unreasonably prevent the necessary class certifications, and 
otherwise to make litigation so burdensome that plaintiffs have to settle for only a small fraction of the actual 
overcharges.  
90  There are many variations on this theme. Attorneys for defendants in cases that have settled for millions of 
dollars appear to believe, Ill after the cases were over and after there was any threat of further liability, that their 
clients never affected prices. Defendant attorneys often assert that their clients (who were found by a court to have 
agreed to fix prices) were prevented by market forces from affecting prices significantly.  However, rather than take 
the risk of having a judge or jury not believe them, they settle for a large sum. 
  Another factor that can make defendants want to settle even if they did not raise prices is the antitrust law’s 
joint-and-several-liability doctrine, which makes every member of a cartel liable for the overcharges of the entire 
cartel. See Denger, (2003: 10). This can lead to extremely large potential damages, and even a small risk of a huge 
payout can, from the defendant’s perspective, overshadow a weak liability case.  A defendant might be forced to 
settle for a significant amount even if it did not cause prices to be elevated. 
91 Interestingly, defendants sometimes assert that unscrupulous plaintiff attorneys often only have an interest in the 
size of their legal fees, rather then the amount they recover for their clients. If true, this gives rise to the possibility 
that plaintiff attorneys, especially in consumer class action cases, might settle for unduly low amounts solely to 
secure generous legal fees for themselves. The Courts are supposed to prevent this from happening, but judges 
sometimes are too busy to do so optimally. 
92 It may be possible, though difficult to derive insights from an analysis of settlements. One could imagine, for 
example, a study of settlements based upon candid interviews with participants. Anonymous questionnaires about 
past cases are another possible research method.   
93 I excluded cases that were overturned on appeal. 
94  Computerized searches were not, with only a few exceptions, particularly helpful. Most searches turned up 
hundreds of useless citations, including searches for "price fixing" or “bid rigging” and “verdict”, "amount of 
overcharge", "overcharge" and "percent", "auction" and "conspiracy" w/in "antitrust", "collusion" and "dollars" or 
"cents". I never was able to design a successful focused computerized case search.   33
damages, and messages to groups of knowledgeable antitrust professionals.
95  Every qualifying 
final collusion verdict is included.
96 
  
  One example will illustrate the difficulties of engaging in this type of research. United 
States v. Anderson
97 involved a conviction for bid rigging USAID contracts. The Circuit Court 
Opinion said that the winning bid on the wastewater treatment facility was $107,017,000, the 
engineers estimated the cost would be $60,000,000, and the defendant’s profit was $50,639,000. 
Thus, the illegal overcharge might have been 47%. The problem with using this figure is that the 
winning bidder certainly might have made some profit in a competitive market.
98  S o  4 7 %  
represents something like the maximum possible illegal overcharge. However, the Opinion also 
said that the winning bidder agreed to pay two co-conspirators $5.35 million and $2.2 million for 
bidding so high that they would not be awarded the contract.
99  This totals 7.1% of the contract 
price, and means that the overcharge must have been at least this much. Since the true 
overcharge probably was between 7.1% and 47%, I used 7.1% when computing the overall 
average. 
 
  The vast majority of the cases either settled or were dismissed.
100  This left a 
disappointingly small sample size to analyze.  However, I know of no reason to believe that the 
sample is biased in any particular direction. Moreover, the sample of 24 observations is roughly 
as large as the sample size of those in the prior surveys reported in Table 1. Nevertheless, this 
sample is disappointingly small compared to the number of social science observations. Due to 
its small size these results should be interpreted with caution.  They should be considered only as 
additional data worthy of analysis and discussion, not as definitive material. 
 
Decisions of Other Antitrust Authorities 
 
Table 1 summarizes 16 percentage overcharge estimates
101 of hard-core cartels that were 
reported to the OECD (2003) by nine antitrust authorities: U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the 
European Commission (EC), the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB), the 
German Bundeskartellampt (BKA), the Danish Competition Authority, the Norwegian 
                                                 
95  For example, inquiries were made on the antitrust listserves of the ABA Antitrust Section, the National 
Association of Attorneys’ General, and of the American Antitrust Institute. 
96 However, many of the verdicts that I did find were only expressed in dollar amounts which I was unable to 
translate into percentages, so I reluctantly had to omit these cases See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 
150 F.2d 877, 884, 327 US 251, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), Transnor  
(Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. North America Petroleum, 736 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), Phillips v. Crown Cent. 
Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (1979).  
97 326 F.3d 1319 (11
th Cir. 2003).  
98  Economists often define “cost” to include a normal rate of return or a normal profit, but I are unsure whether the 
Court was using the term this way. Moreover, in a competitive market risky construction projects sometimes make a 
considerable profit, but sometimes result in a loss.  
99 Id.  Defendant also agreed to give them other considerations, such as a $25 million subcontract, which probably 
had a substantial profit built into it, and the designation to win another contract. Id. 
 
100  I am indebted to dozens of colleagues who responded to appeals for information useful for this study. 
Nevertheless, I surely found only a minor share of final verdicts, and would be grateful if readers of this article 
could inform us of final verdicts that I inadvertently omitted.   
101 Four were judged to be peak estimates. Some other estimates were total damages that could not be converted to a 
rate.   34
Competition Authority, and the Spanish Competition Authority.  In the jurisdictions employing 
Common Law, most cartels are sanctioned after government negotiations that result in guilty 
pleas or by monetary settlements with private parties out of court.  When this is the method of 
resolution, the press releases practically never mention the degree of harm caused by the cartel.  
Very few cartels defend themselves in court, and very few of the trials publish decisions that 
reveal the overcharges. 
 
  In other legal systems, antitrust commissions hold confidential hearings to determine 
guilt and impose sanctions.  These decisions are announced in press releases that seldom mention 
the extent of cartel damages.
102  However, in some jurisdictions a detailed report is released a 
year or two after the decision, and some of these reports have prices that can yield useful 
overcharge information.
103 I read about 80 EC decisions that imposed fines on cartels (Burnside 
2003: Annex 1).  Additionally, commission decisions can be appealed to a court that renders a 
decision with a recitation of the facts of the case.  In this paper, the UK and EC decisions 
afforded enough data to make several estimates.   
   
 
                GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA 
104 
 
  The data analyzed in this paper are drawn from two major sources, published social-
science studies broadly defined and the decisions of courts and commissions entrusted with the 
enforcement of antitrust or consumer-protection laws.  With very few exceptions, I have 
attempted to report on every scholarly or serious social science study that contained quantitative 
information on the price effects of hard-core private cartels.
105  While no time limit was placed 
on the literature search, the majority of the sources consulted were written after 1945.
106 
 
  In general, I aimed at collecting the largest possible body of information on the subject, 
and tried to avoid applying some sort of quality screening.  In the vast majority of cases, the 
writers themselves provided the overcharge calculations.  In a small minority of cases, I made 
inferences from price data contained in the works; the bases for my inferences are briefly 
outlined in Appendix Table 2.
107 Few overcharge claims appearing in newspapers, magazines, 
and newsletters are included because such assertions are usually from anonymous sources who 
                                                 
102 Italy, the Netherlands, and Korea are exceptions to this rule; these overcharges are collected in Connor (2003). 
Moreover, these antitrust authorities and some others have reported a few of their decisions and overcharge 
estimates to the OECD (2003).    
103 The UK Monopolies Commission also operated in this fashion. 
104 The subsequent tables in this report are constructed from a spreadsheet that incorporates data collected as of  
April 4, 2004.  Appendix Tables 1 and 2 contain a few observations added after that date.  
105 See Appendix Table 5 for a list of excluded studies and the reason for their exclusion.  
106 Unless available in translation, I have mostly confined this survey to English language sources. Many antitrust 
authorities now translate their press releases and annual reports into English; moreover, members and some 
nonmembers submit summaries of their annual reports in English to the OECD.  The preponderance of sources 
published after 1945 is explained by the growth of the field of industrial-organization economics.  Although 
theoretical concepts of competition and monopoly go back at least to Adam Smith, the field is generally regarded as 
having developed a separate identity only in the 1930s.  The first textbook of industrial organization was published 
in 1958 (Bain 1958).  
107   If a credible study of a cartel concludes that it was “ineffective,” I have coded this comment as a zero price 
effect and included this observation in the averages.  Likewise, conclusions that the impact of collusion was 
“overwhelmed” by natural market forces are interpreted as a zero overcharge.  However, vague conclusions that a 
cartel episode was “effective” are not tabulated in the quantitative summaries.   35
may not be disinterested parties in an ongoing law suit or in some public policy debate, roles that 
may color their assertions.
108  In some cases, overcharge estimates may originate from articles in 
industry trade journals, but if they were cited by economists, historians, or legal scholars with 
some background in cartel studies, such estimates are reported in the present survey.  I did 
include estimates appearing in a few book-length cartel studies by journalists, public servants, or 
other professional writers of nonfiction. 
 
  Clearly this catholic approach to data-gathering will create concerns in the minds of 
many readers about the reliability and precision of the overcharges.  I agree that substantial 
variation in the quality of the price data, the methods used, degrees of judicial scrutiny, and the 
professional orientation of the sources will result in substantial variation in reliability as 
perceived by any individual. Economists may well give greater weight to writings by 
professionals in their own field than to opinions reached by judges, commissions, or juries, 
whereas legal scholars will often give greater credence to the latter. Legal professionals may 
have strong preferences for high court decisions over state or district courts, or they may have 
strong opinions about European versus American antitrust jurisprudence. Similarly, many 
economists might trust results published in refereed journals more than other publication outlets 
that receive less peer scrutiny, prefer modern quantitative methods to deep historical case 
studies, or express skepticism about the analyses of economists writing before the Age of Game 
Theory.  
 
  To contend with the disparate preferences of readers, I have chosen to cast my net 
widely, but look across the sources for evidence of systematic bias.  Indeed, the analysis of these 
data by source, time period, or method may provide useful insights in itself. I hope to provide the 
interested reader with enough information to make up his or her own mind about reliability. 
 
  The data are available in three levels of analysis: markets, episodes, and overcharge 
estimates. By “market” is meant the industry or product that was subject to price fixing. Markets 
are precisely self-identified by the participants in the conspiracy, though occasionally there are 
alternative names for the same market.
109  The name of the market is eponymous for the cartel.  
Episodes, discussed more fully below, are distinct periods of collusion separated by price wars, 
temporary lapses in agreements, or changes in cartel membership or methods.  Episodes may be 
adjacent in time or may be separated by significant gaps of time.
110 The markets marked by 
adjacent multiple episodes will typically be regarded by antitrust law as one infraction, but as 
economic phenomena as multiple cartels. Most of the analyses in this paper will use overcharges 
as the units of observation.  Each episode will in principle have one true “average” (episode-
long) overcharge and one “peak” overcharge.
111  However, because there are sometimes multiple 
publications about the same episode and because a single analyst will sometimes apply 
alternative methods of estimation, this paper often records several estimates for a single episode.  
 
                                                 
108  Some scholars may have relied on what they judged to be credible journalistic reports of overcharges.   
109 For example, the “nitrogen” cartel is in fact dry salts of nitrogen used as fertilizer, not the gaseous form. The 
hugely successful “vitamins” cartel is best regarded as a series of overlapping ventures, each of which focused on 
one of 15 or 16 products.   
110 Episodes are in principle different from phases of cartels that give rise cartels instability.  Episodes mark changes 
in cartel organization, whereas stability is measured by changes in the degree of cartel discipline or cohesiveness.  
111 In the rare instances where a cartel kept the market price absolutely constant for the whole episode, the two 
overcharge concepts will be the same number.   36
Markets 
 
Publications from economists, historians, and related sources yielded useful overcharge or 
undercharge information on cartels that operated in 262 markets (Table 2).  If one group of 
sellers decided to fix prices in one geographical region and another group colluded on the same 
product in a separate geographical region, these will be viewed as two markets.  Of the 262 
markets, 35% were cartelized by international agreements, where “international” describes the 
membership composition of the cartel and not necessarily the geographic spread of the cartel’s 
effects.  Some international cartels affected directly the commerce of only one nation, though the 
vast majority was international in both senses.  National cartels account for the remaining 65% 
of the cartelized markets
112.  In this category I count some purely national cartels that were 
formed for the sole purpose of controlling a nation’s export sales; in the United States, these are 
called Webb-Pomerene Associations.  In addition, some domestic cartels had agreements with 
international cartels that often protected their domestic market from exports from the 
international cartel’s members. 
 
 
Table 2.  Number of Cartel Markets, by Type  
 
Type                                     Number             Percent 
 
International membership                                     91                         34.7 
National or regional                                               171      65.3 
 
Bid-rigging schemes                                       81      30.9 
Classic cartels                                      181      69.1 
 
Cartel found guilty or liable                                               177      67.6 
Currently under investigation (presumed “illegal”)              6        2.3 
Known to have been operating legally                       65      24.8 
No record of sanctions (presumed “legal”)                        27                          10.3 
 
Total                                        262    100.0 
 
Source:  Appendix Table 1 (version of 4/4/2005) 
 
  Almost one-third of the sample consists of markets affected by bid-rigging cartels.
113  
Although most cartels have some sales to government entities or industrial customers that 
purchase by tenders, these cartels are explicitly indicated by the authors to have substantially or 
exclusively engaged in bid rigging. This proportion is certainly an underestimate because the 
sources did not always provide enough detail on the cartels to be certain of the degree of bid 
rigging.  It is widely believed that bid rigging leads to higher overcharges than otherwise 
                                                 
112 A few markets were cartelized by both types; typically, a domestic cartel was expanded to respond to foreign 
competition.  The potash cartel is one example; originally German, it became international shortly after World War I 
because after potash mines in Lorraine became part of France a joint Franco-German scheme was established.  
113 In Europe, bid rigging is generally referred to as collusion involving “tenders.”     37
identical conspiracies.  The remaining 69% of the cartelized markets may be called “classic” 
cartels, those that set market selling prices and/or market quotas for each or its members
114.   
 
  Two-thirds of the cartelize markets were found to be in violation of antitrust laws by at 
least one legal body.
115  The determination of guilt or liability may take the form of guilty pleas 
(or nolo contendere in U.S. courts up until the 1960s), of a decision at trial by judge or jury, of a 
commission decision to impose fines or other sanctions, of the payments of civil penalties, or of 
negotiated settlements by defendants in a suit. The remaining 39% of the cartelized markets are 
known or believed to be legal or extra-legal, mostly because they operated prior to the enactment 
of antitrust laws in the jurisdictions in which they functioned. Other legal cartels were organized 
and registered under antitrust exemptions, such as export cartels or ocean shipping conferences. 
 
  In some cartelized markets there are multiple overcharge estimates. There are more 
estimates than cartelized markets for two reasons. First, about half of the markets experienced 
multiple phases or “episodes” for which the price effects differed.
116  The sources have 
distinguished a total of at least 623 episodes (Table 3).  This term, which might better be called 
an observational time period, requires some explanation. Second, for many episodes multiple 
studies are available. The same episode may have studies of price effects by multiple authors or 




  If a cartel had more than one episode, then each episode is marked by changes in 
membership composition, the terms of the collusive agreement, method of management, 
geographic focus, or other major change. In other words, when a cartel is re-formed, it enters a 
new phase. Between episodes, pricing discipline often breaks down; in some of the earlier cartels 
the interregnum is a period of contract renegotiation  The European-based interwar aluminum 
cartel (number 18 in Appendix table 1), for example, went through six distinct phases that 
sometimes were adjacent in time and sometimes were several years apart. This heavily 
researched cartel has 28 overcharge observations.   
 
  One study from which I obtained a dozen observations summarized the results of 109 
price-fixing convictions in the fluid milk markets of the Southeastern United States within a few 
years (Lanzillotti 1996). One may count each conviction as an episode.
117 If one prefers to count 
the Lanzillotti summary and two other group studies as a three episodes, then the total becomes 
420. However, some studies that I count as one episode incorporate multiple temporal phases 
(e.g., Ellison’s study of the Joint Executive Committee). Thus, there are reasons to believe that 
the number of episodes is an undercount.  
                                                 
114 Only a couple of cartels were oligopsonies. 
115 Counted in this category are criminal convictions; adverse decisions of the UK Monopolies Commission, which 
made recommendations to the government similar to consent decrees; adverse decisions of the European 
Commission, Parliamentary investigations, and similar civil authorities; and those cartels that paid court-approved 
damages.  Also a few unfinished probes by antitrust authorities are placed in this category.  
116 These episodes are identified in Appendix Table 1 by capital letters following the code numbers that I have 
arbitrarily assigned for each cartel.  Single-episode cartels have numeric coding only.  The cartels with multiple 
episodes have the time spans of the episodes identified by the studies’ authors. 
117 However, I was able to extract only eight of these episodes’ price effects, plus one overall estimate, from this 
source. One other study of UK national cartels provided a summary mark-up estimate for 40 cartels. Otherwise, all 





Table 3. Number of Cartel Episodes, by Type 
 
 
Type                                                                                                           Number            Percent 
 
International Membership                                   151                  36.0 
National          269   64.0 
 
Bid  rigging  schemes         115   27.4 
Classic  cartels          305   72.6 
 
Cartel found guilty or liable 
a       283   67.4 
No  record  of  sanctions           88   21.9 
Under  investigation  2003-04            49   11.7 
 
Total                              420 
b            100.0 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Appendix Table 1 (version of 10/14/04). 
a Episodes that were sanctioned by a court or commission or through a settlement. 
b Counts three “group” observations of 206 cartels (numbers 15, 38, and 55) as single episodes. 
 
  In general the distribution of episodes across types of cartels (Table 3) is quite similar to 





Two kinds of cartel mark-up data are available.  First, researchers usually report the average 
price increases over the whole episode (Table 4).  This is the measure most relevant for forensic 
purposes and is the one that will be the focus of most analyses in this paper. I have collected 699 
of these estimates.
118  In some cases, the averages are carefully weighted by the sales in each 
year or month of the episode, but in most cases the authors give equal weights to the price 
changes in each sub period during the total affected period.  Sometimes it is not clear from the 
source whether the averages are weighted or unweighted; if the conspiracy period is marked by 
steady slow market growth, it matters little which is reported. In other cases, an author gives an 
overcharge for a representative sub period of an episode. In the case of international cartels, 
estimates may be available for multiple regions or currency units during an episode.   
 
  Some of the overcharge estimates are said to be minimum estimates, and these are shown 
in the “Average” column of Appendix Table 2 with “+” signs.  To be conservative, all such 
minimum estimates are counted as averages. Some averages are given as ranges, and I have 
                                                 
118 There are 795 estimates of either 699 average overcharges, 234 peak overcharges, or both.  Of the 795, 88% 
report average mark-ups, 29% report peak mark-ups, and 17% have both types of estimates.  Adding both types of 
estimates brings the total to 933.    39




Table 4.  Number of Average Overcharge Observations, by Type of Cartel  
 
Type Number  Percent 
International membership  362  53.0 
National or regional  337  47.0 
    
Bid-rigging schemes  141  20.0 
Classic cartels  558  80.0 
    
Cartels found guilty or liable 
a 447  63.6 
No record of sanctions (“legal”)  252  36.4 
    
Total              699  100.0 
 
Source:  Appendix Table 1 (spreadsheet dated 4/4/2005). 




  Second, 234, one-fourth of the 933 overcharge figures that were assembled, are peak 
price effects.   In some cases the peak price was reached for only one day during a cartel period 
of several years; more typically, the peak is the highest one of several years. Peak price changes 
indicate the potential for maximum harm when a cartel is at its most disciplined. Classifying a 
particular estimate as an average or peak figure was usually straightforward, but in a minority of 
cases it required judgment.  If the original source is unclear about which type of estimate is being 
presented, in order to be conservative I have assumed it is a maximum.  I report the peak 
estimates separately from the average estimates.  
 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES: RESULTS 
 
 
Number of Overcharge Observations 
 
The number of average overcharge estimates is shown in Table 5 arranged by the cartel 
episode’s end year and three types.  To summarize the main types, there are total of 845 useful 
estimates of overcharges
119 and undercharges drawn from nearly 200 publications.
120  T h e  
overcharges refer to at least 674 episodes of cartels that were organized in 237 separate markets.  
Of these 237 markets, 37% were characterized by international agreements (of which 5% were 
                                                 
119 As explained in more detail below, 699 of the overcharges are “average” or long-run mark-ups, while the 
remaining 187 estimates are “peak” or short-run price effects.  I analyze the former more often than the latter. 
120 The same estimates sometimes appear in multiple publications.  Here I count only the total number of books, 
articles, and reports that contain one or more original estimates.  The very few undercharges are entered as positive 
numbers.   40
from intra-EU cartels), while the remaining 63% were national in membership.  About one-fifth 
of the markets were affected by bid-rigging schemes.  Finally, roughly 64% of the cartels were 
found guilty or liable for penalties by a court or commission. 
 
  The six periods distinguished in this and subsequent tables were selected to represent 
increasingly more effective antitrust regimes in the United States and abroad.
121  In addition, the 
periods correspond roughly to the major changes in the relationship of antitrust jurisprudence to 
economics Kovacic and Shapiro (2000).  The era up to 1890 is an obvious choice because of the 
enactment of the Sherman Act in the United States and the 1889 Anti-Combines Act in 
Canada.
122  During the early decades of the 20
th century, numerous U.S. court decisions made the 
scope and power of the U.S. anticartel law apparent to lawyers, enforcement officials, and 
business persons (Wells 2002).  By and large, economists and other social scientists stood on the 
sidelines of antitrust-law developments before the 1920s.
123  The year 1919 is chosen as a break 
point because it represents the end of a period of U.S. antitrust activism and, because of World 
War I, a date by which nearly all international cartels, many of them with U.S. corporate 
members, had ceased operating.  Many of the prewar cartels were re-established after 1919, but 
in the majority of instances without the active participation of U.S. firms in price- or quota-
setting. The years 1945-1946 are another logical break point. Again during 1939-1945, nearly all 
of the interwar international cartels were disbanded. Scores of U.S. criminal prosecutions of 
international cartels during 1940-1945 clarified the illegality of many more subtle forms of cartel 
participation, such as patent pools and cross-licensing of technologies.  The pace of social-
science publications on cartels quickened. 
 
  The post-World War II era is characterized by the emergence of industrial-organization 
as a separate discipline within economics, of rapid advances in empirical methods of analysis, 
and of the adoption of effective anticartel laws outside of North America.  Kovacic and Shapiro 
(2000) note that by the 1940s “…there was considerable consistency between judicial decisions 
and economic thinking…” (pp. 51-52).  Moreover, the vast expansion of higher education in 
North America and Europe brought about a parallel expansion of the economics profession as a 
whole and, consequently, an acceleration in the total resources devoted to theoretical modeling 
(particularly after 1980) and related empirical testing on collusion.
124  Beginning in the 1960s, 
economists in North America began to work more closely with prosecutors and the private bar in 
antitrust cases, and many of them began to analyze and write about those activities.  This is a 
major factor responsible for the fact that nearly 80% of the estimates of “national” cartels (most 
of them prosecuted in North America) are drawn from the post-1945 time period.  
 
  The post-war era is divided into three sub periods.  The transition years 1945-1973 
correspond with three relevant changes in anticartel enforcement.  First, the antitrust idea became 
firmly implanted in the laws of countries outside North America for the first time: Germany and 
Japan in 1947, the United Kingdom in 1956, and the European Economic Communities (EEC) in 
                                                 
121 They are also convenient to chart changes in the historical views toward cartels or in methods of analysis. 
122 There were written laws against price-fixing in ancient times (Assyria, for example), in 15
th century England, and 
in revolutionary France. None is known to have been effective against private hard-core cartels.    
123 The first time the Supreme Court took notice of economists was in the 1925 Maple Flooring decision (Kovacic 
and Shapiro 2000:47). 
124 Even in recent decades, however, there is a notable absence of empirical publications by European economists 
working out of European research institutions.  Obviously, there are many European analysts, most lawyers by 
training, located in EU and national antitrust authorities’ bureaucracies and performing cartel studies, but few of 
them publish outside of their governments’ official organs.   41
1958. Second, the European Commission (EC), the administrative arm of the EEC, after a 
decade of registering cartels, successfully prosecuted its first cartel in 1969.  Third, U.S. price-
fixing enforcement penalties became significantly more severe at the end of this period. 
 
Table 5. Number of Average Overcharge Observations by Year and Type 
 








b  “Legal”  Primary 
Conduct 
Classic 
Cartel   
                                                       Number 
           
1770-1890  56  6  25  27 4 58  62 
            
1891-1919  67  38  38  67 10 95  105 
            
1920-1945  9 130  43  96  1  138  139 
            
1946-1973  72  21  (6 EU)  67  26  39  54  93 
            
1974-1990  66  21  (9 EU)  76  11  47  40  87 
            
1991-2004  67  146 (18 EU)  198  15  40  173  213 
            
Total  237  262 (33 EU)  447  252  141  558  699 
Source:  Appendix Tables 1 and 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/25/2005) 
a   The companies in the cartel were headquartered in two or more countries.  EU indicates cartels that 
operated in two or more Member States after 1958. 
b  One or more members of the cartels pleaded guilty, were fined or otherwise sanctioned by an antirust 
authority or a parliamentary committee, agreed to payments to settle a private antitrust suit, or (in a very 
few cases) were in 2003 currently under price-fixing investigation by a government agency.  
c The earliest cartel is the Newcastle Vend, an English coal cartel that was formed in 1699 and first 
collapsed in 1770.  Although highly unstable, it persisted until 1845.  
  
 
  Beginning around 1961, the DOJ began seeking guilty pleas from most price-fixing 
defendants, rather than allowing them to plea nolo contendere, which eased the burden of proof 
for plaintiffs in civil treble-damage suits.  Private federal antitrust suits peaked in 1962 as a 
result of the huge electrical-equipment conspiracy (White 1998: Table 1.1). The number of 
private cases per year was five times higher in the mid 1960s than the number in the 1940s, and 
in the 1970s the number tripled from the level in the mid 1960s (ibid.).  Class action suits 
became far more common by the mid 1970s because of changes in federal court rules, a change 
that permitted plaintiffs to attract better lawyers and economic expertise.  
    42
  Another milestone in U.S. anticartel legislation was the 1974 law that made price fixing a 
felony, thereby lengthening maximum individual prison sentences and strengthening the 
bargaining power of the DOJ.  Although the prosecution of price-fixing of relatively 
inconsequential domestic conspiracies was at a high level in 1974-1990, the DOJ did not give a 
high priority to investigating international cartels, nor did it have any success in the courtroom in 
the few international cases it did pursue (Connor 2001a). Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) identify 
1973-1991 as the years during which the Chicago School of economics had its greatest influence 
on antitrust law and enforcement. 
 
  By 1990 all the present criminal sanctions available to the U.S. government were in 
place. In 1990, penalties for corporations rose from $1 million to $10 million
125. Moreover, in 
the early 1990s, the DOJ had in place three devices that improved detection and prosecution of 
cartels: the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for corporations (1989), the automatic amnesty policy for 
corporate whistle-blowers meeting certain criteria (1993), and a demonstrated ability since 1994 
to impose fines above the $10-million statutory cap by means of an alternative sentencing 
provision. These devices were in some cases adopted by the EU and other antitrust authorities, 
which significantly improved the investigation and prosecution of international cartels.  After 
1990 the influence of the Chicago School of Economics waned. 
 
  Several features of the data set are apparent in Table 5.  The number of observations per 
year averages 3.0, but has generally grown over time.  The primary factor that explains the trend 
is the growth in the number international cartels with usable data.
126   Up until 1890 when price-
fixing was legal everywhere in the world, only one estimate is available about every six months 
on average.  After 1890 the number of overcharge estimates found exceeded 3.4 per year in each 
of the five eras, with a peak of 16.4 per year in 1991-2004. 
 
  The first cartel for which price effects can be found is the Coal Gild of northeastern 
England (also known as the “Newcastle Vend”), which made its first collusive agreement in 
1699. This cartel was the longest-lasting cartel found: 145 years.  However, it was also quite 
unstable, with at least a dozen episodes separated by price wars.  This cartel depended on coastal 
shipping for its cost advantage to the London market; it was destroyed in 1845 when railroads 
lowered the cost of shipping coal from the Midlands.  
 
  There were large numbers of cartels extant in the late 19th century; but the small size of 
the fledgling economics profession, a literary approach to writing in economics, and inevitable 
destruction of most business records over time doubtless accounts for the fewness of quantitative 
overcharge observations for 19
th century cartels. During this early period, the vast majority of 
price effects are reported for domestic cartels operating in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany.  
 
  From 1891 to 1945 most of these data are drawn from studies of international cartels. The 
proportion of international schemes is especially high during the interwar period and after 1990 
and especially low during 1946-1990.  It is likely that there were more domestic cartels operating 
legally in Europe in the early 20
th century than there were international cartels, but the latter 
                                                 
125 Raised to $100 million in April 2004; maximum prison sentences rose from 3 to 10 years. 
126 Although there is a dip in 1946-1990, the correlation between the number of grouped observations per year and a 
linear time trend is r = +0.80.   43
were given more publicity because they appeared to be novel forms of business organization.
127  
The increasing awareness of the illegality of price fixing in the United States may also account 
for the absence internal records of domestic cartels in the United States after 1890.  Moreover, 
because the penalties were so low (a maximum of $5000 per count), relatively few court 
decisions bothered to give details about sales or prices during the conspiracy.  Private suits, 
where such data is essential to determining damages, were relatively few in the United States 
until the early 1960s but grew rapidly through the late 1970s (White 1988:Table 1.1). 
 
  During 1891-1919, there are 3.8 price observations per year; the rate rises to about 5.6 
per year in the interwar period.  More data are available for international cartels during 1891-
1945 than for cartels composed of companies from a single nation.  About 75% of the 
observations are drawn from international cartels.  One reason is the international cartels mostly 
were based in Europe, where they operated with legal impunity.
128  Many of the interwar 
international cartels were organized as federations of national cartels and were aimed primarily 
at controlling export sales.
129  As nearly all of them were believed by their members to be legal 
at the time, their activities often were openly reported by the business press.
130  Members of 
these cartels did not attempt to hide their activities; indeed they often publicized their operations, 
particularly if they achieved putatively efficiency-enhancing industry rationalization, protected 
national markets, increased national employment during stressful economic times, or achieved 
increases in price stability.  During this period, many countries passed legislation specifically 
authorizing cartels that controlled national exports, even if that meant agreements on prices in 
various overseas markets.  In a few cases, including the United States, these cartels were used as 
covers for domestic price-fixing. 
 
   In the early and mid 1940s, many of the interwar cartels were investigated by the U.S. 
Congress, indicted by the DOJ, and sued by private parties. Combined with the expanding size of 
the economics profession and the growing interest of economists in imperfect competition, the 
transparency of non-U.S. cartels led to a large number of empirical cartel studies.  For 50 years 
after the end of World War II, the number of known international cartels declined markedly.  
Perhaps because of the aggressive prosecution of cartels by the DOJ in the early 1940s, it 
appears that international cartels were by and large driven underground after 1945.  Few 
international cartels were discovered or prosecuted until the early 1990s -- less than one 
international cartel episode every two years.   
 
                                                 
127 I know that when the UK, Germany, and the EEC began requiring registration of cartels in the 1950s, hundreds 
came forth in each jurisdiction. 
128 That is, they had freedom to set prices. In Weimar Germany for a few years after 1923, cartels were regulated.  In 
a few European countries, cartels were required to register with the government. 
129 I do not include national cartels that were fostered by governments (some governments even compelled all the 
companies in an industry to join) in this data set; likewise, I exclude many international commodity-stabilization 
schemes that were regulated by government ministries under parliamentary laws or came about because of a 
multilateral treaty.  The second tea cartel in the 1930s, which was authorized by several parliaments of the British 
Empire and regulated by the Colonial Office, is one example.  However, I do include a few international cartels with 
one or more members consisting in part of government-appointed committee members, government-owned 
corporations, or government-sanctioned national cartels, if they were formed by a voluntary agreement among the 
members.  An example is the sugar cartel in the late 1930s.  Many of the European export cartels also created 
national monopolies for their members.   
130 U.S. companies apparently believed that patent pooling with foreign firms was legal; others joined cartels 
indirectly through controlled overseas subsidiaries.  These and other subterfuges were judged illegal by U.S. courts.   44
  Several explanations have been offered for the hiatus in international cartel formation in 
the decades following the War.  The destructiveness of World War II left the United States with 
as much as 65% of world industrial capacity in the late 1940s.  As a result, manufacturers in 
Europe and Japan were oriented mainly toward rebuilding their domestic markets; not only were 
few industrial partners available for international agreements, it seems that U.S. firms were less 
prone to form cartels than firms from countries with no or weaker antitrust cultures.  In the 1950s 
and accelerating in subsequent decades, U.S. firms embarked on a period of rapid foreign direct 
investment as the preferred means of entering overseas markets; leading European and Asian 
firms adopted this strategy increasingly after the late 1960s. Until the early 1980s, most United 
States markets were subjected to little import competition, but by the 1990s imports were 
exerting a powerful influence on price competition across a wide spectrum of commodity 
markets.  Most international cartels have arisen only in industries with internationally traded 
merchandise and populated by multinational corporations with strong leading positions.  For all 
these reasons and probably several others as yet unknown, international-cartel formation was 
seemingly at an historically low level until the 1980s.  The large number of overcharges 
available for the data set after 1990 is attributed to the launching of an historically high number 
of international cartels since the early 1980s; most of these cartels could not have been 
contemplated without the direct participation or passive cooperation of leading U.S. companies 
that still tend to be among the leaders in most markets with internationally traded goods.  The 
number of overcharge observations exceeds 16 per year, which is triple the rate of the interwar 
period. 
 
  A second important trend is that most cartel data now arise from prosecuted cartels.  Prior 
to 1946, less than 35% of the observations refer to cartels known to have been prosecuted.  Until 
the mid 1940s, U.S. anticartel sanctions were weak by today’s standards. From around the turn 
of the 19
th century American businesspersons became increasingly aware of the legal dangers of 
overt collusion in the domestic market. However, until the early 1970s national and international 
cartels comprised of European companies could form cartels subject only to registration 
requirements in most European countries (and the EEC after 1960).
131 The European 
Commission began imposing fines on unregistered cartels that affected EEC trade beginning in 
1969 (Harding and Joshua 2003:121).  During 1974-1990, U.S. corporate sanctions on cartels 
became significantly harsher, and the European Union’s prosecutions moved in the same 
direction (Connor 2003).  Both jurisdictions imposed historically unprecedented penalties on 
international cartels beginning in the late 1990s. After 1990, virtually all the observed cartels in 
the sample were studied after they were prosecuted or fined by one or more antitrust authority.  
This pattern does not necessarily mean that the probability of discovery by prosecuting bodies 
has gone up, but it probably does represent a heightened aggressiveness in anticartel enforcement 
as well as a shift in research methods by social scientists.
132 
 
  A third trend manifest in Table 5 is the prominence of estimates derived from bid-rigging 
conspiracies since 1945.  From few recorded examples prior to 1946, in the post-War era almost 
half of all the overcharge observations in the sample were primarily bid-rigging conspiracies.  
The large majority of national cartels, most of them local milk or construction conspiracies in the 
                                                 
131 Export cartels that in theory did not affect the jurisdiction’s commerce were permitted in the United States from 
1918 and in most other nations throughout the 20
th century. 
132 In the last decade, announcements of probes, guilty pleas, and fines on cartelists are more and more to be found 
in convenient internet sites and through internet search engines than formerly. 
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United States, rigged bids.  The immediate victims of most bid-rigging conspiracies were 
governments.  Relatively few international cartels rely primarily on rigging auctions or tenders 
for public projects. What may seem like a surge in this practice may in fact be a reflection of 
changes in data availability.  Most of the articles on bid rigging have drawn on public records of 
state or federal agencies that have been the objects of these conspiracies. It is possible that the 
increase in bid-rigging cases seen in the data is simply due to the advent of open-records laws at 
the state and municipal levels similar to the federal Freedom of Information Act. 
  
 
Table 5A. Number of Zero Average Overcharge Observations by Year and Type 
  
Membership  Legal Status  Bid Rigging 









Conduct  Other 
                                               Number 
            
Before 1891  8 2  4  6  0  10 
            
1891 - 1919  4 2  1  5  0  6 
            
1920 - 1945  0 15  1  14  0  15 
            
1946 - 1973  7 1  5  3  3  5 
            
1974 - 1990  1 2  3  0  0  3 
            
1991 - 2003  1 0  0  1  0  1 
            
Total  21 22  15  28  3  40 
Source: Appendix Tables 1 and 2 (spreadsheet dated 10-23-04). 
a   Cartels with corporate members from two or more countries.  Those with all members from the EU shown 
separately. 
b At least one member of the cartel pleaded guilty, was found guilty at trial, paid civil  antitrust fines, or made a 




Table 5A displays the number of observations of overcharge observations for what will 
be termed “unsuccessful” cartels – those with zero average overcharges.  These zero-effect 
estimates will be eliminated from some of the analyses below.  About 6% of the average-
overcharge data collected indicate that a cartel episode was unsuccessful in controlling prices, 
but the proportion of all average estimates that are zero declines over time.  Studies of allegedly 
unsuccessful cartels were published almost entirely prior to 1945.  Fewer than 1% of the most   46
recent cartels are judged to be unsuccessful. It appears that the skepticism of earlier analysts 
about the power of cartels has nearly disappeared in the last 50 years or so.   
 
Trends in Average Overcharges over Time 
 
Table 6 displays the medians of all average overcharges reported, distinguished by the 
same time periods and types shown in Table 5.  Table 6A repeats Table 6 but eliminates the 
episodes with zero price effects; nearly all of the zero observations come from classic cartels that 
ended before 1973 and from studies written before that time.  Median percentages are displayed 
because nearly all the cells contain positively skewed prices.  That is, a few very high 
overcharges in any particular category tend to overwhelm the larger number of low-to-medium 
percentages when calculating the more common type of average, the mean.  Moreover, while 
there is no upper limit on overcharge estimates, they are not allowed to fall below zero.  In such 
situations the means are larger than the medians, and the median is a better representation of 
central tendency. 
 
  The median cartel overcharge for all types and time periods is 25.0%; for successful 
cartels it is 30.5%.  Perhaps surprisingly, cartels that ended before the Sherman Act was 
promulgated were not as a group highly successful in raising prices. The below-average 
overcharges observed in the first era may be explained by the preponderance of “national” 
cartels, most of them domestic in geographic scope.  International cartels did not become 




  Beginning in 1891 there is a strong downward trend in overcharges by international, 
sanctioned, and non-bid-rigging cartels, but there is a weaker downtrend for the other types.
134  
The downward time trends are similar but slightly stronger among the successful cartels (Table 
6A).  Mark-ups are above average for all types of cartels that were formed in the pre-modern era 
of antitrust (i.e., before about 1911 in the United States and before World War II in other parts of 
the world).  In the period after 1990 when anticartel sanctions were the highest, the overcharges 
of discovered cartels are below the all-period averages for each type.  The distinct decline in 
average overcharges of cartels that ended after 1990 is most evident among international 
cartels.
135  Somewhat surprisingly, it appears that the interwar cartels, nearly all of them 
Eurocentric international legal agreements, attained only slightly higher than average levels of 
price effectiveness.  Perhaps the steadiest overcharges may be seen in the column of legal cartels 




                                                 
133  In Appendix table 2 see the first episodes of the zinc cartel (number 68), copper (22), and gem diamonds (71).  
134 The correlation of median overcharges of all cartels to a linear time trend of the grouped data in table 6 is             
r = -0.47; for international cartels, the correlation is r = -0.72; similarly, among cartels found guilty, the coefficient is 
r = -0.81; and for the “classic” cartels r = -0.61. These trends are confirmed in a more formal analysis (Connor and 
Bolotova 2005). 
135 It is rather odd that the notable surge in discovered international cartels after 1990 came at a time when the profit 
incentives for cartel formation were at an historic low (Connor 2003).  Of course, if profits declined in the 1980s and 
1990s, it is possible that the percentage increase in expected cartel profits may have been at an historic high point. 
Uctum (1998) presents evidence of just such a decline in the USA, Canada, Germany, and Japan from the 1950s or 
1960s. 
136 This last observation should be ignored because there is only one legal cartel formed after 1990.   47
  
Table 6.  Median Average Overcharges, by Year and Type  
 
   Membership   Legal Status    Bid-Rigging  Cartel Episode  
End Date  National  Inter-
national 
Found 
Guilty  “Legal” Primary 
Conduct  Other 
All 
Types
                                            Median percent 
a 
1780-1890 21.0  40.5  16.0  24.4  16.0  22.4  22.1 
1891-1919 19.0  49.5  24.5  35.0  24.5  35.0  30.4 
1920-1945 27.0  36.9  44.0  31.6  44.0  31.6  35.0 
1946-1973 14.7  28.2  13.0  19.5  13.3  23.3  15.3 
1974-1990 19.8  40.8  23.0  26.7  23.0  37.0  25.0 
1991-2004 22.5  25.0  17.1  25.0  23.9  21.5  25.0 
              
ALL YEARS  19.3  31.6  18.9  27.0  23.8  29.5  25.0 
          
Source:   Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/27/2005). 
a Mean of the medians of the lower bound and the upper bound of ranges, where appropriate.  Includes zero 
estimates. See Table 5 for the numbers of observations in each cell.                                                                    
 
 
Table 6A.  Median Average Overcharges of Successful Cartels, by Year and Type 
  
  Median percent
 a 
1780 - 1890  24.5  50.8  16.2  28.4  22.0  28.7  26.5 
1891 - 1919  20.5 50.0 38.1  31.6  24.6  38.0  34.0 
1920 - 1945  27.0  40.7  34.0  40.0  44.5  37.5  39.5 
1946 - 1973  15.5  38.9  14.4  23.0  15.0  26.3  18.8 
1974 - 1990  20.8 41.5 23.0  28.5  25.0  37.0  25.0 
1991 - 2003  22.5 25.0 17.1  25.0
  24.0 21.5  25.0 
           
All  dates  21.0 34.0 19.0  29.1  24.0  31.0  30.5 
 
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 11-02-04).  Excludes zero overcharges. 
a Mean of the medians of the lower bound and the upper bound of ranges, where appropriate.   
b   Cell contains only one observation. See Tables 5 and  5A for numbers of observations. 





Membership  Legal Status  Bid Rigging  All 
Cartel  
Episode 
End Date  National  Interna-
tional 
Found 
Guilty   “Legal”  Primary 
Conduct  Other Types   48
  It is difficult to know what to make of the downward trends for some types of cartels. 
Globalization and shifts in international trade regimes do not seem to be likely explanations.  
Trade and investment were relatively unfettered prior to 1920 and after 1990. Trade restrictions 
were high in the 1930s. The pattern of median overcharges does not correspond to shifts in trade 
regimes.  
 
  Besides the possible influence of the spread of effective anticartel enforcement, several 
alternative hypotheses may be put forward.  Perhaps the application of more sophisticated 
quantitative methods by researchers in recent decades systematically yield lower estimates of 
price effects than the earlier studies that relied on simpler before-and-after comparisons.   
Industry mix could provide an explanation.  The sample drawn from the earlier periods tends to 
contain more minerals and metals conspiracies, whereas the later estimates have a higher 
proportion of chemical, construction, and services firms represented.  Perhaps expected profit 
rates in cartelized industries have declined as an effect of globalization, and those companies that 
join cartels are satisfied with smaller percentage increases from collusion.  Because the most 
recent periods contain a higher proportion of cartels that were caught by antitrust authorities, the 
more recent estimates may be drawn from a population of cartels that is relatively incompetent in 
hiding their activities; that incompetence could extend to the skills needed to negotiate relatively 
high selling prices. Similarly, the greater antitrust scrutiny in the United States from 1940 and 
from Europe since the 1960s could prompt cartelists to refrain from full monopoly pricing 
increases so as to reduce the chances of detection. Some of these hypotheses will be investigated 
below. 
 
Average Overcharges across Types 
 
  A second pattern that emerges in Tables 6 and 6A is that in every period since 1890 
international cartels have been more injurious than domestic (mostly U.S.-based) cartels. In 
general, international cartels are roughly 50% more effective in raising prices than “national” 
cartels (cartels that fixed prices in one country and export cartels comprised of firms from single 
countries).  Indeed, from 1891 to 1990, international cartels were about twice as effective as 
domestic ones (Table 6A).  This is not so surprising in the pre-World War II era because most 
international cartels were formed without concern about prosecution, and even in the interwar 
period U.S. companies may have believed that they had structured their participation in ways that 
would not run afoul the Sherman Act.  But the fact that the differences persisted in the postwar 
period is somewhat unexpected.  The clearly greater effectiveness demonstrated by international 
agreements may reflect a greater degree of freedom from threat of entry than for geographically 
more localized cartels.  International cartels in all eras tended to attract members that controlled 
the lion’s share of production in all the regions of the world with modern production facilities.  
Also, international cartels by their very nature deal with internationally tradable commodities, 
homogeneous producer intermediates with relatively low long-distance transportation costs.  
After 1990 the superior effectiveness of international cartels narrowed considerably. 
 
  A third pattern noted in Table 6 is the inferior price effects of bid-rigging cartels 
compared to conventional conspiracies that set selling prices or allocate market shares.  On 
average bid-rigging schemes displayed 20% lower overcharges, but this pattern is found in only 
four of the six periods.  Bid rigging cartels often were organized to exploit tenders for 
government public-works projects.  Relatively few international cartels engage in bid rigging, 
whereas bid rigging occurs mostly in national or local conspiracies, so the bid rigging/classic   49
distinction may be confounded with the geographic types just discussed above.  Nevertheless, 
this finding directly contradicts Cohen and Scheffman (1989), the prior beliefs of many 
economists, and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that impose higher penalties for bid rigging.  It 
also challenges a rationale of the U.S. Government’s policy shift in the 1980s that overtly 
targeted bid rigging against governments.  
 
  It is noteworthy that by far the lowest overcharges to be found in Tables 6 or 6A are 
those for national, guilty, and bid-rigging cartels that ended during 1945-1973.  Most of these 
conspiracies were discovered and prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice. It is reasonable 
to assume that many of these cases are the cartels that were analyzed by the DOJ’s staff prior to 
the DOJ’s making its guidelines’ recommendations to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.  An 
analysis of the 20 U.S. litigated bid-rigging cases that ended between 1956 and 1985 finds that 
the median overcharge was 13.3% and the mean 17.3%.
137 These averages are low by historical 
standards. Thus, the “10% overcharge assumption” embedded in the Guidelines was not so much 
wrong as short sighted.    
 
  Finally, it is worth noting that there are few unsuccessful cartels in the data set.  Only 
about 6% of the overcharges indicate that an analyst judged an episode to have produced no 
significant effect on market prices.  I do not wish to make too much of this result, because it may 
represent selection bias by the authors of the studies relied upon. Injurious cartels may be 
inherently more interesting or publishable than incompetent cartels.  
 
Distribution of Overcharges 
 
  Given the interest in the factual foundations of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines applied to 
cartel sanctions, it is logical to examine the size distribution of the estimates.  Table 7 classifies 
the average estimates into nine size categories.  Because the Guidelines are predicated on the 
assumption that the average cartel has a 10% overcharge, that break point is of special interest. 
 
Because of the interest in prosecutable cartels, the discussion of Table 7 will focus on the 
effective cartels (non-zero overcharges).  Perhaps the most striking result is that 63% of the 
cartel episodes have overcharges above 20%.
138  The mean overcharge of the 37% of the 
episodes in the two lowest size ranges (0.1 to 19.9) is 11.1%. These are the cartels imagined to 
be typical by the creators of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The 63% of the cartel episodes with 
overcharges of 20% or higher have a mean overcharge of 64.0%, more than five times the level 
assumed by the Guidelines’ authors.  If the Guidelines were truly designed to deter recidivism, 







                                                 
137 There were 24 observations (see Appendix table 2).  Looking at the same sort of cases ending in 1956-1965 
results in a 17.9% median and 21.2% mean. There were very few classic cartels prosecuted in the same period (only 
3); the median overcharge was 15% and the mean 19%. 
138 Note that from a legal perspective, each episode is an actionable offense.   50
 
Table 7. Mean Average Overcharges by Size Category 
 
                             Distribution of Observations  Percentage Range 
a 
Number of 
Observations  Mean Total  Non-Zero 
        Number                                      Percent 
      
Zero or less 
b  44  0 6 0 
      
0.1-9.9 101
c 6.6  15  16 
      
10.0-19.9 135  14.4  19  21 
      
20.0-39.9 203 
d 28.9  29  31 
      
40.0-59.9 101
e 47.9  16  17 
      
60.0-79.9 47  68.5  7  7 
      
80.0-99.9 12  89.5  2  2 
      
100.0-199.9 26  128.9  4  4 
      
200 or greater  19  422.2  3  3 
      
Total 699  42.1
f 100  100 
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/4/2005). 
a Overcharges of 10% or higher are rounded to the nearest whole number.  Midpoints of ranges.   
b Four negative numbers are converted to zero. 
c Four estimates of “weak cartels” are assumed to be 1% overcharges. 
d    71 are 25.0% or lower and 132 are 25% or higher. 
e Fifteen estimates of 50% are from Eckbo (1976). 

















So far only the “average” overcharges have been examined – those that refer to the mean price 
change over all or most of an episode.  Tables 8 and 9 explore the peak price effects attained by 
cartels – the maximum mark-ups observed for one week, one month, one quarter, or one year of 
an episode, depending on the price series available.
139 It is well known that oligopolistic 
arrangements typically generate price changes that fall short of what a pure monopolist in a 
blockaded market would set in order to obtain maximum profits.  Tacit collusion generally 
results in mark-ups above but closer to competitive levels than monopoly levels. While overt 
collusion may be somewhat more effective at raising prices ceteris paribus, information failures, 
potential competition, and cheating also typically result in sub-monopoly price effects.   Because 
the peak periods are generally too brief for significant changes in the structure of the industry to 
change, the observed peak overcharges are measures of the short-run market power exercised by 
cartels when the discipline of the members is at its most cohesive.
140  Thus, the peak price effects 
are instructive about the potential harm that cartels can cause when they are unfettered by 
coordination problems. 
 
  Table 8 shows the median peak overcharge over time and across types of cartels.   
Compared with the data available for the average overcharges in Table 5, these data are over-
weighted by observations taken from the interwar period. Approximately one-fourth of the 234 
observations available for Table 8 refer to interwar cartels, which have been well studied by 
economic historians who often had available public commodity-exchange prices.  Almost 30% 
of the observations on peak prices are for the period since 1991. 
 
  Like the average overcharges discussed above, there are some notable trends in peak 
effectiveness over time.  In all but one of the six periods international cartels achieved much 
higher peak overcharges than the cartels with members from only one nation; similarly, 
unsanctioned cartels displayed much higher peak price mark-ups than cartels that were legally 
punished; finally, price-fixing cartels demonstrated somewhat higher price effects than bid-
rigging schemes up to 1945, but the two types were about the same after 1945 (Table 8).   
Looking at the six columns of Table 8, the only significant temporal patterns are declines in peak 
overcharges by international cartels and the “legal” cartels.




                                                 
139 There is no need to examine effective cartels separately, because nearly all of the peak price effects are non-zero. 
140 Peak price changes may Ill be affected by short-run shifts in demand.  Exogenous, unanticipated shifts in demand 
may exaggerate the peak price changes.  However, in some cases these shifts are endogenous. Especially when a Ill 
financed cartel felt free to announce a new agreement that buyers perceived as likely to be effective, “panic buying” 
often ensued, which leveraged the purely collusive effect on prices. 
141 The simple correlation coefficients over time for the grouped international-cartel overcharges are -0.57 (1891-








Table 9. Peak/Average Ratios of Cartel Overcharges, by Year and Type 
Membership  Legal Status  Bid Rigging 
Cartel Episode 
End Date  National International Found 
Guilty  Legal  Primary 
Conduct  Other 
   Ratio of Medians 
a 
1770 - 1890  1.25  2.58  1.16  1.67  1.46  1.77 
1891 - 1919  1.38  1.55  1.36  2.21  --  1.52 
1920 - 1945  1.96  1.83  1.94  1.96  1.47  1.88 
1946 - 1973  1.93  1.82  2.49  1.37  3.98  1.78 
1974 - 1990  1.75  1.46  1.33  1.26  1.56  1.26 
1991 - 2004  1.42  2.34  2.19  2.74  1.41  2.32 
ALL YEARS  1.82  1.87  2.22  1.92  1.95  2.00 
  
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/29/2005) 
-- = Not available                                                                                         
a The ratio of the median peak overcharges to the median full-period overcharge for those cases 
when both are known and positive.                                                                                      
  
Table 8. Peak Cartel Overcharges, by Year and Type 
            Membership            Legal Status           Bid Rigging 
Cartel Episode 
End Date  National International Found 
Guilty  Legal  Primary 
Conduct  Other 
   Median percent 
1770 - 1890  38  105  19  55  38 
b 51 
1891 - 1919  19  85  33  72  --  37 
1920 - 1945   45   73  34 
a 69  53  72 
1946 - 1973  55  36  49  43  46  46 
1974 - 1990  35  64  35  39  35  39 
1991 - 2004   28   58  24  56  52  47 
ALL YEARS  31  64  39  61  32  49 
  
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/4/2005). There are 234 observations.  
a  Fewer than four observations.                                                                                      
b Fewer than six observations.  53
 
  Table 9 provides calculations of how much higher peak overcharges were compared the 
longer run averages for given episodes. Unlike Table 8, Table 9 calculates ratios for the 173 
pairs of median overcharges for which both an average and a peak estimate are available.  Given 
the manner in which these ratios were computed, a high number indicates that overcharges were 
quite variable during the episode being observed. A ratio close to one reveals a cartel that was 
successful in holding its collusive price flat or steady for the affected period. That is, low ratios 
may be interpreted as cartels that achieved few operational problems. There are no significant 
trends in these ratios over time, nor are there differences among cartel types in stability in fixing 
prices.   
 
  These data are relevant for assessing whether cartels intended to maximize price 
increases or to control variation in their collusive prices. Apologists for cartels, particularly 
those writing about them during the Great Depression, tended to assert that cartels did not aim to 
raise prices so much as stabilize prices.
142  The cartels that should fit this pattern are legal, 
international cartels that ended between 1920 and World War II.  However these cartels achieved  
no greater price stability than those before and after. This result is inconsistent with the positions 
of Marlio (1947), Pyndyck (1979), and some other scholars about cartel objectives.   
 
Overcharges by Location of Cartel  
 
Law-makers and antitrust enforcement officials may be interested in the locus of decision-
making by the cartels in the sample.  Table 10 classifies the cartels according to the location of 
the cartel’s headquarters or the place of residence of all or the great majority of the cartel’s 
managers, not necessarily the cartel’s field of operations because export cartels are categorized 
in their country of origin.  If a cartel was composed of member companies with headquarters in 
only one country or one continent, while others have established secretariats with professional 
staffs in London, Zurich, or similar locations.  In these cases the geographic locus is easy to 
identify.  Cartels with corporate members from multiple regions are more difficult to classify, 
but if a supra-majority of the companies were headquartered in North America, Western Europe, 
or Asia, the cartel is categorized under the appropriate row.   Global cartels are those with a 
diverse mixture of participants from two or more continents. 
 
  There are some significant differences in average cartel overcharges across geographic 
regions.  Those managed across multiple Western European countries have the highest 
overcharges, but curiously those organized within national boundaries in Western Europe were 
as a group the least successful.  North American conspiracies were also quite low.  Median 




Overcharges and Market Size 
 
A commentary in the USSGs asserts that there is an inverse relationship between the size of 
affected sales and the height of the overcharges achieved by cartels. No conceptual or empirical 
                                                 
142 As prices were generally falling, “stabilization”  may in fact have been equivalent to preventing weak demand 
from causing prices to decline. See, for example Plummer (1934).    54
justification is provided for this assertion.  Studies of cartels available to the Commission 
analyze neither factor (e.g., Hay and Kelly 1974, Asch and Seneca 1975, Fraas and Greer 1977, 
Posner 1970).  Eckbo’s (1976) and Griffin’s (1989) studies have information on price effects but 
do not link them to cartel size.  Finally, it is unclear how this alleged relationship ought to affect 




Table  10.  Average Overcharges by Cartel Headquarters Location 
 
Principal Location of Cartel Managers  Number of 
Estimates 
Average   Overcharge 
    Median percent  Mean  percent 
Multiple nations of W. Europe  124  42.8 54.4 
     
Global 
 
165  29.0 53.0 
     
Asia 48  28.9 53.8 
     
USA and Canada  221  22.3 29.8 
     
Australia, Africa, So. America, E. Eur.  23 
a  21.5 23.9 
     
Single nations in W. Europe  118  16.8 35.6 
     
Source: Appendix table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/4/2005). Includes zero overcharges. 
a) Only 13 episodes available.   
 
  
  Nevertheless, I decided to try to examine whether this curious hypothesis might be valid.  
The only appropriate data of which I am aware are those contained in Connor (2003: Tables A.1 
- A.12). This working paper has developed affected sales and overcharge data for a minority of 
modern international cartels; approximately 92 pairs of such data are available; sales are in 
current U.S. dollars and generally fall into the decade of the 1990s.  Correlation statistics were 
calculated for a number of sub samples.
143  The first sample of 50 cartels examined the largest 
geographic market for each cartel; the coefficient was not significantly different from zero (r = -
0.105).  To see whether extreme observations might unduly affect the result, I repeated the 
experiment but dropped first all cartels with $5 billion in sales or more and second all cartels 
with overcharges of 65% or higher; in both cases r became closer to zero (-0.065 and +0.019, 
respectively)., which indicates that extreme observations do not account for the low correlations 
found.  Finally, I examined geographic sub groups of the cartels: global, U.S., EU and other 
single national markets. The correlations for these four samples varied from -0.17 to +0.24, none 
statistically significant.   
                                                 
143 The simple correlation coefficient r takes a value of unity when pairs of numbers are perfectly aligned positively 
or negatively and a value of zero when unrelated.   55
 
  There is no empirical support for the market size-overcharge connection.  The policy 
implication is that there is no justification for going proportionately easy when sanctioning the 
largest  cartels.     
                                                         
 
                                             
 
 
       THE RELIABILITY ISSUE 
 
Many readers may have prior beliefs about the most appropriate data and methods to be used to 
derive estimates of the price effects of cartels.  Some might regard a lengthy historical 
investigation with access to the internal communications of a cartel’s managers as the surest path 
to the truth.  Others might give greater credence to such communications only where the 
cartelists had reason to believe that their activities were legal or where the managers are writing 
about an illegal cartel years after the statute of limitations had passed.  Some might assume that 
disinterested social scientists are likely to be closer to the mark than prosecutors, plaintiffs’ 
counsel, defendants’ counsel, or other interested parties.  Indeed, the cross checks of a more 
global retrospective analysis might contradict delusions of cartel managers about their power 
over markets. Among economists, ever cognizant of the march of progress in quantitative 
research methods, there may be a tendency to find peer-reviewed studies applying methods of 
the most recent vintage to highly disaggregated, detailed data the most reliable.  Among legal 
scholars, many will regard criminal trials or guilty pleas as the gold standard of fact-finding, 
relegating civil commission hearings and other processes with skepticism.  
 
  The task in the remainder of this section is to learn whether the various overcharge 
estimates are sensitive to the methods, data sources, time period, or disciplines of the authors.  
To do so, three approaches are taken.   
 
 
Sources of the Estimates 
 
Confidence in the estimates may be judged in part by the 267 sources from which the estimates 
were derived.  A single source often provides multiple estimates (e.g., Stocking and Watkins 
1946). The single most common type of source is 96 adverse antitrust decisions by U.S. courts 
(33 decisions), the European Commission (17), by the antitrust authorities of seven nations (28), 
and three reports of the OECD (18) (Table 11). In many instances the decision contains an 
explicit rendition of the overcharge, but in others the decision shows the price effects that were 
generated by the cartel.  
 
  The second most frequent source of estimates is papers in peer-reviewed journals, 83 
articles in all.  Nearly all of these journals are in the discipline of economics, law and economics, 
or economic history.  Social scientists typically accord a high degree of credibility to peer-
review outlets.  The third most frequent source is 58 books or chapters in books.  Some have a 
degree of peer review, but this practice varies by publisher and author; a few began as university 
essays or dissertations.  The great majority of the books were authored by academics, but a 
couple of books were written by parties to a suit (e.g., Bane 1973, Sultan 1974), and a few were   56
written by investigative journalists (Gray 1982).  A high but unknown share of the more recent 
articles and books were written by economists who served as experts in litigation.    
 
  Minor sources include six government reports (three by the League of Nations), 20 
economic working papers, one speech, and three magazine articles.
144  Many of these sources are 
subject to internal reviews by department supervisors or senior editors, but the reviews are not 
usually blind ones.  Some of the working papers are subject to rigorous review, but most are the 
authors’ responsibilities.   
 
  Table 11 shows the types of ultimate sources for each of the estimates.  By “ultimate 
source” is meant the original study from which the estimate was quoted or derived; for example, 
if a book chapter cites or interprets a legal decision, the latter is the ultimate source.  The units of 
observation are the estimates, not the sources. 
 
Table 11.  Numbers of Social-Science Sources and Overcharge Estimates 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
            Source Type                                  Number of                             Estimates 
        _____________________________ 
                                                                   Sources 
                      Number               Percent 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Peer-reviewed  academic  journals:   83    170   22.8 
1. Economics, economic history                              149    20.2   
2.  Other  social  science        14     1.9 
3.  Law                7     1.0 
 
Books  and  monographs:    47    241   32.4 
1.  Academic  authors  and  editors      213   28.6 
2.  Journalists               2       0.3 
3. Interested parties or unknown                                                         26                     3.5 
 
Chapters in edited books:     11      54      7.3 
 
Government reports 
        6      23       3.1 
 
Court or commission decisions 
a   96    146     19.6 
 
Economists’ working papers    20                106      14.2 
 
Newspapers, magazines, speeches      4         4       0.1 
 
Total                   267               744             100.0 
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/27/2005). Includes either average or peak estimates; those with both 
are not double counted.  
a) There are 33 U.S. court, 17 European Commission, 8 UK, 8 Taiwan FTC, 4 Japan FTC, 4Korean FTC, 2 China 
Monopolies Commission, 1 Swedish, and I French decision. Interpreted by social scientists and legal scholars. 
                                                 




  The majority of the estimates are drawn from the traditional end-product outlets of 
academic research; academic books, book chapters, and peer-reviewed journals account for 63% 
of the total.  In addition, 14% of the estimates were taken from economist’ working papers and 
conference presentations, most of which were distributed in the last few years, examined modern 
international cartels, and appear to be intermediate versions of book chapters and journal 
manuscripts.
145  The majority of the government reports were authored by civil servants with 
specialized training in economics, and some were written by academics commissioned by the 
agency; typically these reports would be vetted by a panel of experts.  Similarly, the legal 
decisions of the UK Monopolies Commission were reviewed and approved by panels that 
contained a couple of leading professors of industrial economics working alongside senior civil 
servants attached to the Commission. Much the same process was used for the Congressional 
committee reports on cartels.  Decisions of courts of law and competition-law commissions are 
subject to the review of higher courts.  In sum, 775 of the estimates are drawn from the formal or 
informal writings of academic social scientists, and most of the remainder was the product of 
professionally trained individuals subject to the checks and balances of higher institutional 
reviews.      
 
Sensitivity to Publication Dates 
 
  Here the hypothesis examined is whether there are systematic differences between the 
average overcharges across time, using the date of publication of the study as a proxy for 
analytical advances. The intuition here is that the authors of more recent empirical studies of 
cartels have learned to avoid the methodological pitfalls of their predecessors
146.  Among the 
economic studies that dominate the sample, there is an undeniable trend away from mere 
narrative historical case studies sometimes embellished with simple graphical illustrations 
towards more formal statistical modeling; moreover, there is a trend away from evaluating 
cartels from the point of view of the theory of pure monopoly to a more sophisticated and 
nuanced view informed by game theory and other conceptual advances in industrial economics.  
Because in previous sections above differences in average overcharges were found over time, I 
also disaggregate the data by the cartels’ termination dates. 
 
  The results of this temporal analysis are displayed in Tables 12 and 12A; the discussion 
will focus on the successful cartels.  The publications are classified according to four periods that 
correspond roughly to milestones in social-science analysis of cartels.  The era prior to 1946 is 
marked by studies that betray a relatively undeveloped understanding of oligopoly theory, some 
confusion about essential nature of private cartels, and the absence of statistical methods of 
analysis.  Various authors would confuse cartels with “combinations” (mergers and 
acquisitions), unified firms with monopoly power, and large diversified or multinational 
corporations – categories now viewed as distinct economic phenomena. In the earlier years when 
antitrust enforcement was weak or nonexistent, many writers failed to see the necessity of 
distinguishing voluntary agreements to restrict trade from wholly compulsory arrangements.  In 
1946, with the appearance of the landmark studies of Stocking and Watkins (1946, 1948) cartel 
                                                 
145  Several of them have notes to that effect. 
146 Alternatively, one might infer that analysts may have increasingly employed techniques that have won court 
approval as forensically reliable (see Connor 2004a).   58
studies moved to a higher level of analytical rigor. These studies and those that followed had the 
advantage of at least a decade of rapid developments in oligopoly theories that loosened 






Table 12.  Average Overcharge Estimates by Publication Dates 
 
                                   Publication Date of Study    Cartel Episode 
End Date  Before 1945  1945-1970  1971-1989  1990-2004  Number 
   Percent    
Before 1891          
Median 22.0 




Mean 25.6  39.4  24.7  29.6 
        
1891-1945        
Median 26.0 
103 42.7 
 79 43.9 
34 29.0 
31 247 
Mean 49.1  76.1  44.4  38.9 
        
1946-1990        




Mean  − 36.4  29.2  37.4 
        
1991-2003        
Median  −  −  − 25.0 
211 211 
Mean  −  −  − 37.9 
        
Number 138  100  133  328  699 
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/4/2005).                                 






   
      
   
        
               
        
        
      
        
               
  
 
Table 12A. Average Overcharge Estimates by Publication Dates, Successful Cartels 
 
                              Publication Date of Study  Cartel 
Episode 
End Date  Before 1945  1945 - 1970  1971 - 1989  1990 - 2003 
                                            Median percent 
                                             Mean percent 





9  1770- 
1890  29 39  31 46 
          





31  1891- 
1945  55 81  44 39 
          




71  1946- 
1990  − 36  33  38 
          
          
−  −  − 25 
210  1991- 
2003  −  −  − 38 
          
 
 
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 11-02-04).                                 
Note: Superscripts indicate sample size in cell. “Successful” means non-zero 
overcharge.   60
monopoly, thereby sharpening the understanding of collusive behavior in general and the 
distinctions between overt and tacit collusion.
147   By the 1970s and 1980s, further advances in 
oligopoly theory were being made (though had not yet been integrated into the consciousness of 
most empirically oriented economists), the “Chicago School” of economics was having an 
impact on the field, and quantitative statistical methods first came into widespread use by 
economists and economic historians.
148 By about 1990 or so, knowledge of game theory 
pervaded the modeling efforts and empirical research of professional economists; moreover, a 
reassessment of the Chicago-School challenge had asserted itself.    
 
  Table 12A demonstrates some interesting trends, but provides no evidence for concluding 
that overcharges vary systematically over time.  Looking initially at cartels that ended in the pre-
antitrust era, one sees that contemporary and early writers about these cartels arrived at moderate 
estimates of cartel price effects – a median estimate of 25%.  Studies prior to 1990 continued to 
calculate a similar or lower median price effect.
149  However, as the methods of scholarship 
presumably improved, the estimated price effects of cartels active in the most laissez-faire of 
economic environments actually rose to a median of 50%.
150  
 
  A pattern of virtually constant median estimates is evident for the cartels that were active 
after the Sherman Act became law but ended before 1990.  The second category is dominated by 
the international albeit Eurocentric “interwar” cartels, many of which were revivals of similar 
legal export cartels operating before World War I.  Both contemporary chroniclers of these 
interwar cartels and studies published since 1990 were equally conservative in their evaluation of 
price effects. For those cartels ending between 1945 and 1990 (many of them bid-rigging 
agreements), there appears to be no tendency for estimates of median price increases associated 
with cartel behavior to change as publication dates become more contemporary.   
 
  The analysis presented in Tables 12 and 12A is suggestive but has many shortcomings, 
principally because many other things could be changing over time besides the analytical 
approaches of various writers. Averaging could mislead because the samples of cartels (even 
those ending in the same broad periods) change as the publication periods change.  To remedy 









                                                 
147 Two books on oligopoly published in 1933 are often cited as the beginning of industrial-organization economics 
as a distinct field. 
148 Although an article published by Joe Bain in 1951 is usually credited as the first statistical study in industrial 
economics, such methods were uncommon in cartel studies until the very late 1960s. 
149  The samples of cartels in each time period overlap, but are not identical.  I will correct for changes in the sample 
immediately below. 
150  Note that the mean does not fluctuate over time for the earliest group of cartels, but I regard the mean as less 
indicative of central tendency than the median.   61
Table 13 examines whether median overcharges vary by type of publication and prosecution 
status.   Using peer-review journals as the basis of comparison, estimates of overcharges tend to 
be higher in other types of publications for guilty cartels that ended prior to 1946; for 
unsanctioned cartels the opposite is true.  However, for more contemporary cartels, studies in 








Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/4/2005). 
 - - = Not available 









The third check on reliability of estimates across various analytical methods controls for changes 
in the composition of the sample by focusing on one cartel episode at a time.  Recall that a cartel 
episode refers to a single market, time period, and form of cartel organization.  This check on 
reliability requires us to examine only those episodes that have two or more estimates derived 
Publication Type             Cartel Year and Cartel Prosecution Status 
  1888-1945                  1946-1973                   1974-2004 
Guilty  Legal           Guilty    Legal               Guilty  Legal 
 
                                         Percent 
Peer-reviewed journal      10     30                       17      7*                    23     22 
  
Book      29     32                       13    23                      23     15 
  
Book chapter      56     20                       --     74*                    18     43 
  
Government report      21*   13                       16*    0*                    30*    50* 
  
Official decision      51    --                         13      --                      25      -- 
  
Other        39*    --                      14*    0*                    24      28* 
    62
from at least two of seven different methods.
151  Only 91 episodes (about one-third of the total) 
are available, because the majority of the cartel episodes have only one study using a uniform 
method of overcharge estimation.  
 
  There are 291 pairs of observations available for this analysis of reliability.  I have 
identified six general methods of estimation.  In the full sample of 674 average overcharges, the 
most widely used (45% of the total) is the so-called before-and-after method in which the price 
during the episode is compared to one of three “but-for” or base prices.  The benchmark prices 
refer to periods before the cartel began its operation, after the cartel ceased its activity, or a 
period during the affected period when there was a brief breakdown (a disciplinary price war 
perhaps) in full collusion.  The base periods require judgment on the part of the analyst, because 
the but-for period ought to be as free from demand or supply conditions not observed during the 
collusive period as possible.  The second most popular method is statistical modeling, which 
accounts for 20% of the estimates.  The yardstick methods accounts for about 10% of the sample.  
Overcharges derived from costs of production or profits are the least frequently employed 
method (about 3%).  These five methods have been sanctioned by U.S. courts for determining 
damages in price-fixing trials (Connor 2004).  Sixth, approximately 10% of this study’s 
estimates are quotes from or interpretations of decisions made by antitrust authorities.  Finally, 
about 10% of the estimates are given by writers who did not explain their methods; these 
unspecified estimates are mostly from archival sources studied by economic historians, from 
legal-economic studies by antitrust specialists, or from books written by journalists that 
summarize estimates provided by anonymous sources close to a lawsuit involving a cartel. In 
general, these unspecified estimates are produced by non-economists writing without the benefit 
of anonymous peer review, whereas the other five methods are studies written by professional 
economists.
152  One may speculate that most of the unspecified estimates are before-and-after 
comparisons.  
 
  In Table 14 each entry in a cell is constructed by taking the median estimate of the 
method listed in the first column and dividing that number by the corresponding median estimate 
that used the method in the heading of the table. All possible ratios are calculated with the 
median ratio shown.  A median ratio of one indicates that there is no difference between methods 
on average.  Several of the median ratios are drawn from such small sub samples that I refrain 
from drawing any conclusions.   
 
  A general comment about the ratios is that nearly all of them lie between 0.5 and 1.5 and 
most are close to unity.  This demonstrates that by and large different authors and different 
methods applied to identical cartel episodes do not result in markedly different estimates.  The 
                                                 
151 In a small number of cases, a particular study may offer more than one approach to the study of  a cartel episode, 
but in the vast majority of cases the estimate being compared are taken from studies by different authors typically 
writing at widely separated times. 
152 There are several notable exceptions to this dichotomy.  Eckbo, a Ph.D. economist, did not in explain his method; 
several estimates of overcharges by economic historians use state-of-the-art analytical methods; and some of the 
aluminum cartel’s “economic” estimates were drawn from a businessman’s memoir (Marlio)   63
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Appendix Table 6 (spreadsheet dated 10-28-04).     - - = Fewer than three pairs available 
a Ratio of median overcharges using method in left column divided by the median based on method above. 
Superscripts indicate numbers of pairs. 
 
Table 14A. Median Ratios of Estimates for Same Episodes but Different Methods 
(Simplified) 
                                    Denominator Method 
Numerator Method 
Unspecified  Before and 
After 
a  Cost Based  Yardstick  Econometric 
Model 
  Ratio of medians 
b 
Unspecified method  1.00   0.93




        
Before and after  1.08 
38 1.00




        
Cost based  1.34 
2 1.29 
15 1.00    2.10 
1 0.60 
7 




1 1.00    0.57 
4 
        




4 1.00   
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 10-28-04).    
- - = No pairs available
 
a Ratio of median overcharges using method in left column to medians based on method above. Superscripts 




Table 14. Median Rates of Estimates for Same Episodes by Different Methods   
                                                  Denominator Method 
Before and After   Numerator Method
   Unspec-












  Ratio of medians 
a 
            
Unspecified   1.00
  1.15 
32 -  -





            
Price before cartel  0.87 






            
Price during cartel  - - 
1 1.00    0.45 
2 2.22 
3 5.33 
12 -  - 
0 
   1.09 
5         
Price after cartel  1.14 
9 0.73 
52 2.23 




            
Cost or profit   0.74 
3 1.38 
11 2.22 
3 -  - 
1  1.00   - -  0.60 
7 




10  - -  - -  1.00   0.57 
4 
            
Econometric model  0.54 
21 0.51 
45 -  - 0.32 
11 1.66 
7 1.76 
4 1.00     64
correspondence among the three before-and after methods is quite close.
153  Therefore, in 
Table14A all of the before-and-after methods are treated as one method.
154  In this table, all the 
ratios are between 0.5 and 2.0.  Nevertheless there are three differences worth commenting on. 
  
  First, the eclectic estimates that termed “unspecified” are on average quite close to the 
before-and-after price method.  There are 38 pairs of observations, and the median unspecified 
estimate is only 8% lower than the median before-and-after estimate for the same cartel 
episodes.  Moreover, when the top row of unspecified estimates are compared to the three other 
estimation methods (cost, yardstick, and econometric), the pattern is quite similar to the pattern 
in the second row of table 14A.  This confirms a guess made earlier that most of the unspecified 
estimates probably employ the before-or-after method.   
 
  Second, another somewhat surprising result is that the before-and-after method produces 
cartel-overcharge estimates that are quite a bit higher than econometric model applied to the 
same data.  To be specific, the pre-cartel but-for prices are typically double estimates derived 
from econometric models and post-cartel prices are triple. In principal, econometric models are 
simply more formal and precise ways of applying the before-and-after method.  Econometric 
techniques offer the opportunity to the analyst to make precise allowances for several sources of 
shifts in demand and supply, for seasonality, for trends in technology, and for feedback effects. 
If in fact econometric techniques are the most accurate, what this result seems to suggest is that 
authors of traditional before-and-after analyses are failing to adjust for all the competitive factors 
that might drive up the competitive benchmark price.  An example of such a situation is when a 
cartel’s formation is preceded by a predatory price war that forces the pre-cartel price to 
unsustainably low, sub competitive levels (Connor 2004).  The before-and-after method does not 
lend itself easily to adjustments for such subtle influences as seasonal demand and currency 
exchange rates.  
          
  Third, compared with the before-and-after, the cost-based and yardstick techniques yield 
relatively high overcharge estimates.
155 This suggests that the methods that use costs or profits 
fail to fully account for all competitive industry costs, perhaps those related to product marketing 
or overhead.  Similarly, as most of the yardsticks are prices in regions in which the cartel did not 
attempt to fix prices, this result suggests that indirect geographic spillovers from cartel activity 
may be more common than most analysts anticipate.  If the yardsticks are product substitutes, 
analysts may have underestimated quality differences. 
 
                                                 
153 But not perfect.  The overcharge estimates developed by comparing the cartel-affected price with a pre-cartel 
price are lower than those constructed from a post-cartel price. The ratio of 46 paired comparisons is 0.70.  This 
result is unexpected, because it implies that post-cartel prices are lower than pre-cartel prices.  Post-cartel real prices 
are sometimes observed to be higher than the pre-cartel price; speculation as to why has centered on institutional 
features of markets (e.g., long-term supply contracts) that cause price declines to lag or on the possibility that the 
learning involved in cartel cooperation translates into more effective tacit cooperation after a cartel is dissolved 
(Connor 2001).  Other scholars have noted the incentive that former cartelists have to keep their prices high during 
the post-conspiracy period when they are negotiating a settlement for private damages (Harrington 2004). On the 
other hand, post-cartel prices have sometimes been lower than pre-cartel prices because the cartel was preceded by a 
sharp price decline and because exposed cartel members may try to repair customer relations with favorable prices. 
It appears that the latter forces outweigh the former. 
 
154 This approach increases the number of paired observations slightly. 
155 These two methods seem to be conservative relative to statistical modeling, but the number of pair-wise 
observations is quite limited.   65
 
Sensitivity to Peer Review  
 
  As one further test of reliability, I examine whether the average overcharge estimates are 
sensitive to type of review given to a particular study.  One might expect peer review to rein in 
exaggerated or unsubstantiated overcharge estimates. In the “peer-review” category I include 
academic journals, dissertations, explicit court and commission decisions, and reports issued by 
the OECD.  This is a restrictive concept of peer review, because doubtless some of the books and 
chapters from conference proceedings were also peer reviewed.  Furthermore, to allow for 
improvements in analytical rigor over time, I distinguish three time periods separated by the 
years 1946 and 1974.  Finally, I divide the observations into those cartels that are known to have 
been legally sanctioned and those not sanctioned. 
 
  The results are shown in Table 15.  Peer review does not systematically produce lower 
estimates of overcharges.  To simplify the comparisons, let us look at the median overcharges of 
the two largest sources: journal papers and books. In four of the five instances, peer-reviewed-
journal estimates are larger or about the same as estimates from books.  For example, in the case 
of convicted cartels ending 1946-1973, peer-reviewed studies display slightly higher average 
overcharges (34% versus 33%). 
 
  Perhaps the strongest finding is the contrast between convicted and other cartels.  In the 
vast majority of comparisons, the unsanctioned and presumptively legal cartels generated higher 
price mark-ups.  This finding has significant implications for anticartel policy, because it 
suggests that ceteris paribus less effective cartels are the most likely to be caught and 




Table 15.  Average Percentage Cartel Overcharges, by Legal Status and Type of Study 
 
Date of Publication                 Convicted Cartels 
a            Legal and Unsanctioned Cartels 
 
                                 Peer Reviewed 
      ___Other___      Peer Reviewed 
   ____Other____ 
 
             J      G      D           B    C   W   O        J     G     D          B    C    W    O 
                                                                      median 
                     mean   
 
Before 1946         --    21
3   37
8         23
43 --   --   --        29
21  10
12  --       30
49   30
1  --    -- 
           --    19    33          64   --   --   --         32     21     --       40     30    --    -- 
   
1946-1973         34
3   --   12
20        33
25   --   --   7
1     44
8   -- 
  245
6       33
54    5
1   --   --   
                               27    --   68          64     --   --    7       40    --   225        43      5     --   --          
 
1974-2004          19
96 21
6   25




2      30
42 50





        27  150   37         32   62   34     63       51    50    --       25   42    18    28   
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Appendix Table 2 (spreadsheet dated 4/4/2005).   66
a At least one closely related episode was subject to an adverse decision of a court or antitrust authority. 
Note:
  J=Peer reviewed academic journals, G=government publications, and D=court and commission decisions 
(including those reported to the OECD).  B=books, C=chapters, W=working papers by academics, and O=other 
(journalistic, speeches, etc.). Superscripts are number of observations.   
 
 
     




  The results of the survey of final verdicts in collusion cases are that the 25 collusion 
episodes had a median average overcharge of 21.6% and a mean average overcharge of 30.0% 
(Appendix Table 4).
156  The 9 cases that reported peak overcharges produce a median peak 
overcharge of 71.4% and a mean peak overcharge of 130%.  All but 5 found that the cartel had 
raised prices by more than the USSC’s 10% benchmark. Due to the small number of final 
verdicts it would not be meaningful to analyze these verdicts in even smaller groups, e.g., there 
were only find 8 final verdicts involving bid rigging episodes, so it does not seem worthwhile for 




  How useful are the decisions of judges and juries in answering the question of how high 
cartels raise prices? Their verdicts are of course based on the opinions of the competing expert 
witnesses, who come to radically different conclusions about the size of the damages involved.
157 
Both sides make their presentations and the finders of fact decide which expert is more 
believable on particular issues (with plaintiff having the burden of proof).
158  
  
  This may or may not be the best way to determine which expert witness’s conclusions are 
more accurate since many skills besides facts and economic reasoning can play a role in the 
judge or jury determination.  While the common law system of jury and judge verdicts is far 
from perfect, it is the system the nation has chosen to use in a wide variety of life and death 
decisions affecting society.
159  Since the United States long has continued to use this system,
160 
our nation has made an implicit decision that judges and juries are the best way to arrive at the 
truth the largest percentage of the time. I know of no way to prove whether judges or juries 
achieve results better than those of the economists who publish studies in journals and books. 
                                                 
156 For a discussion of the merits of examining only final verdicts, see Connor and Lande (2004). 
157  It is extremely unlikely that there has ever been even a single antitrust case where experts for opposing sides 
agreed upon the amount of damages.  Similarly, although there is no evidence for the allegation, the economic 
studies reported elsewhere in this article are open to the charge that some of the authors’ and their methodology are 
biased. Occasionally, judges appoint special masters to advise them on the damages. 
158 Moreover, the likelihood and size of damages also will depend upon the absolute and relative abilities of the 
defending and prosecuting counsel.  It is an open question whether defendants or plaintiff are likely to have the best 
legal representation on average. 
159 While it may be true that some juries and trial or appellate judges juries are not objective, the burden of proof 
should be on those who would assert that the overall system, including its appeals, has a systematic bias, or that an 
alternative approach to answering the question of how high cartels raise prices would be superior. 
160 In other nations with admirable judicial systems, judges or judicial panels are the vehicles of decision making in 
antitrust cases, which are typically are civil matters.    67
Neither sample is perfect: each has it strong and weak points. But since the question of how high 
cartels raise prices is an important one that deserves as reliable an answer as can be ascertained, 
this method deserves consideration.  And, since our two major approaches reinforce one another, 
the credibility of both is strengthened. 
 
  Further, since such a large percentage of cases settle, one reasonably might ask whether 
the few that do not settle are in some manner different from those that do. Since the motivations 
for settling and not settling are so varied, one can only speculate as to the biases involved.   
 
  Are there likely to be any significant systematic differences between cases that settle and 
those that do not? Is there reason to believe that classes of cases for which settlement will be less 
likely - such as in cases where the parties have different expectations as to what the outcome is 
likely to be - when the overcharge percentage is especially high? As examples I will present two 
contrasting possibilities.  First, it certainly is possible that for cases when the cartel overcharged 
by a large percentage the defendants might reason that plaintiff is likely to be able to prove at 
least some overcharges to the fact finder’s satisfaction.  Defendant might be more likely to settle 
these cases.
161  Alternatively, it could be true that a small overcharge percentage -- less than 5% -
- might be too small for plaintiff successfully to distinguish from purely random movements in 
prices.  If plaintiffs believed that defendant had increased price by 4%, but knew that it would be 
extremely difficult to prove this, they would be less likely to sue.
162 As these examples illustrate, 
one can speculate as to why a survey of verdicts could be biased in either direction.  While one 
should certainly acknowledge this method’s potential flaws, I know of no reason to believe that it 
is either systematically biased or unreliable, or why this unreliability would shift the results in a 
particular direction.  
         
         DECISIONS OF OTHER ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES 
 
Table 16 assembles 171 average overcharge estimates that originated from adverse cartel 
decisions by antitrust authorities: final judgments of U.S. courts and administrative decisions of 
commissions around the world.  In some cases the method of estimation is not known, in others 
the price-effect data are lifted from the decisions. The data are arranged by geographic location 
of the cartels. There are 110 non-U.S. observations, 73% of them from Europe. The largest 
number of observations comes from decisions made by the European Commission and the UK 
Monopolies Commission. 
 
  The mean overcharge is almost 46%, and the means derived from European and Asian 
decisions are close to those from U.S. court decisions.  However, because of positive skewness, 
it is more appropriate to examine the medians. The median North American overcharge is the 
                                                 
161 Some cases with large overcharges settle, while some smaller ones do go to trial. 
162  Further, it might be less likely that plaintiff would even file a civil case unless it believed that damages were 
likely to be high. However, this article is examining overcharge percentages, not total recoveries, and it focuses on 
medial percentages. Aren’t plaintiffs likely to file cases with large expected total payoffs, regardless what 
overcharge percentage that constitutes?  What difference does it make to plaintiffs or their attorneys if they prove a 
1% overcharge on $1 Billion in sales, 10% on $100 million, or 100% on $10 million?  In all three examples the 
amount of the expected overcharge would be identical.   68
lowest, and those from Asian authorities the highest, but none strays far from the median 





Table 16.  Overcharges from Decisions of Antitrust Authorities, by Jurisdiction 
   
          
Antitrust Authority  Number   Median   Mean 
   Percent Percent 
North America:  61  20.0  43.2 
Mexico 1  18.8  18.8 
United States  59  20.0  42.8 
Canada 1  90.0  90.0 
      
Europe: 80  23.8  48.3 
Denmark 1  25.0  25.0 
European Commission 43  31.0  40.8 
France   4  31.0  30.5 
Germany 3  13.0  13.0 
Hungary 1  15.0  15.0 
Spain 2  3.0  3.0 
Sweden 1  8.3  8.3 
UK 25  14.3  74.3 
      
Asia and Australia:  30  28.0  45.0 
Australia 2  10.5  10.5 
China 2  21.1  21.1 
Israel 1  120.0  120.0 
Japan 8  28.8  26.1 
Korea 8  22.1  45.4 
Taiwan 9  65.0  74.5 
      
Total 171  23.1  45.9 
 
Source: Appendix Tables 2 and 4 (spreadsheet dated 4/4/2005). 
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       CONCLUSIONS 
 
Empirical Findings on Cartel Overcharges 
 
The survey identified hundreds of social-science studies of cartels that contained 674 
observations of “average” overcharges.
163  The primary finding is that the median
164 cartel 
overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25%:  18% for domestic cartels, 32% 
for international cartels, and 28% for all successful cartels.
165  Thus, in general international 
cartels have been about 75% more effective in raising prices than domestic cartels. Cartel 
overcharges are skewed to the high side, pushing the mean overcharge for all types of cartels 
over all time periods to 49%. “Peak” cartel overcharges are typically double those of the long-
run averages.
166 These results are generally consistent with the few, more limited, previously 
published works that survey cartel overcharges. Six economic studies that exhibited high 
standards of scholarship report samples with simple average median overcharges of 28% and 
simple average mean overcharges of 31% of affected sales.  
 
  The results of the survey of final verdicts in decided U.S. horizontal collusion cases, only 
three of which were international cartels, show an average median overcharge of 21% and an 
average mean overcharge of 30%.
167 Thus, the 24 U.S. decisions produce average overcharges 
that are quite comparable to the results of the much larger set of economic estimates. All but five 
of the reported decisions found that the cartel had raised prices by more than the USSC’s 10% 
benchmark.
168 Outside the United States, 62 decisions of competition commissions cited median 
average overcharges of 29% and a mean of 49%.  Except for the UK Monopolies Commission 
(median of 20%), all other jurisdictions reported higher overcharges.  
 
  The authors’ professions, types of publications, degree of peer review, and analytical 
estimation methods from which these estimates are derived vary greatly.  However, extensive 
examinations of source reliability give no reason to regard any sub set of the sample as 
inherently unreliable.  
 
 
Issue 1: the USSGs 
  
  In the sample of 674 social-science overcharges, 79% were higher than the 10% 
presumption contained in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines; 60% were above 20%.  This paper’s 
introduction noted that there is a view among some antitrust writers that there is little evidence 
that cartels raise prices significantly for a period long enough to justify extant anticartel laws 
                                                 
163  Average overcharges are those calculated from an entire cartel episode, not just a peak or isolated result. 
164 All figures presented in this section incorporate all relevant zero estimates and omit peak results. 
165 This study has a  majority of episodes and estimates taken from international cartels. 
166 If one assumes that the peak mark-ups are the result of a cartel having achieved something close to monopoly 
price levels, then the lower average overcharges imply that historical cartels are constrained by substitutes, fear of 
entry, internal discord, or other factors that frustrate optimization.  This is a common finding in studies that measure 
the degree of monopoly power. 
167 In addition, the 9 cases that reported peak overcharges produce a median peak overcharge of 71.4% and a mean 
peak overcharge of 130%. 
 
168 Because of the relatively small number of verdicts (sample of 23), it is improper to place much weight on sub-
groups of these data.   70
and, especially, extant cartel penalties.  Consequently, they argue for the repeal or scaling back 
of the fines or damages that result from collusion. Even some who recognize that a significant 
number of cartels are harmful believe that the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s presumption that 
cartels raise prices by 10% is too large. This survey’s results, which are based upon an 
extraordinarily large amount of data spanning a broad swath of history of all types of private 
cartels, sharply contradict these views.  In fact, the data suggest the opposite.  Median 
overcharges are two or three times as high as the level presumed by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission. Moreover, the great majority of the overcharge estimates – those with overcharges 
above 20% -- have a mean overcharge of 55.3%, more than five times the Guidelines’ 
presumption. 
 
  The Guideline’s 10% overcharge presumption was, moreover, based upon the estimate 
that “the average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the selling price.”
169  The Guidelines 
“average” is the equivalent of the mean, not the median.
170  The correct comparisons are 
therefore not between the Guideline’s figure of 10% and the medians of 27% for the economic 
studies and 22% for the case verdicts.  Rather, the truer comparison would be to the mean figures 
of 36% and 27% respectively.  One must be agnostic on the question of whether, from the 
perspective of optimal deterrence, mean or median figures should be used as the basis of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s presumption. However, the decision to focus on the median figures 
has been a conservative one. 
 
   Surprisingly, bid rigging was no more injurious than other forms of collusion.  If 
anything, the data suggests that bid rigging is slightly less injurious. These results suggest that 
the USSC should amend its Guidelines, which currently treat bid rigging more harshly than other 
forms of collusion. Nor is there any empirical basis for the Guideline’s statement that cartels are 
less dangerous when they are formed in larger markets.  
 
  There is another respect in which this paper has been conservative: it focuses solely on 
the public injury that arises from the transfer of income or wealth from purchasers to the cartel.  
However, cartels also can lead to allocative inefficiency, umbrella effects, less innovation, 
managerial slack, and to non-price harms to quality and variety, etc. Yet, these factors have not 
taken these harms into account. Nor have the figures been adjusted for inflation.  While the 
Guidelines seem to have doubled the 10% presumption to account for its omission of these 
factors, I believe that doubling is insufficient. 
   
  For all of these reasons, if the U.S. Sentencing Commission decides to re-examine 
whether 10% is the right overcharge presumption,
171 Connor and Lande (2004) propose raising 
                                                 
169 15 U.S.C. 1 Application Note 3.  
170 The inclusion of a few highly successful cartels in a sample implies that the sample’s mean is significantly higher 
than its median. The mean will also be higher than the median because overcharges cannot be less than zero. 
171 This article’s introduction observed that it was possible that Blakely v.Washington could mean that the 10% 
presumption will be declared unconstitutional or employed less often.  Instead, defendants may litigate the actual 
overcharges. If this happens, most of the 79% of cartels that overcharged more than 10% should acquiesce to the 
government’s use of the 10% presumption. Only the 21% of cartels that overcharged less than 10% should be likely 
to contest this. However, these fines have no prejudgment interest, so defendants benefit from the delay that comes 
from litigation. 
  However, a key issue is whether cartels usually know in advance of litigation roughly how much they 
overcharged. Could most cartels predict in advance of litigation, for example, that a Court will find that it 
overcharged 5%, as opposed to 15%?  How risk-averse are they, in light of the probability that lengthy, protracted   71
the presumption to 15% for domestic cartels and 25% for international cartels.
172 This is a 
conservative and modest proposal in light of this article’s demonstration that cartels typically 
generate at least two or three times the harms presumed by the current Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
Issue 2: Global Sanctions 
 
The principal antitrust authorities abroad also seem to base their typical or maximum fines on a 
10% harm presumption.
173  Many jurisdictions follow the EU’s lead in limiting their cartel fines 
to at most 10% of a guilty company’s annual sales.
174  This self-imposed restriction will not, 
under a wide range of conditions,
175 result in fines that reach or exceed a cartelist’s monopoly 
profits. Average fines imposed since 1995 by Canada and the EU on identical cartels have been 
lower than U.S. government fines (Connor 2005).  When the effects of private suits are factored 
in, it is clear that the U.S. court system is already shouldering the bulk of the world’s burden of 
punishing international cartels.   
 
  The survey results suggest that overcharges generated by cartels discovered outside the 
United States are higher than North America-centered cartels.  Moreover, contemporary 
international cartels have a majority of their members drawn from Europe and Asia, and these 
cartels as a group are more harmful than geographically localized conspiracies.  Consequently, 
anticartel laws and fine-setting practices abroad are in even greater need of strengthening. 
 
 
Issue 3: Cartel Deterrence 
 
Global cartels are the most harmful type.  Despite the evident increases in cartel detection rates 
and the size of monetary fines and penalties in the past decade, a good case can be made that 
current global anticartel regimes are under deterring (Bush et al. 2004, Connor 2005).    
 
  For most types of cartels, there are modest downtrends in cartel mark-ups over time.
176  
Since 1990 the average overcharges of discovered cartels fell to 15-16% for domestic cartels, 
and to 25% for international cartels.
177  Because the post-1990 era has been the period with by 
                                                                                                                                                             
litigation could result in a much higher result?  I believe that cartels often are risk seekers and often will be able to 
make this prediction with a fair degree of accuracy. 
 
172 If the policymakers decide that it would be unwise to make this differentiation, however, a 20% overall 
presumption would be appropriate. The doubling of the base fine and the 0.75 to 4.0 culpability multipliers are not 
affected by this proposal. 
173 Is there something particularly alluring about the fingers of two human hands that impels decision makers to 
fixate on ten or multiples of ten when designing numerate sanctions’ standards? 
174 Canada centers its fines around 20% of affected Canadian sales, but has no culpability multipliers other than 
leniency discounts.  Brazil permits 30% of affected sales. 
175 The conditions are that the targeted company is fairly specialized, has most of its sales inside the jurisdiction’s 
borders, and joins a highly durable international conspiracy with a low probability of detection (Connor 2003).  
176 The fact that cartel overcharge estimates do not change systematically over the past century (except as noted 
above) provides a rough indication that progress in theories and empirical methods has not totally invalidated cartel 
case studies published in the early years of cartel scholarship.  I also ascertained that median overcharges are not 
sensitive to whether or not a study was subject to formal peer review. However, in an analysis of finely matched 
cartel episodes, I did find that econometric approaches typically produced lower estimates than did application of the 
before-and after method.    
177 This period also has the highest proportion of cartels that are international.   72
far the highest level of fines imposed, this decrease is consistent with the theory of optimal 
deterrence.  It also suggests that the recent worldwide trend towards the intensification of cartel 
penalties has been desirable. If procedures for calculating criminal fines correspond more closely 
to the actual levels of cartel overcharges, monetary sanctions against price fixing will more 
closely provide optimal deterrence.      
      
  Global cartels are difficult to detect, have less fear from entry of rivals, achieve higher 
levels of sales and profitability, and systematically receive weaker corporate sanctions than 
comparable domestic cartels.  Base fines of 20% of cartelists’ affected commerce, even when 
adjusted by significant culpability multipliers,
178 will do little to deter most of these cartels.  
  























                                                 
178 For a variety of factors, however, very few firms actually pay a fine amounting to 20% or more of the amount of 
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Appendix Table 1.  Alphabetic List of Cartelized Markets 
 
                    Characteristics       Number of 
Name  Code 
No.  Interna-      Loca- 




Found Guilty, Liable 










Airlines, US passenger  172           US      1+  1 
Air Routes, Danish  235  X        EUR    EC fines  2  2 
Almonds, US and export  205           US    Legal cartel  1  2 
Aluminum, metal (interwar)  18  X        EUR         U.S. consent decree  6  28 
Aluminum, metal (1990s)  199  X       INTL      1  1 
Aluminum phosphide, US  82            US    U.S. guilty pleas  1  2 
Asphalt, Alabama, US   204            US  X  US settlement  1  1 
Asphalt, Oklahoma, US  7           US  X  Jury trial decision  1  1 
Auction houses, fine art  42  X       US+UK    U.S. pleas, EU fines  1  5 
Auctions, houses in DC, US  53            US  X  U.S. trial  1  1 
Auctions, used police cars, NY City  52            US  X  Civil settlement  1  2 
Automobile manufacture, US  25            US      1  2 
            
Ball & roller bearings, France  115  X         FR    France, fines  1  1 
Banks, Euro-Zone fees, DE & NL  216     X          DE    EU fines  9  9 
Basic materials, JP  214              JP    JFTC actions  1+  1 
Bath tubs, iron, UK  63             UK    Legal cartel  1  1 
Bath tubs, enameled, US  239            US    US trial  1  1 
Bedsteads, metal, UK  167             UK    Legal cartel  1  1 
Beef, US  45            US    US trial     
Bond underwriting, US  153             US  X    1  1 
Bread, white pan, US  37             US    U.S. Appeals Court  1  1 
Bromine  6  X         US    U.S. guilty pleas  3  4 
            
Cable, rubber & plastic, UK  59             UK    Legal cartel  1  1 
Cable, power, Germany  124             DE  X  Germany, fines  1  1 
Carbon, arc lighting, US  188             US    Legal cartel  2  2 
Carbon black, US exports  152             US          Legal export cartel  1  1 
Carbon dioxide, US  202             US    US civil settlement  1  1 
Carbon fiber, US  198            US    US investigation  1  1 
Cardizem heart medicine, US  203            US         US civil trial  1  1 
Carton board, EU  39             EUR    EU fines  1  1 
Cartons, corrugated, US  142             UK    US trials  1  6 
Carpets, woven, UK  62             UK    Legal cartel  1  1 
Cathode ray tubes (see electronic 
radio & TV tubes)           
Cell phones (see telephone)             
Cement, Norway  212             NO    Legal cartel  1  1 
Cement, South Africa  70             ZA  X    1  2 
Cement, Germany  106  X         DE  X  Germany, fines  1  1   96
Chicken, US  144             US    US trial, consent 
decree  1 1 
Cigarettes, U.S.  26             US      1  1 
Citric acid  76  X        INTL    U.S. pleas, EU fines  1  6 
Choline chloride  81  X           US    US jury trial  1  4 
Coal, Ruhr, Germany  155             DE    Legal cartel  1  2 
Coal, anthracite, eastern US  160            US    US trial  10  16 
Coal, black, Australia  179             AU      6  9 
Coal, Newcastle, England  166             UK    Parliamentary inquiry  5  17 
Coconut oil, Philippines  206             PL    Legal cartel  1  1 
Coke  147  X         EUR    Legal export cartel  1  2 
Concrete, Denmark  51             DK  X    1  1 
Concrete, Germany  114  X         DE  X  Germany, fines  1  1 
Construction & procurement, JP  213             JP  X  JFTC actions  5+  5 
Construction, 8000 buildings, 
Germany  177              DE  X  Germany fines  1 1 
Construction, electric wiring, 
Denmark  122             DK  X  Denmark, fines  1 1 
Construction, electrical, France  175             FR  X  France consent decree  1  1 
Construction, university, France  176             FR  X  France consent decree  1  1 
Construction, roads, Colorado, US  222              US  X  Civil settlement  1  2 
Construction, roads, France  177             FR  X  France consent decree  1  1 
Construction, roads, Korea  193             KO  X  Korea FTC fines  1  1 
Construction, roads, seal coating, 
US  211             US  X    1 2 
Construction, kitchen, Japan  163             JP  X  Japan trial  1  1 
Construction, US Navy shipyard, 
Japan  162             JP  X  JFTC fines  1 1 
Construction, Netherlands  108  X          NL  X  Netherlands, fines  1+  1 
Construction, Norway  107  X          NO  X  Norway, probe  1+  1 
Construction, public, Japan  161              JP  X  A few civil actions  1+  2 
Construction projects, Korea  32             KO  X  Korea, fines  1+  1 
Construction, USAID in Egypt  101  X          EGY  X  U.S. trial  1  1 
Construction, roads, Florida  1             US  X  Trials, settlements  1+  1 
Construction, roads, Germany  123              DE  X  Germany, fines  1+  1 
Construction, roads, SD & NC, US  34             US  X  Trials, settlements  1+  2 
Construction, roads, US  195             US  X  Trials, settlements  1+  1 
Construction, sewers, US  33             US  X  Trial  1+  3 
Copper metal  22     X       
US+INTL      9 30 
Copper concentrate  88  X          INTL    US, EU Probes  1  1 
Copper smelters, UK  225              UK  X    4  4 
            
Dairy processing, US  54              US    US consent decree  1  1 
Diamonds, gem, So. Africa  71  X          ZA    Legal cartel  1  1 
Distributors, natural gas, TW  229              TW    TFTC fines  2  2 
Dredging, river, Japan  164              JP  X  Japan trial  1  1   97
Drugs (see pharmaceuticals)                 
Dyestuffs  159  X         EUR    Legal cartel  1  2 
            
Electric light bulbs  21  X        EUR      1  15 
Electric light bulbs, US  189             US      1  1 
Electric light bulbs, UK  184             UK    UK Commission  1  2 
Electric meters, UK  61             UK  X  Legal cartel  1  1 
Electric motors, UK  60             UK    Legal cartel  1  1 
Electric power equip. U.S.  48             US  X  US pleas, settlements  5  18 
Electric power equip., Nor.  116  X        NO  X  Norway, fines  1+  1 
Electric power equipment  129  X        EUR       X  US conviction  2  3 
Electric power equip., UK  183             UK  X  UK Commission  1  4 
Electronic radio & TV tubes, UK  192  X        UK    UK Commission  1  5 
Explosives, US  98  X         US  X  U.S. guilty pleas  1  1 
            
Fertilizer (see nitrogen, phosphate, 
potash)  --         
Fire protection installation, 
Australia  121             AU    Australia, fines  1 1 
Ferrosilicon, US  100  X        US    U.S. pleas  1  1 
Flour imports, Taiwan  234           TW  X  TW FTC fines  1  1 
Ferry services, English Channel  41  X        EUR    EU, fines  1  1 
Frozen foods, Australia  120             AU    Australia, fines  1  1 
Frozen fish, US  36             US  X  US guilty pleas  1  3 
Fuels, military, Korea  112  X        KO  X  Korea, fines  1  1 
            
Games & toys, UK  104  X        UK    UK, fines  1  1 
Garbage collection, NY & NJ  233              US  X  NYC convictions  2  2 
Gasoline, retail, Italy  109  X        IT    Italy, fines  1  1 
Gasoline, retail, France  110  X        FR    France, fines  1  1 
Gasoline, retail, Sweden  111  X        SE    Swedish court, fines  1  1 
Gasses, compressed, Canada  102  X        CA  X  Canada, fines  1  2 
Glass, flat, Benelux  237  X       EUR    EU fines  1  1 
Glass, flat, US  113  X        US    US settlement  1  1 
Graphite electrodes  84  X        INTL    US, EU, Korea, fines  1  8 
Gunpowder, US  158             US    First episode legal  2  2 
Gymnasium seats, US  2             US  X  US settlements  1  1 
            
High fructose corn syrup, US  197            US    US settlements  1  1 
Hotel association, Spain  125             ES    Spain, fines  1  1 
            
Insecticide, forest, Canada  83  X        CA  X  Canada pleas  1  1 
Iron & steel rolls, cast, EU  227  X       EUR  X  EU fines  1  1 
Iodine  40  X        EUR    Legal export cartel  1  1 
            
Lead  69  X        INTL    Legal export cartel  4  4   98
Lemons, California  210             US    Legal cartel  1  2 
Linerboard, US  201             US    US civil settlement  1  1 
Linoleum exports  137  X        EUR    Legal export cartel  1  1 
Linoleum, UK  180            UK    UK Commission  1  2 
Lysine  75  X        INTL    US pleas, EU fines  1  11 
            
Manufacturing, UK  55             UK    Legal cartels  40  1 
Manufacturing, U.S.  38             US    US pleas, fines  57  1 
Magnesium metal  28  X        US    US pleas, fines  2  4 
Magnesite  94  X        EUR    US prosecution  1  1 
Market makers, NASDAQ, US  31             US    U.S. settlements  1  1 
Mercury  72  X        EUR    Legal cartel  3  6 
Methionine  78  X        INTL    EU fines, US 
settlements  1 2 
Methyl glucamine  85  X        INTL    EC, Canada fines  1  1 
Milk, 3 counties, Kentucky  9             US  X  U.S. state convictions  1  1 
Milk, 2 counties, Florida  10             US  X  U.S. state convictions  1  1 
Milk, 3 counties, Florida  11             US  X  U.S. state convictions  1  1 
Milk, Danville, Kentucky  12             US  X  U.S. state convictions  1  1 
Milk, Owensboro, KY  13             US  X  U.S. state convictions  1  1 
Milk, core area, Kentucky  14             US  X  U.S. state convictions  1+  1 
Milk, Southeastern U.S.  15             US  X  U.S. state convictions  109  1 
Milk, Dallas, Texas  19             US  X  U.S. settlement  1  1 
Milk, Cincinnati, Ohio  30             US  X  U.S. trial  1  1 
Milk, AMPI cooperative  226            US    U.S. trial  1  1 
Milk, U.S. marketing orders  207             US    Legal cartel  1  2 
Mobile/cell phones (see telephone)                        
Mushrooms, canned , Germany  230  X     INTL    EC fines  1  1 
            
Nails, Germany  186             DE    Legal cartel  1  1 
Nitrogen (sodium nitrate) fertilizer  16  X        INTL      2  7 
Nonferrous metals, UK  181             UK    UK Commission  1  2 
                
Oil (see petroleum)             
Oranges, California navel  209             US    Legal cartel  1  3 
            
Paper, carbonless, EEC  89  X        EUR    EC fines  1  1 
Paper pulp, bleached sulphate  228  X       INTL    EC fines  2  4 
Paper pulp, mechanical sulfite  138  X        EUR      1  1 
Paper, thermal fax, US  99  X        US    U.S. pleas & trial  1  1 
Paints, export, Japan  157             JP    Legal cartel  1  1 
Petroleum, US  24  X        US      1  1 
Petroleum, TX & Okla.  190             US    Legal cartel  1  1 
Petrol., offshore leases, US  154              US  X    1  1 
Petroleum refining, Midwest  35             US    U.S. trial  1  1 
Petroleum, lamp oil, Ontario  134             CA    Legal cartel  3  3   99
Pharmaceuticals, UK  105  X        UK  X  UK probe  1  1 
Pharmaceuticals, US  141             US    US trial  1  1 
Pharmaceuticals, respiratory, Italy  118  X        IT  X  Italy, fines  1  1 
Pharmaceuticals, cholesterol, Italy  119  X        IT  X  Italy, fines  1  1 
Phosphate rock exports, US  135  X        US    U.S. indictment  2  2 
Phosphorus, red  132  X        EUR      1  1 
Pipes, cast iron, SE US  23             US    U.S. trial  1  1 
Pipes, concrete, US  143             US  X  US trials  1  2 
Platinum   47  X           EUR      3  7 
Plumbing fixtures, US  156             US    US trial  1  1 
Plywood, US  145             US    US trial  1  1 
Plywood, Japan  178             JP  X  JFTC fines  1  1 
Polyvinyl chloride plastic  232  X        EUR    EC fines  1  1 
Porcelain, sanitary, UK  57             UK    Legal cartel  1  1 
Potash  73  X        EUR      4  19 
            
Quebracho extract  50  X        ARG    U.S. conviction  3  8 
Quinine  131  X        EUR    U.S. pleas, fines  1  2 
            
Railroad, Chicago to East, US  49             US    Legal U.S. cartel  1+  7 
Railroad, U.S. South  133             US    Legal U.S. cartel  1  1 
Raisins, US   208             US    Legal US cartel  1  1 
Rayon  136  X        EUR      1  1 
Roundwood buying, Sweden  236            SW  X    2  2 
Rubber, crude  20  X        EUR    Legal export cartel  2  4 
            
Salt, Michigan  194             US      2  4 
Salt, rock, US  3             US  X  U.S. convictions  1  1 
Salt, white, Salt Union, UK  168             UK    Legal cartel  4  9 
Salt, white, duopoly, UK   215             UK    Commission decision  1  1 
Scholarships, graduate, US  173           US    DOJ consent decree  1  1 
Shipping, France-Africa  43  X        EUR    EU fines  1  1 
Shipping, 3 conferences  171  X        EUR    Legal cartels  6  2 
Shipping, chemical tankers  86  X        EUR    U.S. pleas  1  1 
Shipping, express packages, US  127             US    Legal U.S. cartel  1  2 
Soil & gravel, Japan  165             JP  X    1  1 
Soft drinks, US  27             US      1  1 
Sodium chlorate  79  X        EUR      1  1 
Sorbates  77  X        INTL    US and EU fines  1  5 
Steel, bulk metal, European  74  X        EUR    Legal cartel  2  6 
Steel drums, UK  64             UK    Legal UK cartel  1  1 
Steel girders, Germany  187             DE    Legal cartel  1  1 
Steel and iron, Germany  238             DE    Legal cartel  4  5 
Steel pipes, sewage, UK  58             UK    Legal UK cartel  1  1 
Steel pipes, insulated, EU  93  X        EUR    EU fines  1  2 
Steel rails, US  150             US    First episode legal  1  1   100
Steel rails, Europe  169  X        EUR    Legal cartel  1  3 
Steel, seamless tubes, EU  91   X        EUR        EU fines  1  2 
Steel tubes, US  151             US    Legal cartel  1  1 
Steel, flat stainless, EU  92  X        EUR    EU fines  1  3 
Steel, structural, buildings, US  4             US  X  U.S. convictions  1  2 
Steel, structural, bridges, US  5             US  X  U.S. convictions  2  4 
Steel, structural, EU  95  X        EUR    EU fines  1  1 
Sulfur, international  87  X        INTL      3  4 
Sulfur, crude,  US exports  191             US    Legal export cartel  2  1 
Sulfuric acid, US & Canada  103  X       US+CA    DOJ probe  1  1 
Sugar beets, US  44             US    U.S. trial  1  1 
Sugar, cane  17  X        INTL    Legal export cartel   2  3 
Sugar refining, US  67             US    U.S. trial  2  8 
Sugar, Spain  126             ES    Spain, fines  1  1 
Sugar refining, UK  96             UK    EU, fines  1  1 
            
Tea  128  X        EUR    Legal cartel  1  1 
Tetracycline, US  223             US    Civil settlement  1  1 
Thorium nitrate, Germany  170             DE    Legal cartel  1  1 
Timber, US auctions  29             US  X    1  1 
Tin  146  X        INTL    Legal export cartel  1  4 
Titanium metal, US  139             US  X  US trial  1  1 
Telephone fees, UK & Germany  97  X        IT    EC probe  1  1 
Telephone fees, Italy  117  X        IT    Italy, fines  1  1 
Tobacco leaf, US  200             US  X  US settlement  1  1 
Transformers, large, UK  65             UK  X  Legal UK cartel  1  1 
Transformers, system, UK  66             UK  X  Legal UK cartel  1  1 
Tungsten carbide  8  X        INTL    U.S. trial  2  4 
            
Uranium metal  130  X        INTL    U.S. pleas, settlements  1  6 
            
Vanadium ore, US  46             US    U.S. jury trial  1  1 
Vitamins and Carotenoids, bulk 
a   80  X        INTL  X  U.S. & EU fines  14
a 55 
Vitamin D, US  140             US    Patent abuse trial  1  1 
Vitamin B4 (see choline)                  
            
Wallpaper manufacturing, BL  231              BL    EC fines  1  1 
Wire, Germany  185             DE    Legal cartel  1  1 
Wire nails, US  149  X           US    Legal cartel  1  2 
Wire rope, non-marine, UK  56             UK    Legal UK cartel  1  1 
Whiskey alcohol, US  148              US    First episode legal  5  6 
Wire and cable, UK  182             UK    UK Commission   3  3 
            
Zinc metal
 f  68  X        INTL    Legal export cartel  5+  8 
Zinc phosphate  90   X         EUR    Fined by EC  1  2 
              101
Total 245 markets  --  90 International     79  153 guilty/liable 
d 560 
b  664 
average 
        55  known “legal”    216  
peak 
        37 presumed legal 
e   886 
total 
Source: Appendix Table 2 and References. 
a One for all vitamins, one for the three Carotenoids, and twelve individual vitamins. 
b This total counts three multiple cartel summaries (see cartel numbers 15, 38, and 55 above) as 206 episodes.  Counting these entries as 
one episode reduces the total to 353.  In addition, most bid-rigging cartels could in principle count each contract as an episode, but are 
treated as one here; for example, in cartel #211 more than 3500 contracts were overtly collusive bids. 
c Fines, trials, consent decrees, settlements, commission decisions, parliamentary inquiries, and known official investigations are all 
considered adverse sanctions for cartels.  Adverse parliamentary and commission decisions resulted in changes in conduct similar to 
consent decrees. 
d Includes six markets (88, 97, 103, 105, 107, and 198) that in 2004 were being investigated by antitrust authorities; a high proportion 
will be legally sanctioned. 
e Counts blank entries in column above. Blank entries are cases without information about any criminal sanctions or adverse civil 
proceedings and are presumptively legal or extralegal. 
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Appendix Table 2. Summary of Price-Fixing Damages, Social-Science Studies 
 
Overcharge or 
Undercharge  Cartel Type, Location, and Dates





   Percent   
  1. Florida state road-building contract 
auctions, 1738 projects, 1981-1986; no 
mention of convictions 
Econometric model; average 
of 5 bidders, maximum of 19 
bidders 
8-10 34-45 Gupta  (2001) 
  2. Bid rigging against schools by the   
      Folding Gymnasium Seating   
      Council, U.S., April 1954-early 1960; 
DOJ consent decree in early 1960; study 
controls for changes in costs 
 
    
2A. Same as above  Benchmark price is for Jan.-
Mar. 1954  40.9 --  Erickson (1976: 
192-193) 
2B. Same as above  Benchmark price is for brief 
breakdown period April-June 
1959 
36.6 --  Erickson (1976: 
192-193) 
2C. Same as above  Benchmark price is for Sept. 
1960 – March 1961  30.4 --  Erickson (1976: 
192-193) 
  3. Bid rigging, rock salt sold to state and  
      local governments, northern U.S.; began 
in early 1930s and renewed in 1948-49, but 
court testimony covers only 1954-1960; 
umbrella pricing by two largest U.S. 
companies; guilty at trial 
But-for price is average of 
1961-63 prices; study controls 
for changes in costs  60 66  Erickson (1976: 
197) 
  4A. Bid rigging and market divisions,  
      structural steel sold to construction  
      contractors for public buildings, upper  
      Midwest of U.S., March 1950–August    
1962; probably convicted 
Pre-conspiracy prices (1948-
March 1950) compared to 
conspiracy period except for 
one brief breakdown in 
collusion; peak is 1961-62 
9.0 27.9  Erickson (1976: 
199) 
4B.  Same as 4A above   Conspiracy prices compared to 
post-conspiracy prices (Sept. 
1962-Dec. 1963); peak prices 
from 1961-62 
0 17.3  Erickson (1976: 
199) 
5. Bid rigging and market divisions,  
      structural steel sold to construction  
      contractors for bridges, upper  
      Midwest of U.S., March 1950–Aug.   
      1962; meetings were “interrupted” from 
July 1960 to March 1961 
 
    
5A. Conspiracy period March 1950 – 
August 1962, excluding interruption 
Benchmark price is for 1948- 
March 1950  9.0 --  Erickson 
(1976:199) 
5B. Same as 5A.  Benchmark price is for 1948- 
March 1950  27.9 --  Erickson 
(1976:199) 
5C. Late phase of conspiracy, April 1961 – 
August 1962 
Benchmark price is for Sept. 
1962 – Dec. 1963  0.0 --  Erickson 
(1976:199) 
5D. Same as 5C.  Benchmark price is for Sept. 
1962 – Dec. 1963  17.3 --  Erickson 
(1976:199) 
5E. Same as 5A  Compares profit on equity 
1950-1961 of a typical 
conspirator with the U.S. 
national industry average 
50 --  Erickson 
(1976:199)   103
6. Price fixing of bromine sold to    
pharmaceutical manufacturers to make 
potassium bromide, U.S., three phases: 
 
    
  6A. National Bromine Co., pool 1885- 
         1891 
Base is 1880-1884 prices  9.7 19 Levenstein 
(1997) 
  6B. Shields pool, 1892-1902  Base is March 1891-October 
1892 prices  65.2 126  Levenstein 
(1997) 
  6C. Shields pool, 1892-1902  Base is 1880-1884 prices  31.6 81  Levenstein 
(1997) 
  6D. Dow Chemical pool, 1902-1914 
Base is several non-
cooperative periods during 
1905-1908 
74.4 257  Levenstein 
(1997) 
7. Bid rigging by 8 members of the Asphalt 
refiners Assn. of liquid asphalt contracts 
for the Oklahoma Highway Dept., 1954-
1968, found guilty by jury trial 
Comparison of constant OK 
winning bid price with average 
delivered prices in 6 
surrounding states supplied 
from OK 
71 71 Funderburk 
(1974:69-70) 
8A. Cemented tungsten carbide, invented 
by Krupp Steel and General Electric in 
early 1920s; two firms formed a cartel in 
1928 protected by patents later invalidated; 
GE had a U.S. production monopoly, but 
Krupp sold to two US importers, which 
colluded with GE and  were 
monopolistically bought be GE in 1936 and 
1937;  price lowered in Oct. 1936-1940; GE 
indicted for price fixing by DOJ in 1941, 
found guilty at trial in 1947 
U.S. price in 1927 when Krupp 
still exported to U.S. compared 







8B.  Same as 8A 
U.S. price 1928-36 compared 
to yardstick of (Krupp’s) 





8C. Same as above, except for Oct. 1936 to 
1941 
U.S. price October 1936 to 
1941 compared to yardstick of 






8D. Same as 8C 
U.S. price October 1936 to 








8E*. Same as 8A 
U.S. price in 1928-1936 
compared to Krupp’s U.S. 
import price to two US 
exclusive importers and GE 
co-conspirators 
886 886 
U.S. v. General 
Electric Co. et al 
(10/8/1948) 
 9. Bid rigging school milk contracts,   
      Boone, Kenton, and Campbell Counties,  




13 21 Lanzillotti 
(1996:433) 
10. Bid rigging school milk contracts, Dade  
      and Broward counties, Florida, 1979- 
      1985 
Average 1986-1989 post-
conspiracy prices  13 16 Lanzillotti 
(1996:443) 
11. Bid rigging school milk contracts, three  
      counties, Florida, 1979-1985 
Average 1986-1989 post-
conspiracy prices  2.6 7.5  Lanzillotti 
(1996:433) 
12. Bid rigging school milk contracts,  
      Danville, Kentucky 1983-1988 
Prices bid to state agency in 
same county  49 59 Lanzillotti 
(1996:447) 
13. Bid rigging school milk contracts,  
      Owensboro, Kentucky, 1984-1988 
Prices bid to state agency in 
same county  126 280  Lanzillotti 
(1996:447)   104
14. Bid rigging school milk contracts,  
      Kentucky “core conspiracy area,” 1981- 




25 35 Lanzillotti 
(1996:448) 
15. Bid rigging school milk contracts,      
summary of several cases of school-milk 
bid rigging in South of U.S. 1979-1988, 
estimates prepared for trial and used for 
settlements, from among 109 specific      
cases listed; may include numbers 9-14 
above 
Various methods used for 
numbers 9 to 14 above 
15-20 -  -  Lanzillotti 
(1996:452) 
16A. Price fixing of nitrogen and nitrate 
(nitrate of soda, ammonium sulfate), 
international private cartel, including some 
national cartels, formed July 1929 after four 
years of sharply falling prices; included 
Chilean miners’ national export cartel and 
UK and German producers of coke-
byproduct and synthetic manufactures; 
collapsed 1931  
Method not explained, and 
number cannot be found in 











16B. Same as 16A  Ammonium sulfate average 
UK prices in 1932 compared 





16C. Same as 16A  UK ammonium sulfate prices 
one month after collapse of 






16D. International cartel was reformed at 
end of 1932 and continued to operate until 
at least 1947; a period of rising demand 
U.S. ammonium sulfate prices 






16E. Same as 16D  Ave. UK ammonium sulfate 






16F.  Same as 16A  Lerner index  42.9 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
16G.  Same as 16D  Lerner index  28.2 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
17A. Price fixing sugar, international 
private cartel comprised of the 21 
governments with 85-90% of world sugar 
imports; began in 1938, ended Sept. 1939; 
froze the export shares of all exporting 
regions 
Ave. prices on the London 
market in Sept. 1937-Sept. 
1939, relative to 1935-36 








17B.  Same as 17A; international sugar 
cartel of 1937-1939 
Lerner index  6.4 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
17C.  International cane and beet sugar 
cartel of May 1931- Sept. 1935; a private 
agreement with possible government 
enforcement applied to the national sugar 
cartels of Cuba, Java, Peru, and five 
European countries to reduce output and set 
export quotas; Hexner calls this cartel a 
dismal failure because importing countries 
boosted their self-sufficiency; Plummer 
says only Hungary passed legislation to 
enforce the agreement 









18A. Price fixing and territorial quotas of  Price in Europe in 1905  --  100,  Posner   105
aluminum; the first international private 
cartel of the world’s five manufacturers, 
formed by contract on Nov. 2, 1901 in 
effect until late 1906 








18B. Second international cartel; same 
membership as 18A; tighter contract signed 
in late 1906; members and outsiders added 
200% more capacity in 1905-08; late 1907 
recession  put added stress on the cartel; 
formally dissolved Sept. 30, 1908  
Benchmark is German ingot 
prices in late 1908 relative to 
mid 1907; decline in part due 




18C.  Same as 18B  Author’s interpretation of case 
studies of other researchers  50+ --  Eckbo  (1976:33) 
18D. Same cartel as 18B, but data are from 
a top manager of the cartel in its later years 
who is an apologist for the benefits of 
cartels 
Exact transaction prices from 
1906 to 1908 in gold French 
francs; the base of comparison 
is the price demanded by the 
cartel’s French members in 
Jan. 1908 which would have 
guaranteed a good rate of 
return; cartel dissolved in April 
1908 and prices fell far below 
the base price; peak is all of 
year 1907 
83 167  Marlio (1947: 
13) 
18E. Same as 18A and 18B combined, but 
prices in U.S. market; imports flood into the 
U.S. market in 1910-1912 
Alcoa’s U.S. prices in 1910-
1912 compared to 1902-07 





18F. Third international cartel agreement 
reached  June 12, 1912 (5 days after Alcoa 
accepted a DOJ consent decree to end an 
antitrust probe!); ended by outbreak of war 
in August 1914  
Average annual U.S. price in 






18G. Same as 18F above  Average European transaction 
prices Jan. 1913 to Jan. 1915; 
peak is 1914; compared to 
same base price as in 18D 
above  
30.4 33.3 Marlio (1947: 
18) 
18H. Prices fall after end of war prompting 
fourth, unwritten cartel agreement in 1923; 
lasted until 1926; Alcoa formed a holding 
company for its burgeoning European assets 
which was controlled through its Canadian 
subsidiary; European members refrained 
from exporting to US and Alcoa did not 
export to Europe at less than cartel’s prices  
Method not explained and 
numbers not found in S&W;  
S&W refers to 1922-1924  
price changes of 33% in 
Europe and 44% in the U.S.; 
Elliott considers 1923-25 









Elliott et al. 
(1937:256) 
18I.  Same as 18H above  Author’s interpretation of case 
studies of other researchers  50+ --  Eckbo  (1976:33) 
18J.  Fifth international private cartel, 1926-
1930; unlike some others, this author 
interprets new cartel agreement in 1926 as 
start of a new episode; other authors 
consider 1924-1938 as one episode 
Author’s interpretation of case 
studies of other researchers 
50+ --  Eckbo  (1976:33) 
18K. Price fixing of aluminum in Europe by 
8 companies that owned a common joint 
venture, the Alliance Aluminum Co., July 
London list or “official” price 
compared to the price 
members could buy out of 
45 75.1  Marlio (1947: 
37-40)   106
1931 – early 1939; joint venture purchased 
and sold aluminum stocks to members; 
cost-saving technological change rapid in 
1930s 
Alliance Aluminum stocks; 
peak is Nov. 1931 
18L. Same as 18K.  Transaction prices from Nov. 
1931 to Dec. 1936 in gold 
French francs compared to 
Mar. 1938–Jan. 1939 (1.1 FF) , 
a period the author, an expert 
insider, calls cooperative but 
not very effective; peak is 
Nov. 1931 
83.6 101.2  Marlio (1947: 
39-40) 
18M.  Same as 18K above  Author’s interpretation of case 
studies of other researchers  50+ --  Eckbo  (1976:33) 
18N. Study that measures the U.S. market 
power of Alcoa during the period when it 
was a monopolist in the U.S. market (1923-
1940) partly because of agreements with 
European producers that limited imports 
Econometric model with 
excellent data that measures 
short-run and long-run mark-
up over Alcoa’s U.S. marginal 







18O.  Same as 18J above   
Compares average London 
metal price 1926-29 with price 
in late 1930 after US-Canadian 
entry 
24.4 --  Oualid (1938:20-
21) 
18P.  Same as 18K above  Average London price 1932-
36 with July 1931 or late 1930  5.3-17.7 -- Oualid (1938:20-
21) 
18Q.  Same as 18K above 
Same as 18P, except base of 
comparison is price in “cartel-
free” markets Belgium, 
Netherlands, and Central 
Europe 
17.7-25 --  Oualid (1938:20-
21) 
18R.  Same as 18A  Lerner index predicted from 
econometric model  203.0 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
18S.  Same as 18F  Lerner index predicted from 
econometric model  66.7 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
18T. Same as 18J  Lerner index predicted from 
econometric model  44.9 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
18U.  Same as 18K  Lerner index predicted from 
econometric model  51.5 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
18V.  Same as 18A, but authors believe that 
1904-07 prices were strongly affected by a 
boom in demand 
European price change from 
1900 to 1902  25 -- Elliott et al. 
(1937:226) 
18W.  Same as 18H above  Changes in prices in the US 




18X.  Same as 18F 
European prices in 1912-14 
relative to competitive 1908-
11 period 
0-70 --  Elliott et al. 
(1937:228) 
18Y.  Same as 18H, except that transactions 
prices are taken from an exhibit from a 
private antitrust suit against Alcoa 
Peak U.S. price in Dec. 1925 
relative to 1920-21 when 
Alcoa faced large European 
import competition; adjusted 
for $.03 rise in U.S. tariff in 
Sept. 1922 
-- 32  Elliott et al. 
(1937:255) 
18Z. Same as 18H; author believes that 
over-capacity, increased scrap supplies, and 
depression caused prices to decline 20%; 
Cartel was able to bring off an 
“orderly reduction in prices” 
with no change in profits 
0 --  Elliott et al. 
(1937:260)   107
costs declined by 20% 1926-1930/31 
I8AA.  Same as 18H above  Changes in prices in Europe 




18BB. Same as combination of 18H          
and 18J. 
Average U.S. net realization 
prices in 1924-1938 compared 
to 1921-22;peak is 1937; 






19. Bid rigging of Dallas-Fort Worth school 
milk contracts in 1980-1992 by 9 dairy 
processors, which paid a large settlement to 
end a civil suit. 
 
 
Examines winning bids in 
DFW to those in San Antonio, 
Texas for several types of milk  5.0-6.0 --  Lee  (1999) 
20A.  Price fixing of crude rubber 
international private cartel, London-based 
Rubber Growers’ Assn., agreed in recession 
year 1920 to cut output by 25% in 1921; 
Dutch  producers supported cut; in 
November 1921 UK and colonial 
legislatures made it a government program   
World price change from just 
before cartel (1920- early 









20B.  UK government rubber-quota 
program encouraged expansion of Dutch 
East Indies production; by 1926-27 it was 
no longer effective; officially abandoned 
Oct. 1928; new scheme implemented June 
1934-April 1944; the Intl. Rubber 
Regulation Cmte. in London with 
government and industry members set 
output and export limits, which were 
negotiated by Britain, Holland, France (and 
their colonies) and Siam; Suslow judges the 
IRRC to be a private cartel  
Real world prices in 1934-39 
compared to base years 1930-





20C.  IRRC based its price objective on 
covering full costs of production plus a rate 
of return on assets of about 7.5%; extensive 
studies of plantation costs in all areas were 
commissioned  
Nominal prices 1936-1939 
compared to upper limit of full 
costs of production  15-134 141  Hexner (1946: 
287) 
20D.  Same as 20B  Lerner index  194.1 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
21A. Price fixing and quotas for electric 
incandescent light bulbs, international 
private cartel formed as Phoebus SA, 
incorporated in Switzerland, by contract on 
Dec. 23, 1924 by British, German, Dutch, 
Hungarian, Japanese, French, and U.S. 
companies; ended Sept. 1939; reestablished 
1945-55, but weak after GE withdrew in 
1945 
Method not explained; cannot 
find such price change in the 











21B. Same as 21A above  Prices of 25, 40, 60 Watt bulbs 
in Holland  in 1938 relative to 
U.S. (yardstick) prices; 
average assumes 25 W 
accounts for 50% of market 





21C. Same as 21A above  Same as above except 
Germany vs. USA  140 220 Stocking and 
Watkins   108
(1946:343) 
21D. Same as 21A above  Same as above except Sweden 




21E.  Same as 21A above 
Compare (retail?) prices of 
60W bulbs in Germany in 
1929-30 with same bulbs 
before cartel began (1924-25); 
no adjustment for cost 
reductions 
-11 -- Benni et al. 
(1930:75) 
21F. Same as 21A above 
Cartel price reduction in 
Sweden as new local lamp 







21G. Same as 21A 
From Phoebus’ records, 
average net 1937-38 
manufacturers’ prices in 8 W. 
European member countries, 
relative to Japan, the only 





21H. Same as 21A  Same as above for British 












21K. Same as 21A  Same as above for non-




21L. Same as 21A  Same as above for rest of the 




22A.  European copper market was 
cornered by the “Secrétan” syndicate of 
four UK and French firms by signing long 
term supply contracts with major mines; 
Sept. 1887-Mar. 1889; Mar. 1889 crash 
came after unexpected increases in mine 
output and recycled Asian supplies arrived 
London Metal Exchange prices 
in late 1888 compared with 
costs (mine contract prices 
held by syndicate); maximum 
price is compared to LME 
price at end of March 1889  
31 129 Elliott et al. 
(1937: 395) 
22B. The “Amalgamated Pool” raised $155 
million to finance purchase large stocks of 
U.S. copper in April 1889; price crashed at 
end of 1901 when pool owned 200,000 tons 
Price in mid 1901 compared 
with end of 1901  35 -- Elliott et al. 
(1937: 397-98) 
22C. Amalgamated Copper Co. organized a 
US supply-control cartel in 1906; effective 
1907-1912. 
Average prices late 1907-1912 
compared to 1906; peak effect 
was from early 1906 to  “Panic 
of 1907” 
35 127 Elliott et al. 
(1937: 398) 
22D.  Copper Export Assn. was formed 
Dec. 1918 covering 95% of US production; 
it agreed (illegally) to reduce output by 42% 
during 1919; by 1923 large post-war govt. 
stocks were liquidated and it disbanded; 
1923-26 was one of the few normal  period 
in the copper market after 1913 
Author’s estimate of price 
elevation above competitive 
levels in 1919 
29 -- Elliott et al. 
(1937: 418-419)   109
22E. Price fixing of copper, Copper 
Exporters Inc., the only Webb-Pomerene 
Association to have foreign (non-U.S.) 
members [sic], effective October 1926 – 
May 1930, world prices; officially 
dissolved 1932 [preceded by 1888-1890 and 
1918-1922 cartels] 
Method not explained; cannot 










22F. Same as 22E above; world prices 
March 1929 
Compared with average of 3 






22G. Same as 22E; world  copper prices in 
year following Great Crash, May 1929-May 
1930; cartel lost control of prices after May 
1930 when large African mines opened; 
formally dissolved in 1932 





22H. Same as 22E; an early economic study 
of international cartels, most of them 
European based, that depends on 
information from previously published 
economic studies and press accounts; 
writing at the beginning of the Great 
Depression, the author is more impressed 
by the failures of cartels to raise prices than 
their successes; of scores of private cartels 
studied, only two have data on their price 
effects;  international copper cartel 
maintained near monopoly over supply, but 
experienced rapidly falling demand and rise 
in stocks 
World export prices in Dec. 
1932 compared to  May 1929-
April 1930 
-- -72  Plummer 
(1934:149-152) 
22I.  Same as 22B, but judged effective 
only from early 1899 to Dec. 1901; ended 
by lack of European cooperation and 
domestic cheating 
New York wholesale prices 
1899-1901  compared with 
1898 
31-64 --  Herfindahl 
(1959:81) 
22J.  Same as 22B 
New York wholesale prices 
1899-1901  compared with 
1902-03 
55-64 --  Herfindahl 
(1959:81-82) 
22K.  Same as 22C; Herfindahl is skeptical 
that any of the collusive arrangements 
alleged in 1904-05, 1906-07, 1908, 1909, or 
1912-13 were effective 
New York wholesale prices 
1904-13 compared with 1906  0 --  Herfindahl 
(1959:92-99) 
22L.  Same as 22D; the CEA was 
successful in restricting supply in 1921-22 
and possibly in 1918-20 also, but price 
effects were weak and brief 
New York wholesale prices 
1921-22  compared with 1923-
26 
0+ -- Herfindahl 
(1959:92-99) 
22M. Same as 22E above.  Compared world prices March 
1929 with average of 3 years 





22N.  Same as 22E, except shorter effective 
period 
New York wholesale prices 
April 1929-April 1930 
compared with competitive 
1926-28 
28 -- Herfindahl 
(1959:208) 
22O.  Same as 22N 
New York wholesale prices 
April 1929-April 1930 
compared with 1931 
88 -- Herfindahl 
(1959:208) 
22P.  Same as 22D; a 1918-1922 (or 1924) 
U.S. Webb-Pomerene Assn. that liquidated 
large wartime stocks, but may not have 
Lerner index  0  -- 
Griffin 
(1989:189-190), 
Hexner   110
affected export prices  (1946:224) 
22Q. Second international copper cartel 
formed with exporters of all countries 
except Canada as members; active May 
1935 – Sept. 1939; agreement on output 
reductions; New York export prices  
Base price late 1934-early 
1935 compared to 1938-1939 
average price; peak price 






22R. Same as 22Q;  London exchange 
prices, which S&W assert are better 
reflection of  output and export quotas 
Comparison of May 1937 price 




22S. Same as 22Q; average annual prices of 
spot purchases of standard copper on the 
London exchange, in pounds sterling ; 
author believes that rise chiefly due to 
increased demand 
Base is 1932-34 prices 
compared to 1936-39; peak is 
1937 40  73  Hexner (1946: 
228) 
22T. Same as 22E; League of Nations 
copper price series; authors state that cartel 
aimed at a price of $0.18/lb. and tried to 
reduce prices during early 1929 demand 
spike; it lost control of price after late April 
1930 
Price before contract signed 
compared to May 1929-mid 
April 1930 when cartel 
achieved its target price; peak 
was a few days in April 1929 
29 71 Benni et al. 
(1930:21) 
22U.  Same as 22E above; second study of 
same cartel by League of Nations 
researcher, but 8 years later 
Considers the cartel a failure 
because it could not control 
prices when demand dropped 
in early 1930 and African 
mines opened compare 1929 
price with lowest in 1930s 
(1932) 
-- -72  Oualid  (1938:35) 
22V. Same as 22Q above 
Author believes that March 
1935-Sept. 1936 primarily the 
result of quotas; but peak rise 
in Jan. 1937 heavily influenced 
by surge in demand  
36.6 90.3  Oualid  (1938:37) 
22W.  Same as 22E  Lerner index for 1926-1930  0  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
22X.  Same as 22Q  Lerner index for 1935-1939  0  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
22Y.  Same as 22Q above; author is careful 
to identify periods when demand was weak 
or strong enough to affect prices; 1936-38 
were years with steady or mixed growth in 
demand 
New York electrolytic quality 
copper, f.o.b. prompt delivery; 
change from 1931-34 to 1936-
38 average; 1937 is peak year 
37 67  Walters 
(1944:146) 
22Z.  Same as 22Q 
Same as 22R above, except 
base year is 1934, the one with 
the most comparable demand 
conditions to 1936-38 
50.3 83.2  Walters 
(1944:146) 
22AA.  A Paris-based cartel operating in 
“the late 1890s” (ca. 1896-99) had almost a 
monopoly, but little effect on prices 
Method not explained  0  --  Jenks (1907:49) 
22BB.  The next-to-last known phase of the 
copper agreement (began ca. 1964) ended in 
1966; members of the cartel agreed to sell 
“outside normal marketing channels” to 
certain preferred customers (who were 
forbidden to resell) at a lower price fixed 
for 2 years at a time; all other buyers 
purchased copper on the London Metal 
Exchange, which was manipulated by the 
No estimates are available for 
non-U.S. sales; in the mid 
1960s U.S. producers kept 
domestic prices higher than the 
export (LME) price 
0+ --  Kronstein  (1973)   111
cartel through occasional large purchases by 
the cartel on the LME; author hints at a 
U.S.-African agreement on exclusive 
territories  
22CC.  Same as 22E 
Average 1929 prices compared 
to competitive 1923-26 prices 
or to Mar. 1932 price; peak 
was Mar. 1929 
30 75 Elliott et al. 
(1937: 441) 
22DD.  Same as 22B 
London cash prices during Jan. 
1888-Feb. 1889, compared to 
either early 1887 or late 1889. 
75-118 --  Andrews 
(1889:509-514) 
22EE. Last international copper cartel; 
lasted from 1968 to as late as 1988 
Econometric model that 
predicts a Lerner Index  25.0 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
22FF. Same as 22A  Econometric model that 
predicts a Lerner Index  51.5 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
22GG. Same as 22D  Econometric model that 
predicts a Lerner Index  0 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
22HH. Same as 22E  Econometric model that 
predicts a Lerner Index  0 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
22II.  Same as 22Q  Econometric model that 
predicts a Lerner Index  0 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
22JJ*. Same as 22A 
London Metal Exchange prices 
from “late 1887” (before) to a 
few months later 
-- 100+  Prain (1975: 
103) 
22KK*. Same as 22E, except that authors 
believe cartel not effective until after 
9/1927 
Price increase from 9/1927 to 




23A. Bid  rigging of cast-iron pipes, used 
for rail beds, culverts, drainage, or sewage; 
all U.S.  states west and south of Penn-
sylvania and Virginia, circa 1895-1896; 
found guilty at trial; Judge Taft concluded 
that an f.o.b. plant price of $13/t for 16” or 
smaller pipe and $15/t for 30-36” pipe was 
sufficient for a reasonable profit 
Method not explained; 
apparently Posner’s 
interpretation of this famous 





v. Addyston Pipe 
23B*. Omaha, NE municipal tender for 512 
pieces of 20” pipe in 12/1895 
Trial documents reveal that a 
“premium” or “bonus” of 
$23.40/ton (a profit yardstick) 
was the overcharge split 
among the cartel, whereas the 
delivered cartel price was 
$15.40 
52.0 --  U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe 
23C*. St. Louis, MO tender   Bonus of $6.50/t on a winning 
bid price of $24/t  37.1 --  U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe 
23D*. Same as 23C  Bonus of $6.50/t when the 
delivered but-for price was $17 
to $18/t 
36-38 --  U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe 
23E*. Atlanta, GA contract of 12/1895, size 
of pipe and winning bid not mentioned 
Bonus was $7.10/t; reasonable 
profit yardstick is the but-for 
price of $13to $15/t  
47-55 --  U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe 
23F*. Average bonus of $3.63 made by 
cartel from 6/1/1895 to 12/31/1895 
Bonus relative to reasonable 
profit yardstick  20-21 --  U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe 
23G*. Sales of So. Pittsburg Co. in WV, 
MI, and OH; a non-member of the cartel 
was located in Columbus, OH  
Bonus varied from $1/t to 
$1.50/t; yardstick is reasonable 
profit price 
5.6-8.8 -- U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe 
23H*. Chattanooga Co. generated a $3/t 
bonus on all sales in West-central 
Yardstick is reasonable profit 
price 
16.7-
17.7  --  U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe   112
Tennessee 
23I*. In Jan. 1896 cartel made an average 
bonus of $7 to $8/t 
Yardstick is reasonable profit 
price  39-47 --  U.S. v. Addyston 
Pipe 
24. Sophisticated oligopoly model that 
measures market power in the U.S. crude 
petroleum and natural gas markets 1947-
1971; Appelbaum’s model does not 
distinguish tacit from overt collusion; some 
members non-U.S. 
Econometric model prediction 
of average mark-up on full 





25A.  Mark-ups in the U.S. automobile 
industry; study is a general one of mark-up 
and productivity change; it does not 
distinguish overt from tacit behavior; oddly, 
6 of 17 industry groups have higher average 
mark-ups than “automobiles” (e.g., 
chemicals is 61%); financial profits for the 
industry averaged only 3.2%;  source is a 
1990  NBER working paper, but results 
same in 1993 refereed journal paper 
Morrison uses a large scale, 
sparsely specified,  pooled 
1953-1986  time-series 
econometric model of 18 
major industry groups in 
manufacturing, one of which is 






25B.  Same as 25A above 
Tables 2, 2A show mark-ups 
average 30.6%; Table 2A 
shows the largest mark-up of 




(1993: Tables II 
and V) 
26. Price elevation due to oligopoly market 
power from all sources (unilateral, tacit 
collusive, and overt collusive) in the U.S. 
cigarette manufacturing industry. 
Large-scale, richly specified 
oligopoly econometric model 
fitted to 1955-90 data; focused 
on excise tax incidence; 
average wholesale price (with 
taxes) divided by the sum of 
variable production cost, 





Barnett et al. 
(1995: tables 1 
and 3) 
27. Price elevation due to all sources of 
market power (unilateral, tacit, or overt) of 
the U.S.  soft drinks bottling industry 
(does not include the syrup makers like 
Coca-Cola) 
A cross-sectional econometric 
model applied to 1972-1987 
data on 40 food processing 
industries; Lerner index of 
market power is 3
rd highest 










28A. International patent-pooling cartel in 
magnesium metal market combined with 
exclusive supply contract by Dow Chemical 
with fabricator AMC (a General Electric 
affiliate), July 1927-1942, which raised 
prices to all U.S. buyers 
Prices charged to all U.S. 
buyers 6/33-11/38 compared to 
yardstick of AMC’s prices or 




28B.  Dates of cartel above are changed to 
Oct. 1932 (the date Alcoa signs a contract 
with I.G. Farben) to April 1942 (Alcoa, 
Dow and 3 others indicted by DOJ); U.S. 
cartel member pleaded nolo and paid fines;  
beginning in 1942, wartime price controls 
were imposed at levels to guarantee high 
profits 
Real net prices charged by 
Dow Chemical to foreign 
customers during 1933 -1941 
compared to 1942-1943; 
“after” prices more reasonable 
because of rapid cost 
reductions before and during 







28C.  Same as 28A for years 1927-1929  Lerner index  61.3  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190)   113
28D.  Same as 28B  for years 1934-1937  Lerner index  33.3  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
29. Auctions for U.S. Forest Service 
timber, 1975-1981, Pacific Northwest, 108 
auctions in an area with high timber 
density; most other forest areas are less 
competitive 
Econometric model of 
collusion with supply effects; 
mean compared to model of 
competitive market price 
5.7 --  Baldwin et al. 
(1997) 
30. School district milk-supply-contract 
bid rigging in Cincinnati, Ohio by three 
dairies, 1980-1990, for 2% chocolate milk 
in pints; from a trial with finding of guilt 
Average price of winning bids 
relative to competitive control 
group of dairies, from fitted 
econometric model; maximum 
is highest year 
6.5 11.3 
Porter and Zona 
(1999:263), 
Porter and Zona 
(2004:229) 
31. Brokerage firms that in early 1990s 
were market makers on the NASDAQ 
exchange and that beginning May 27 or 28, 
1994 no longer avoided odd-eighth quotes 
on the stocks of four large companies after 
exposure of the practice in newspapers.  
More than 20 of these market-maker paid 
record civil damages    
Comparison of bid/offer 
spreads on four stocks before 
and after 5/27/94  
50 --  Christie et al. 
(1994) 
32. Winning bids in 134 construction 
contracts for Government of Korea public 
works construction projects worth more 
than $10 million each, Jan. 1995-June 1998  
Econometric model using 
forecasting approach  15.5 --  Lee and Hahn 
(2002:83) 
33A. Bid rigging by three contractors on 
city contracts for sewer construction in a 
Southeastern U.S. city, late 1970s to Jan. 
1980, from plaintiff’s expert opinion 
prepared for a trial held in 1985-1988 
Direct court  testimonial 
evidence on City Project No. 




33B. Same as 33A 
Three statistical models 
applied to six other projects 






33C. Same as 33A 
Statistical model applied to 




34A. Bid rigging in 2,014 No. Carolina and 
So. Dakota state highway construction 
projects, 1975-1982, with identity of some 
collusive firms certain and others suspected 
Econometric model for NC 





34B. Same as 34A 
Econometric model, auction 





35. From well-known price-fixing trial, U.S. 
v. Socony-Vacuum, of 24 integrated 
Midwest petroleum refiners (of which 12 
were convicted); agreement to restrict 
refinery output, March 1935-April 1936; 
prices are Midwestern spot 3
rd grade 
gasoline, 60-62 octane, f.o.b. Oklahoma  
But-for prices are averages of 
1934, 1933-34, or 1932-34; 
max. price was 5.4 ¢ per gal. in 
12/35 23-31  36-46  Johnsen 
(1991:179) 
36. Five firms pleaded guilty to bid rigging 
U.S. Dept. of Defense procurement 
contracts for frozen fish, 1981-Sept. 1989, 
consisting of three distinct episodes  
Econometric model that uses 
post-conspiracy prices to:     Froeb et al. 
(1993:419-423 
36A. Same as 36, for 11/86-7/88 (103 bids)  Backcast period A  30  --   
36B. Same as 36, for 6/84-11/86 (74 bids)  Backcast period B  23  --     114
36C. Same as 36, for 9/88-9/89 (44 bids)  Forecast period C  23  --   
37. Bakers of Washington State colluded on 
price of white pan bread from about 1954 
to 1964; confirmed by a decision of the 
U.S. 9
th Circuit Court  
Yardstick is conservative, the 
average U.S. retail price; 
maximum price difference is 
late 1958 
15+ 20.5 Mueller and 
Parker (1992:79) 
38. An event study of the impact on stock 
prices of price-fixing indictments, mostly 
U.S. manufacturing sector, announced 
during 1962-1980 on 127 publicly traded 
U.S. firms in 57 conspiracies (out of 200 
total); at least 85% pleaded guilty and were 
fined 
Econometric study; estimated 
additional revenues from the 
conspiracies are compared to 




39. EU carton board cartel, 1/86-12/91 
EC decision to impose fines, 








40.  An international cartel in iodine was 
formed in 1878 by Chilean, English, and 
French companies; in the 1930s these 
companies and others from Germany, Italy, 
and Norway were linked by a common 
selling organization in London; Japanese 
producers joined in June 1937; ended in 
Sept. 1939 
Eckbo’s estimate is in a table, 
but he provides no discussion 






41. Ferry Operators, English Channel 
Freight, 10/92-12/92; EC fines 
EC orders nullification of 







42A. International fine-art auction house 
services 1992-2000, convicted by U.S.DOJ, 






42B. Same as 42Aabove 
Information about changes in 
U.S. commission rates paid by 
all clients 
91-200 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.4) 
42C*. Same as 42A above 
Based on unchallenged 
testimony at US trial about 
Sotheby’s increased profits of 
$50-75 million, its market 





42D*. Same as 42A above 
Government’s calculation of 
overcharge and affected 
commission revenues accepted 
by judge for sentencing of 
Sotheby’s owner  
27-29 -- 
AP (4/23/2002), 
NY Law J. 
(4/23/2002) 
42E*. Same as 43A above 
Calculations of class-action 
lead counsel of total damages 
($300 million) and total 
commissions 
94-100 -- Stewart  (2001) 
43. Shipping conference, France to Central 
& West Africa 1975-1992; fined by EC 
4/1/92 
From decision of the European 
Commission printed in the 





Table A.4), EC 
Official Journal   115
L134 (5/18/92:3) 
44. A 1952 U.S. court decision concluded 
that 3 beet-sugar refiners had conspired to 
undercharge sugar-beet farmers in the 
1939-1941 crop years by $0.25 /ton 
Prices paid to growers by 
processors in 1939-1941, 
excluding Sugar Act 
payments; lowest (peak) price 
is from 1939  
4.6 7.6  Adams and Bock 
(1980; 143-144) 
45.  U.S. jury trial concluded that grocery 
retailers in California had conspired from 
1953 to 1970 to under pay their suppliers of 
beef 
1953-1970  wholesale prices of 
beef compared the three years 
after the conspiracy terminated   47 65  Adams and Bock 
(1980; 145-146) 
46.  Suppliers of vanadium ore conspired 
to lower prices to certain corporate 
customers in the U.S. in the 1950s; a rare 
monopsony case; jury trial decision in 1962 
But-for price was that paid for 
the same grade of ore at the 
same time by the U.S. 
Government  
39? --  Adams and Bock 
(1980; 146) 
47A. First international platinum cartel 
was formed in 1903; one UK and one 
French marketer of Russian metal; ended 
1914 
Average stabilized price 1905-
14 compared to 1903  125 -- Elliott et al. 
(1937:152) 
47B. Second intl. wholesalers’ cartel 
formed 1920; included original 2 members 
plus one U.S. firm and “German interests”; 
ended in early 1931 after opening of new 
mines in Russia, Columbia, So. Africa, and 
Canada after 1927 
Cartel’s peak effectiveness 
was 1920-1927; peak price of 
$120/oz. reached in 1925; 
comparison is with price early 
1931 
-- 336  Elliott et al. 
(1937:153) 
47C. The second international platinum (a 
byproduct of gold, copper, or nickel 
mining) miners cartel was formed in 1918 
by companies mining and smelting in 
Russia, UK, Canada, So. Africa, Columbia, 
Germany, and France; Russia withdrew in 
1927; did not control substitute palladium 
prices; may be related to 47B 
Real prices 1919-1927, 
compared to non-cartel period 





47D.  The third international platinum 
miners’ cartel began Oct. 1931 with 
establishment of Consolidated Platinums 
Ltd. in London which managed export 
quotas and set refined metal prices; 
probably collapsed 1933 
Real prices in 1932-1933 
compared to 1930-31; 1932 is 




47E.  Same as 47D above 
Real prices in 1932-33 
compared to 1935-38 or to 
1935 alone because 1936-38 






47F.  Same as 47C  Lerner index  75.4  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
47G.  Same as 47D  Lerner index  11.1  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
48.  Electric power generating and 
transmission equipment, bid rigging 
against U.S. electric utilities began in 1930s 
but data available only for 1950-1959, 
overcharges of about $175 million per year 
in 1950s, 29 corporations pleaded guilty in 
1960 and paid fines of almost $2 million, 
almost 2000 private treble-damages suits 






48A. Average price increases on all  Result of five-year study by  9-10  --  Carlton and   116
products  joint committee of Congress  Perloff 
(1990:216), U.S. 
Congress (1965) 
48B. Same as 48A; widely cited study by 
FTC staff members, eight of the most 
important product classes out of 20 that 
were cartelized during 1950 or earlier and 
1959; analysis covers sub period 1950-1954 
Econometric model applied to 
data from special survey of 70 






et al. (1985:836) 
48C. Same as 48A, except a temporary 
lapse in cartel discipline called the “White 
Sale” of 1955 





et al. (1985:836) 
48D. Same as 48A, except final collusive 
episode of 1956-1959 





et al. (1985:836) 
48E. Turbine electric generator quarterly 
transaction prices 1948-1963 from industry 
trade association; Sultan concludes that 
conspiracy was “ineffectual” (p ix) and had 
no “measurable impact on price… when 
measured with the dummy variable 
technique”  (p.111); yet hidden in an 
appendix is a Version II model cited by 
Carton and Perloff that includes both direct 
and indirect effects; finds positive 1960-72 
price differences, which seem to be due to 
tacit behavior  
Very complex econometric 
simulation model with and 
without conspiracy effects for 
1955-59; average price 
differences are much larger in 
1958-1960 than after 1960; 






48F.  Large electric power transformers 
1947-late 1959 
Simple comparison of 
defendants’ transaction  prices 
with the 10 quarters of prices 
after the cartel was prosecuted; 
peak prices 1956 
30-38 90  Kuhlman (1967: 
553) 
48G.  Same as 48A; a journalistic 
monograph of the U.S. electrical equipment 
conspiracy based on interviews, court 
proceedings, and Congressional hearings 
Comparison of “book” (list 
collusive ) prices in early 
1950s with late 1994-early 
1955 price war “discounted” 
prices, all products 
-- 40-45  Smith (1963: 
110) 
48H.  Same as 48G above, large circuit 
breakers 
Price in winter of 1957-1958 
price war among members of 
the electrical circuit breakers 
cartel, compared to previous 
book prices 
60 60  Smith (1963: 
112) 
48I.  Same as 48G above, switchgear  Same as above for 1958 prices  -- 40-45  Smith (1963: 
114) 
48J.  Same as 48E; decision from a bench 
trial in Ohio Valley Electric v. General 
Electric 
Judge compared actual prices 
paid with post-conspiracy 
prices and adjusted the price 
difference downward to 
account for a number of 
changes in demand and supply 





48K.  Same as 48A; estimates made by two 
academic economists in late 1962 working 
for the Anti-Trust Investigation Group, a 
consortium of 164 plaintiffs’ counsel for the 
1,912 treble-damage suits; analysis used  
But-for prices were before, 
during, during, and after 
(1948, 1950, 1955, and 1961) 
with the last year giving the 
largest overcharges; 
10-11 --  Bane (1973:217-
219)   117
both list prices and buyers’ prices paid from 
1948 to end of 1961 and corrected price 
increases for labor and material costs; steam 
turbine generators 1948-1960 
“conservative” Blue Book 
figures used all four years 
48L. Same as 48H, except for large circuit 
breakers 1956-1959  Same as 48K above  28  --  Bane (1973:217-
219) 
48M.  Same as 48K above, except large 
power transformers 1956-1959  Same as 48K above  37  --  Bane (1973:217-
219) 
48N.  Same as 48K above, except watt-hour 
meters 1956-1959  Same as 48K above  13  --  Bane (1973:217-
219) 
48O.  Same as 48A; result of a jury trial in 
1964 in Philadelphia Electric v. General 
Electric et al. for a mix of products 
purchased by the plaintiff  
Jury decision on actual 
damages  8.7 --  Bane  (1973:314) 
48P. Same as 48A; result of a bench trial in 
1964 in Ohio Valley Electric v. General 
Electric et al. 
Bench decision on actual 
damages  11 --  Bane  (1973:314) 
48Q.  Same as 48A; result of a court’s 
special master’s analysis, Prof. Kessel of 
the Univ. of Chicago, in Atlantic City 
Electric v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker trial; 
plaintiffs included Gulf State and Kansas 
City Power and Light; after the Special 
Master’s report was issued, I-T-E quickly 
settled 
Range of estimates is for 
different mix of  purchases by 
two utilities 
21-24 --  Bane (1973:217-
219) 
48R.  Same as 48E 
Previous estimate is from the 
text; this one is from Table 
A18.4 for 1955-59 
13.3 --  Sultan 
(1975:348) 
49A. Classic empirical study of the Joint 
Executive Committee, a famously unstable 
U.S. railroad cartel that fixed prices and 
market shares on transport from Chicago to 
East Coast cities for 328 weeks from 1880 
to 1886  prior to the passage of the Sherman 
Act  
Average price increase during 
“cooperative periods” 
identified by the JEC’s 
detailed internal records  66  --  Porter (1983) 
49B.  Same as 49A; an econometric 
analysis of the Joint Executive Committee, 
one of the most intensely examined cartels 
in history; the model specifies both demand 
and supply relationships and, unlike Porter 
(1983),  corrects for serial correlation   
To derive the average 
equilibrium price during 
collusive periods, one must 
solve the supply equation for 




Table 2  p.42), 
Ellison (2003) 
49C.  Same as 49A, except author’s 
econometric model for 1871-1898 uses 56 
semiannual observations of real prices of 
grain shipments; controls for a few railroad 
costs and demand factors; distinguishes 
between months when Great lakes shipping 
via Buffalo was competitive and months 
when ships could not sail 
During 1871-74 JEC period 
when there were only two 
companies serving Chicago 
from the East, winter rates 
compared to pre-JEC period 
24.4 --  Briggs 
(1989:201) 
49D.  Same as 49A above 
Same as 49C above except 
summer rates when there was a 
large fringe competing 
9.5 --  Briggs 
(1989:201) 
49E.  Same as 49A above 
Compares winter rates during 
JEC when there were 4 or 5 
railway companies with pre-
JEC rates 
5.5 --  Briggs 
(1989:201) 
49F.  Same as 49A  Same as above except summer  .5  --  Briggs   118
rates (1989:201) 
49G.  Same as 49A except model is two 
equations solved simultaneously, which 
allows for feedback effects;  covers only the 
JEC cartel period; has a greater array of 
controls for demand and supply shifters, 
including market concentration 
Alternative model 
specifications result in some 
variations in the estimated 
coefficient for price; larger 
effects are highly significant 
13.7-
30.8  --  Briggs 
(1989:203) 
50A.  Quebracho (tanning agent) cartels 
organized voluntarily by about 20 Latin 
American and 1 UK firm in four 
agreements 1916-17,  1919-22, 1926-31, 
and 1935-44; cartels were “reinforced by 
decrees of the Argentinean and Paraguayan 
governments”; nevertheless, the cartel’s 
U.S. agents were prosecuted by the DOJ in 
1942 
New York import prices for 
1926-30 compared to 1923-25 









50B.  Same as 50A above for years 1919-
1922  
Real prices in 1920-22 taken 
from Berge (1944) compared 





50C.  Same as 50A above for years 1926-
1931 
Real prices in 1926-31 
compared with 1924-1925 and 





50D.  Same as 50A above for years 1935-
1942 
Real prices in 1935-39 






50E. Same as 50A and 50D above  NY import prices for 1935-39 
compared to 1932-33  52 --  Hexner (1946: 
281) 
50F.  Same as 50A and 50C above   
Eckbo’s interpretation of 
Hexner and information from 






50G.  Same as 50A and 50D above for 




50H.  Same as 50D above; information 
from Congressional testimony in 1942 and 
from court documents when six trading 
companies pleaded nolo in 1942 
Last of six price increases 
from Nov. 1934 to Jan. 1941, 
compared to pre-Nov. 1934 
price 
-- 95  Berge 
(1944:118) 
50I.  Same as 50A 
Real prices in 1926-31 






51. Ready-mix concrete bid-rigging cartel 
in Denmark, January 1994 to January 1996; 
prices on several grades from 18 sites; 
collusion was facilitated by detailed price 
reports issued by the Danish Competition 
Authority that made previously secret 
discounts known to sellers; study controls 
for costs; no mention of prosecution 
Average prices compared to 
quarter before new 
government price reporting 
began  19 25  Albaek et al. 
(1997:433,440) 
52A. Bid rigging of English oral auctions 
of  340 quality-graded used 1988 
Chevrolet Caprice police cars, New York 
City, January 1990-May 1991; alleged 
bidding ring active in 3 of 13 auctions; civil 
case settled out of court 
Ratio approach statistical 
analysis of Howard and 
Kaserman (1989); mean of 
three auctions  17.1 22.4  Nelson 
(1993:385) 
52B. Same as above  Dummy variable model 
following Howard and  16.6 21.4  Nelson 
(1993:390)   119
Kaserman (1989); from 
Equation 1 
53. Bid rigging ring in Washington, DC of 
680 houses sold at public auction 
(mortgage foreclosures or NISI 
proceedings), Jan. 1967-August 1990, 
followed by English “knockout” auctions 
among ring members to distribute profits; 
six members pled guilty, 6-9 found guilty at 
trial   
Econometric model with 
almost perfect fit to sample of 
bids by members found guilty 
at trial; model accounts for 
complex profit payout system  32.5 146+  Kwoka (1997: 
Tables 1 and 2) 
54. Regional market power of AMPI dairy 
cooperative with 30,000 members, 1972-
April 1975 (date of DOJ consent decree) 
over farm milk prices  
Econometric dummy-variable 
model of the price premium in 
markets with average market 
shares, relative to post-decree 
margin, as a proportion of U.S. 
average blend price of farm 
milk 
3.0-4.0 -- 
Madhaven et al. 
(1994: Tables 1 
and 4) 
55.  Intensive case studies of 40 cartels in 
UK manufacturing before and after the 
1956 antitrust legislation and Restrictive 
Practices Court decisions from 1959 and 
later made 85% of the sample cartels 
illegal.  Despite strong demand increases 
and moderate inflation in early 1960s, 39 of 
40 cartels showed significant price declines. 
Change in nominal wholesale 
UK prices reported by sellers 
or major buyers from 1956-59 
price levels to various periods 
following first negative Court 
ruling in 1959 
0-30 -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
56. Same as 55 above, UK wire ropes, non-
marine, 1956-59 
Price 36 months after negative 
ruling 15.3  -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
57. Same as 55 above, UK porcelain 
sanitary bathroom fixtures,  1956-59 
12 months after 
20.0 -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
58. Same as 55 above, UK steel pipes, 
sewage and drainage, 1956-59  
36 months after  
25.0 -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
59. Same as 55 above, UK rubber and 
plastic coated cable, 1956-59 
6 months after  
25-30 -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
60. Same as 55 above, UK small electric 
motors, 1956-59 
36 months after  
20-25 -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
61. Same as 55 above, UK electric meters; 
probable bid rigging against government 
electricity-generating companies 
72 months after, as reported by 
one buyer  15.0 -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
62. Same as 55 above, UK carpets, 
mechanically woven, 1956-59 
Up to 10 years later 
0 -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
63. Same as 55 above, UK iron bath tubs, 
1956-59 
Average 1965-69 prices 
30+ -- 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
64. Same as 55 above, UK steel drums, 
1956-59 
Average 1960-69 prices 
-- 10 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
65. Same as 55 above, UK electricity 
transformers, largest sizes; probable bid 
rigging against government electricity-
generating companies, 1956-59 
Average 1960-1970 prices 
-- 25 
Swann et al. 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
66. Same as 55 above, UK electricity  Average 1960-1970 prices  --  25-41  Swann et al.   120
transformers, system and distribution; 
probable bid rigging against government 
electricity-generating companies, 1956-59 
(1974: 156-57, 
166) 
67A. The Sugar Trust was formed in Nov. 
1887 and was effective in eastern U.S. until 
the Spreckels factory in Philadelphia 
opened in early 1892 
The increase in gross margins 
in 1888-89 divided by the 
average wholesale price; peak 
is Sept. 1889; UK and German 
yardsticks show no 
technological change affecting 
prices 
6-14 15  Jenks  (1900:145) 
67B.  Same as 67A, except that in mid 1892 
the Trust bought out Spreckels; until new 
rival firm appeared in Sept. 1898 
The increase in gross margins 
in 1892 to mid 1898 relative to 
average price; peak is Sept. 
1896 
7-9 16  Jenks  (1900:145) 
67C. From “narrative evidence,” weekly 
memos of meetings of the Sugar Institute, a 
trade assn. of the 14 U.S. cane sugar 
refiners from Dec. 1927 to 1936 when 
Supreme Court declared it to be an illegal 
cartel; Institute achieved higher prices 
solely through collusion on trading rules, in 
face if increasing competition from beet 
sugar and imports 
Comparison of prices in 
relatively competitive period 
1926-27 (Lerner Index was 
0.031) to cartel period (Lerner 
ave. 0.085 and monopoly 
index 0.110) and adjusts for 
only source of cost changes 
















67D. same as 67C above 
But-for price is from 1937-




67E.  Eastern U.S. Sugar Trust, from a 
quantitative NEIO model fitted to 1890-
1914 price, demand, and cost data; Am. 
Sugar Refining Co.’s market share fell from 
91% in 1892 to 71-86% in 1893-97 to 
below 62% after 1901. 
Elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
indexes significantly greater 
than zero for 1893-1897, 






67F.  Same as 67E 
Elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
indexes significantly greater 





67G.  Same as 67E 
Elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
indexes significantly greater 





67H.  Same as 67E 
Elasticity-adjusted Lerner 
indexes significantly greater 





68A. History of several early attempts 
(1847, 1862, and 1885) at forming national 
zinc cartels in France and Belgium that held 
stocks of zinc off the market to raise prices; 
the first was “successful” for 13 years (viz., 
1847-60), the others were not. 
Historical case study, but no 
price data discussed; method 
unclear 
0+ --  Devos  (1994) 
68B. First international zinc export cartel 
began 1910, ended Sept. 1914; included all 
the largest firms in AT, BL, UK, FR, DE, 
and NL with 62% of world production; 
large US market was protected by tariffs 
No prices available, but 
characterized as a “weak” 
cartel 
0+ -- 
Benni et al. 
(1930), Plummer 
(1934:102) 
68C.  Second international zinc cartel 
similar to 68A; began Sept. 1928, revised in 
Jan. 1929 and dissolved Dec. 1929 because 
market price stayed above its target price; 
signed only  3-month contracts 
A “weak” cartel also  0+  -- 
Benni et al. 
(1930), Plummer 
(1934:102)   121
68D. Same as 68C; international zinc cartel 





68E.  Same as 68C; members included all 
major European producers; monthly 
agreements on production cuts of 5% to 
10%; no control over new electrolytic-zinc 
process factories and friction between 
vertically integrated and nonintegrated 
members 
European prices from Mar. 
1929 to lowest level in May 
1931 
63 -- Elliott et al. 
(1937) 
68F.  A revival of the 1928-29 European 
cartel with Australia and Canada added; 
output adjusted every 3 months if price 
exceeded or fell below £24/t; mid 1931-
1934 (or 1935) 







68G. Same as 68F; beginning in July 1931 
and continuing through 1933, European 
producers reduced production to 45% below 
rated capacities; stocks reached normal 
levels by 1933 causing prices to rise 
through mid 1934 
No precise data provided, but 
analysis consistent with 68E 
above 
0+ -- Elliott et al. 
(1937:764) 
68H.  Historical case study based on 
internal memorandums of 2nd international 
zinc cartel; the Zinc Producers Group of 22 
companies in Australia, UK, Germany, 
France, Spain, and Canada operated from 
1945 to 1975 using output restraints, 
purchases of stocks, list price targets, and 
manipulation of the zinc contracts on the 
London Metals Exchange; effective only 
from 1964 to 1968.  
But-for price is 1960-62 or 
1961-63 average f.o.b. cash 
price on the London Metals 
Exchange compared to July 
1964 – Dec. 1968 average; 
peak is 1965 average  39-46 53  Tsokhas (2000: 
Table 1) 
69A. Same companies, conduct, and time 
period as 68H above, except for the Lead 
Producers Group; price increases effective 
only in 1965-1967. 
Base period is 1960-64 or 
1961-65 LME cash contract 
prices; collusive period is 
1965-1967; peak is 1966 
34-53 49-69  Tsokhas (2000: 
Table 2) 
69B.  Lead cartel, all leading mining and 
smelting companies of 8 countries, signed 
an agreement 11/1/38, abandoned 9/39, but 
considerable doubts about whether agreed  
reductions in sales were ever implemented 
London spot exchange prices 
Nov. 1938 to August 1939  0 --  Hexner (1946: 
230) 
69C.  International lead cartel 1921-1923  Lerner index  20.5  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
69D.  This author states that there were no 
international agreements prior to April 1931 
after London prices had declined by 60% 
since 1929; in 1930 and 1931 the Lead 
Producers’ Association cut non-US 
production by 80-85% 
Production quotas caused late 
1931-1932 prices to rise above 
the lowest previous price 
observed in June 1931 
10-50 --  Elliott 
(1937:662) 
70A. South African cement cartel fixed 
prices and quotas from at least 1922 to 
1994; adopted a multiple basing-point 
pricing system in 1956; legally exempted 
after 1986 by the So. African Competition 
Board, which reversed its position in 1995; 
Leach‘s extensive apologia of cartels fails 
Prices set by cartel in Natal 
area compared to bulk prices 
charged by a new importer of 
Spanish cement in 1984-85; 
cartel later cut prices in Natal 
by 24% and drove importer out 
of business 
5-10 -- 
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to criticize the Natal-import episode 
70B. Same as 70A above 
Authors derive average  1972-
1990 mark-up by comparing 
cement price-cost margins 
with those in buildings-
materials mfg. and all 
manufacturing    
17-26 --  Fourie and Smith 
(1995) 
71. Historical/political-science study of the 
So. African gem diamond cartel, the 
Diamond Syndicate, that got control of all 
major mines in 1888 and began to reduce 
sales in that year 
Prices in 1889 to 1890 






72A.  An export cartel organized by the two 
dominant producers of mercury located in 
Italy and Spain, both with government 
ownership or control; cartel reserved home 
markets for each company and operated 
exports through joint sales agents in 
Switzerland or London or in the importing 
countries 1928-1936; interrupted by 
Spanish Civil War 
Eckbo’s interpretation of case 
studies by others; prices may 
refer to export markets that 







72B.  Same as 72A above, except for 1939-
1949 
Eckbo’s interpretation of case 
studies by others; ; prices may 
refer to export markets that 




33),  Hexner 
(1946: 232-233) 
72C.  Same as 72B above from period when 
sole selling agency was established in 
London until it was nationalized by the UK 
government in 1942 
Eckbo’s assumption on the 
basis of the UK nationalization  50+ --  Eckbo (1967: 
40) 
72D. Same as 72A; from an early economic 
study of international cartels, most of them 
European based; writing at the beginning of 
the Great Depression, the author is more 
impressed by the failures of cartels to raise 
prices than their successes; of scores of 
private cartels studied, only two have data 
on their price effects, one of them the 
international mercury cartel, which 
controlled 88% of global supply in 1927 
and 58% in Aug. 1932, during a period of 
rapidly falling demand 
Price change from May 1931 
to August 1932 in UK, from 
information in previously 
published economic studies 
and press accounts  
-- -58  Plummer 
(1934:149-152) 
72E.  Same as 72A above, except dates of 
operation are 1926-30; in 1931 mercury 
cartel control dropped to 57%; prices are 
minimum annual League of Nations series 
in pounds sterling 
Average 1926-30 prices 
compared to competitive 1932-
35 period; peak is 1926 
99 126  Oualid (1938:22-
23) 
72F.  Same as 72A  and 72B combined  Lerner index, econometric 
model  108.3 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
72G. International cartel 1954-1970  Lerner index, econometric 
model  270.4 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
72H. International cartel 1975-1982  Lerner index, econometric 
model  42.9 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
73A.  From 1897 to 1919, the German 
potash cartel, the Deutche Kali Syndikat, 
which contained a mix of private and state-
owned mines, had a near monopoly on 
In June 1909 the cartel’s 
contract expired and three 
dissident members signed 





(1916)   123
world exports; Newman states that industry 
was nationalized and all producers 
compelled to join the cartel in April 1919; 
Schroeter judges that the cartel began as 
early as 1876 and that the Prussian state 
began controlling the cartel in late 1910; 
Tosdal believes start date is 1879  
at prices well below the 1908- 
early 1909 U.S. c.i.f. import  
price 
73B. Same as 73A above 
As interpreted by Levenstein, 











73C.Same as 73A above 
German price of chloride of 
potash in 1878 compared to 
the 1896-1906 average 
55 --  Levy  (1927:295) 
73D. Same as 73A above 
Estimates price-cost margin in 
1910 to be 200%; costs appear 
to be close to LRMC 
100+ --  Schroeter 
(1994:76) 
73E.  First international potash cartel 
formed in August 1924, after deep price 
cuts during 1919-1923; voluntary 
agreement between the German and French 
national (both were government-controlled) 
cartels to set prices and quotas (70%, 30% 
respectively) for U.S. exports; in 1929 the 
only significant U.S. producer was secretly 
bought by the German cartel; lasted in its 
original form until 1932; overcapacity was 
cut and the industries rationalized, causing 
production costs to decline in 1920s and 
1930s; no cost changes in 1920s 
U.S. import prices of Manure 
salts (20% potash)  set at start 
of cartel compared to 
competitive 1909-10 U.S. 








73F.  Same as 73E above  Same as 73E for muriate of 
potash (51% potash)  42.7 --  Newman (1948: 
583) 
73G.  Same as 73E above  Same as 73E for sulfate  of 
potash (49% potash)  50.7 --  Newman (1948: 
583) 
73H.  Same as 73E above 
Change in U.S. import prices 
from September 1924 to May 
1929 for manure salts 
65.2 --  Newman (1948: 
583) 
73I.  Same as 73E above 
Change in U.S. import prices 
from September 1924 to May 
1929 for muriate of potash 
12.4 --  Newman (1948: 
583) 
73J.  Same as 73E above 
Change in U.S. import prices 
from September 1924 to May 
1929 for sulfate of potash 
11.4 --  Newman (1948: 
583) 
73K.  Second international cartel;  Polish 
producers were added in 1932 as members 
and given a 4% export share; Spanish 
production  expanded rapidly under French 
and British ownership from 1932 to 1934 
when it captured  33% of U.S. market 
Prices of U.S. imports in 
100%-potash-equivalents fell 
from 1933 to 1934  because of 
Spanish entry into the world 
export market 
71.6 --  Newman (1948: 
584) 
73L. Third international cartel; signed a 
new agreement with Spanish producers in 
1935 giving them 15% export share;  
outbreak of Spanish Civil War in 1936 
Same as 73E  above for years 
1934 to 1937-1941  37.7 --  Newman (1948: 
583)   124
reduced Spain’s exports; Russia and 
Palestine added in 1936; probably ended 
Sept. 1939 
73M.  Authors view 1st,  2
nd, 3rd 
international potash cartels 1926-35 (73E, 
73K, and 73L) as one cartel 
Compare average 1927-35 
German potash prices with 
price in 1926; peak is 1934 
24 33  Oualid  (1938:26) 
73N.  Same as 73M 
Compare 1926-35 French 
prices with 1926; peak is 
1927-29 
40 46  Oualid  (1938:26) 
73O.  Same as 73M  Lerner index  56.3  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
73P. Same as 73E; Schroeter ascribes price 
increase to a renewed agreement in May 
1925 that adjusted the French-German 
export quotas and set of 50-50 common 
sales agencies in the importing countries.   
Berlin potash prices in late 
1925 compared to 1924 and 
early 1925 prices  
50+ --  Schroeter 
(1994:78) 
73Q. Same as 73E  Average Berlin prices in 1928-
1932 relative to 1924 prices  55-65+ --  Schroeter 
(1994:80) 
73R. Polish potash mines opened in 1927 
and were admitted to intl. cartel with a 
national hegemony and a 4% export share 
in 1932; Russian cartel entered with a 10% 
quota in April 1934; but failure to 
incorporate large Spanish production from 
1932 to May 1935 was the cause of a price 
crash in 1934-35 
Berlin prices in 1928-32 
relative to 1934-35; peak price 
in 1931 
73 89  Schroeter 
(1994:80) 
73S.  Same as 73R; in May 1935 Spanish 
producers were allotted a national 
hegemony and a 15% world export share; 
U.S. producers made a secret agreement in 
1935 to follow the intl. cartel’s prices, for 
which they were found guilty in 1940 
Berlin prices in 1936-37 after 
Spain joined cartel compared 
to 1934-35 
26 --  Schroeter 
(1994:78) 
73T*. Same as 73A 
Compares prices in 1908 with 
prices offered during cartel 
suspension on two-year 1909-





73U*.  Same as 73E 
Compares average 1926-28 
muriate of potash US import 
prices with period of weak 






73V*.  Same as 73E 
Compares average 1926-28 
potash sulphate US import 
prices with period of weak 






73W*.  Same as 73E 
Compares average 1926-28 
manure salt US import prices 
with period of weak cartel 





73X*.  Same as 73E 
Compares average 1926-28 
kainite of potash US import 
prices with period of weak 






74A. International steel cartel centered in 
Western Europe in 1930s; cartel raised 
Prices in Germany above 
world price, apparently from  33 --  Levenstein and 
Suslow   125
prices in domestic markets of members, but 
sold abroad at lower, possibly competitive 
prices; seems to cover two episodes below 
(74B and 74C) 
Barbezat’s studies; Baker 
applies a general oligopoly 
model to U.S. data from 1933-
39; Gallet’s model refers to 







74B. First international steel cartel of Sept. 
1926-March 1931 
S & W conclude that it 
“…lacked power over prices”; 
Benni et al. agree for whole 








74C.  Second international steel cartel of 
June 1933- Sept. 1939 
This reorganized cartel was 
bigger and more successful 
than the first, but its power 
over price cannot be 
disentangled from the recovery 






74D.  Same as 74C  Lerner index  38.9  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
74E. Same as 74C, but League of Nations 
prices collected f.o.b. Antwerp in pounds 
sterling, which author states are the same as 
found all over continental Europe 
Average prices July 1933-Oct. 
1936 compared to either Jan. 
or April 1933  
9.3-17.5 -- Oualid  (1938:40) 
74F.  Same as 74A  Lerner index  13.6  --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
75. International lysine cartel 1992-1995, 
prosecuted and sanctioned by the U.S., EU, 
Canada, and Mexico 
 
    
75A.  








Change in U.S. prices 1993, 








Official estimate of overcharge 
during 1992-95, combined 
with court records of U.S. 
affected sales 
17.1 --  OECD  (2003:55) 
75D.   Selling prices in U.S. relative 
to LRMC   17.6 56  Connor (2001b, 
2004) 
75E  Econometric model of the U.S. 
lysine market 
17.6-
18.0  56-57  Morse and Hyde 
(2000) 
75F. 
Benchmark is pre-cartel 





Benchmark is pre-cartel EU 
prices  17 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1), EC 
decision of 
6/27/2000 
75H.  Benchmark is pre-cartel world 
prices  14 --  Connor (2001b, 
2003: Table A.1) 
75I.  Residual analysis from  8  --  Connor (2001b,   126
75D,F,G, and H above; Asia 
and Latin America 
2003: Table A.1) 
75J. 
Magazine article; Canadian 





Prediction of price change due 
to collusion from a dynamic 
simulation model of the lysine 
industry that focuses on the 
role of ADM’s entry 
24.6 --  De Roos 
(2004:50) 
76. International citric acid cartel, mid 
1991- early 1995; convicted and fined in the 
U.S. and EU 
Transaction prices compared 
to a range of  long run full 
economic costs 
    
76A. 
Transaction prices compared 
to a range of  long run full 





76B.  Benchmark is pre-cartel prices 
in Canada  19-32 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
76C.  
Benchmark is pre-cartel prices 
in EU  45-50 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1), EC 
decision of 
12/5/2001 
76D.  Benchmark is pre-cartel world 
prices  30-34 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
76E.  Official U.S. government 
estimate, method not reported  31 --  OECD  (2003:55) 
76F. 
Statement of EC 
Commissioner M. Monti 






77 International sorbates cartel 1979-1997, 
successfully prosecuted by U.S. DOJ, 
Canada, EU, and private plaintiffs in U.S. 
 
    
77A.  
Press report from anonymous 






Benchmark is pre-cartel and 
post-cartel U.S. prices from 






77C.  Same as above for Canada  37-47 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
77D.   Same as above, world prices  42 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
77E. 
Trade journal.;  simple 






78A. International cartel in methionine 
1986-1999, successfully prosecuted by EU 
and large private settlements in U.S. 
Benchmark is pre-cartel U.S.  
prices from trade magazine 
sources 
10-14 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
78B. Same as 78A, but for the European 
Union; span is Feb. 1986 to Feb. 1999 
Narrative of meetings gives 
both target and transaction 




(10/8/2003):1-32   127
1990 to Feb. 1999; overstated 
benchmark (proxy for pre-
cartel price) is mid 1990 price; 
peak is mid 1992 
79.  International sodium chlorate cartel 
formed by exporters from Switzerland, 
Sweden, Italy, Germany, France, and 




Real prices in 1931-1939 
compared to nearly constant 
prices in 1920-1930, a period 
of relatively robust demand; 





80. International cartel in 15 bulk vitamins 
and Carotenoids, various dates between 
1988 and 1999; prosecuted by U.S. DOJ, 
EC, CBC, ACCC, and private plaintiffs in 
U.S. and Canada.  
 
    
80A. All vitamins in US, 1989-99 
a 
Press report of  U.S. class-




80B. Same as 80A for Canada, 1989-99 





80C. Vitamin E in US, 1990-99 
Analysis of U.S. list or spot 





80D. vitamin B1 in US, 1991-94  Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices pre-cartel   9-11 16  Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
80E.  vitamin B2 in US, 1991-95 
Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices before and after cartel 
for vitamin B2 
12-19 21 Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
80F.  vitamin B5 (calpan), 1991-98 
Analysis of U.S. list or spot 





80G.  folic acid ( B9), 1991-94 
Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices before cartel for folic 





80H.  vitamin C, 1991-95 
Analysis of U.S. list or import 





80I.  vitamin B3 (niacin), 1992-98 
Analysis of U.S. import prices 
before cartel  33 71 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1), Con- 
nor (2001a:329) 
80J.  vitamin B12, 1991-94  Analysis of U.S. list or spot 
prices pre cartel  13 73  Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
80K.  beta carotene, 1991-98  Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices pre cartel  25-35 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.1) 
80L.  vitamin B12 in Canada, 1991-94 
Analysis of Canadian list or 





80M.  Vitamin A for world, 1990-99 
Analysis of world list prices 
pre cartel   25-30 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80N.  Same as 80D  vitamin B1, 1991-94  Analysis of world list prices  9-10  --  Connor (2003:   128
before cartel   Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80O. Same as 80E  vitamin B2, 1991-95 
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel   12-19  -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80P.  Same as 80F vitamin B5, 1991-98 
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel   25 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80Q.  vitamin B6 
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel  4-40 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80R. Same as 80G  folic acid (B9) 
 
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel   23 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80S. Same as 80H vitamin C  
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel  11-23  -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80T.  Same as 80K  beta carotene 
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel  25-30 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80U.  Same as 80K other Carotenoids in 
US 
 
Analysis of U.S. list prices 
before cartel   9-13 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80V.  Same as 80K other Carotenoids, 
world 
 
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel   25-30  -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80W.  Same as 80I vitamin B3   
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel   33 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80X.  Same as 80J vitamin B12 
Analysis of world list prices 
before cartel   33 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.1, 2001: 
322-330) 
80Y.  Same as 80A . An innovative trade 
model is fitted to international trade data in 
all bulk vitamins for 90 countries without 
significant domestic production; covers the 
years 1985-1999 (misses last 14 months of 
cartel); converted into 2000 U.S. dollars; 
importing nations with anticartel laws are 
distinguished from those that did not; model 
predicts quantity and price effects of the 
global vitamins cartel ;  total overcharge is 
$2,626 million 
Simple average of 24 






80Z.  Same as 80A and 80Y above for 24 
countries identified by the OECD with 
anticartel laws during the affected period (a 
possibly generous designation), excludes 
U.S. and many EU countries with large 
exports  
Simple average of 24 
overcharges on vitamins 




80AA. Same as 80A and 80Y above, but 
excluding five countries present authors 
believe did net effectively enforce their 
laws during most of 1989-1999: So. Africa., 
China, Romania, Peru, Bulgaria, Zambia. 





80BB.  Same as 80A and 80Y above for 20 
largest countries with no anticartel laws 
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80CC.  Same as80A and 80Y above for  20 
countries  plus 5 mentioned in 80X 





80DD.  Same as 80A  for South Korea, 
1990-99 
Comparison of 1997 import 
price relative to 1990, year 
before cartel 
70.0  --  KFTC (2003: 2) 
80EE.  Same as 80A and 80DD 
Comparison of 1997 import 
price relative to 2000, year 
after cartel 
38.4  --  KFTC (2003: 2) 
80FF.  Same as 80H; one of the weakest 
and least durable of the vitamins cartels 
because of large Chinese exports 
Sophisticated simulation 
model estimated with accurate 
industry parameters that 
predicts “no collusion” price of 
$27/kg. and collusive price 
with Chinese fringe of $33 
22.2 --  De Roos 
(2001:20) 
80GG.  Same as 80H and 80FF 
Same as 80FF except that but-
for price of $29.96 is from  
noncooperative oligopoly 
regime; peak price assumes no 
fringe 
22.3 29.5  De Roos 
(2001:28) 
80HH.  Same as 80H and 80FF 
Same as 80 GG except that 
but-for price of $29.00 is 
punishment-phase price war 
26.3 33.8  De Roos 
(2001:28) 
80II  Vitamin B6, 1991-94  Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices before and after cartel   7-28 19  Connor 
(2001a:326) 
80JJ. Vitamin D3, 1992-98?  Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices before cartel   36 47  Connor 
(2001a:323) 
80KK. Same as 80H  Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices after cartel  10 21  Connor 
(2001a:326) 
80LL.  Same as 80II  Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices after cartel  48 79  Connor 
(2001a:326) 
80MM.  Same as 80D  Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices after cartel  50 59  Connor 
(2001a:326) 
80NN.  Same as 80I  Analysis of U.S. list or import 
prices after cartel  16 33  Connor 
(2001a:329) 
80OO.   Same as 80C 
Average annual 1991-98 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
before (1990) prices 
25.0 39.2 EC  (2001:86) 
80PP.  Same as 80C 
Average annual 1991-98 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
after (1999)  prices 
51.9 67.2 EC  (2001:86) 
80QQ.  Same as 80C 
Average annual 1991-94 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
before (1990) prices 
8.7 19.6  EC  (2001:86) 
80RR.  Same as 80D 
Average annual 1991-94 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
before (1990) prices 
6.5 18.5  EC  (2001:87) 
80SS. Same as 80D 
Average annual 1991-98 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
after (1996-99)  prices 
79.7 100 EC  (2001:87) 
80TT. Same as 80E 
Average annual 1991-94 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
before (1990) prices 
19.4 31.8 EC  (2001:87) 
80UU.  Same as 80D 
Average annual 1991-98 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
after (1997-99)  prices 
24.3 37.1 EC  (2001:88) 
80VV.  Same as 80F  Average annual 1991-94 EU  39.6  58.3  EC (2001:88)   130
transactions prices in euros vs. 
before (1990) prices 
80WW. Same as 80II 
Average annual 1991-94 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
before (1990) prices 
45.5 86.0 EC  (2001:88) 
80XX Same as 80II 
Average annual 1991-94 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
after (1996-99)  prices 
91.5 144.7 EC  (2001:88) 
80YY. Same as 80H 
Average annual 1991-95 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
before (1989-90) prices 
14.8 30.4 EC  (2001:89) 
80ZZ.  Same as 80H 
Average annual 1991-95 EU 
transactions prices in euros vs. 
after (1997-99)  prices 
76.0 100 EC  (2001:89) 
80AAA. . Liquid vitamin A in US, 1990-99  Benchmark is pre-cartel spot 
and list US prices  70-75 200  Connor 
(2001a:320,331) 
80BBB. Dry vitamin A in US, 1990-99  Benchmark is pre-cartel spot 
and list US prices  40-45 70-75  Connor 
(2001a:320,331) 
80CCC. Vitamin E, world, 1989-99  Benchmark is pre-cartel price  35  --  Connor 
(2001a:336) 
81. Choline chloride (a/k/a vitamin B4) 
cartel 1989-1998, divided markets between 
No. American and European manufacturers; 
convicted by U.S. DOJ, in a US civil jury 
trial, and in EU 
 
   EC  (2001:86) 
81A.  Benchmark is pre-cartel EU 
prices  9 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.2) 
81B. 
Benchmark is 1988 price for 






81C.   
US jury trial; jury chose 
plaintiffs’ expert’s 
econometric model estimate 
33.6 --  Hausfeld 
(2003:5) 
81D.   
Benchmark is post-cartel price 
(1999) compared to U.S. 






82. Aluminum phosphide cartel Jan. 1990 
to Nov. 1990, convicted by U.S. DOJ        










Kansas City Star 
7/14/94 
83. BT forest insecticide, bid-rigging of 
Canadian government tenders 1991-1992, 
convicted after CBC probe 
 
Statement of CBC officials 
65 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.3) 
84. International graphite electrodes cartel 
1992-1998, convicted by U.S., Canadian, 
EU, and Korean authorities 
 
    
84A. 
Statements of DOJ officials 
about U.S. prices; DOJ 




(10/19/99,   131
11/30/00) 
84B. 
Statements of CBC officials 
about Canadian prices;  CCB 
press release 7/20/00; 











KFTC report to OECD, 




U.S. govt. report to OECD 
about U.S. prices  -- 65  OECD (2003: 
55) 
84F.  Benchmark is before prices in 
U.S.  51-65 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.4) 
84G.  Benchmark is before prices in 
EU  50 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.4) 
84H.  Benchmark is before world 
prices  50-58 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.4) 
85. International cartel in methyl 
glucamine 1990-1999, convicted by CBC 
and EC 
Benchmark is pre-cartel prices 
75 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.4) 
86. International bid-rigging cartel in 
shipping of chemicals in parcel tankers 
1998-2002, convicted in U.S. 
Estimates reported in business 
press 15  -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.4), WSJ 
2002 
87A.  International sulfur cartel operated 
1934-1939; members included U.S. private  
producers with 80% of world supply and an 
Italian state agency   
Eckbo’s interpretation of 





87B. Same as 87A  Lerner index, econometric 





87C.  International sulfur cartel 1907-1910 
(or 1913), an agreement with the Italian 
monopoly to limit U.S. exports to Europe  
Lerner index, econometric 





87D.  International sulfur cartel 1922-1932; 
an agreement between the U.S. Webb-
Pomerene Assn. and the Italian monopoly 
to limit exports and set quotas for each 
party 
Lerner index, econometric 





87E.  Cartel of 1947-1958  Lerner index, econometric 
model  38.9 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
88. International cartel alleged in copper 
concentrate 2001-2003, probe by U.S. and 
EU 
Press reports, method 
unknown  25 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.4) 
89. EU carbonless paper cartel 1992-1995, 
fined by EC 
From Eur. Commission 
decision  10-24 -- 
Connor(2003: 
Table A.5), EC 
(8/8/2002) 
90A. EU zinc phosphate cartel 1994-1998, 
fined by EC  
Proxy prices are Special High 
Grade US zinc quarterly 
prices, 1994Q2 to Dec. 1997; 
pre-cartel 1992-93 benchmark 
8.4 -- 
Connor(2003: 




90B. Same as 90A  
Proxy prices are Special High 
Grade US zinc quarterly 
prices; post-cartel 1998-99 
17.8 -- 
Connor(2003: 
Table A.5), EC 
12/11/2001),   132
benchmark  Purchasing 
Magazine 
91A. EU seamless steel tubes cartel 1990-
1995, fined by EC 
Analysis of “oil country tubes” 
prices; benchmark is pre-cartel 
(ca. 1986) corrected for 
general price inflation 
15 -- 
Connor(2003: 




91B. Same as 91A 
Analysis of “oil country tubes” 
prices; benchmark is post-
cartel (ca. 1996) corrected for 
general price inflation 
9 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.5) 
92A. EU flat stainless steel cartel 1993-
1996, fined by EC 
1994-97 prices of flat stainless 
steel coils, Type 304, cold 
rolled from trade magazines; 
EC statement gives peak price 
change in March 1995, which 
permits but-for price during 
cartel to be inferred  
60.0 90+ 
Connor(2003: 
Table A.5), EC 
(1/21/1998) 
92B. Same as 92A 
Same as 92A above, except 
used 1997Q1 (post-cartel) 
price as the benchmark 
66.9 100+ 
Connor(2003: 
Table A.5), EC 
(1/21/1998) 
92C. Same as 92A 
Apparently the authors’ 
interpretation of the EC 





93A.  EU cartel in district insulated 
heating steel pipes; Nov. 1990-March 
1996; fined by EU 
EC decision has about ten 
references to price changes 
induced by the cartel, 
including 3/93 and 12/93-2/94 
price wars; these are converted 
to annual price changes and 
weighted by annual EU sales 
to calculate the cartel average; 
the peak period is 1/95-3/96 
17 30 
Connor(2003: 




93B. Same as 93A 
Authors’ interpretation of the 








94.  A magnesite export cartel was 
established by Austrian and Czech 
producers in 1923 (probably ended 1939) as 
a joint marketing venture; U.S. producers 
later developed “an understanding” with the 
cartel to divide the No. Am. and European 
markets, for which they were prosecuted by 
the DOJ in 1941 
Eckbo’s interpretation of the 
antitrust prosecution  50+ --  Eckbo  (1967:40) 
95. EU steel beams cartel 1984-1990, EC 
fines 
Benchmark is  EU prices in 
mid 1990 to late 1992 after the 
cartel members were raided   20-30 -- 
Connor(2003: 




96. British sugar refining cartel 1986-
1990, fined by EC 
From EC decision 
50 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.2), EC 
(10/14/1998) 
97. Mobile telephone roaming charges in  Trade journal reports of  450  --  Connor(2003:   133
UK and Germany; EC probe underway 
2003; dates uncertain (2000-2002?) 
yardstick fees in other 
European countries 
Table A.5) 
98. Explosives cartel in U.S. regions 1985-
1993; some bid-rigging; U.S. convictions 
DOJ indictment for the IL, IN, 
and KY prosecution, dated 






99.International cartel in  thermal fax 
paper sold in large rolls in U.S. 1990-1992, 
U.S. convictions 
Press stories paraphrasing DOJ 






51), L.A. Times 
(7/15/94) 
100. International ferrosilicon cartel 1989-
1991, convicted in U.S. 
From a decision of the US 
Court of Appeals 2
nd Circuit of 
11/1999 on the prices set by 
the cartel in its early months, 
compared to prices in 1989   
5.2-10.3 -- 
Connor (2003: 






101. International bid-rigging cartel, 
USAID wastewater construction projects 
in Egypt, 1988-1996, convicted in U.S. 
courts; court opinion gives details on profits 
made on one large bid (47%) 
U.S. federal Court of Appeals 
11
th Circuit (2002) decision 
gives restitution ordered to be 
paid to USAID and affected 
sales; also U.S. govt. report to 
OECD; consistent with profit 
rate less a generous “normal” 





102A. Canadian bid-rigging cartel in the 
compressed industrial gasses industry 
June 1989 – May 1990; fined by 
predecessor of  the CCB 
Statement of the Canada’s 
Ontario  Ministry of Health on 
the effects of the post-cartel 




Globe and Mail 
2/8/1992) 
102B. Same as 102A 
Prices in Ontario compared to 
US border cities during 
conspiracy  40 -- 
Connor (2003: 
Table A.6), 
Globe and Mail 
2/8/1992) 
103.  Alleged international sulfuric acid 
cartel in U.S. and Canada 1988-1998; under 
DOJ investigation 2003-04 
From Chem Market Reporter 
and other trade magazines, 
prices for bulk deliveries of 
pure or standard virgin grade 
to US, Gulf or Tampa; but-for 
US price is from year 2000   
32-53 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.6) 
104. International cartel operating in the 
UK retail market for children’s games and 
toys Jan. 1999-April 2001; under UK 
investigation 
UK Office of Fair Trade 
estimate  42 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6) 
105. International cartel in the markets for 
generic pharmaceuticals (Warfarin and 
penicillin) sold by bidding for UK national 
health service contracts 1996-2000; under 
UK investigation 
UK national health service 
estimate 
163 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6), 
106. International cartel, cement, mostly 
bid rigging against several German 
government units 1993-2001; fined by the 
Bundeskartellamt (BKA) 
Press reports of BKA decision 
include BKA-estimated 
overcharges by cartel on a 
price per ton basis; trade 
sources on Belgian and EU-
wide prices yield the rate  
11-23 -- Connor (2003: 
Table A.6),   134
107. International bid-rigging cartel in 
large-scale, mostly Norwegian government, 
construction projects 1994-2000; under 
investigation 
Estimate by the Norwegian 
antitrust authority  37 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6), 
108. International bid-rigging of Dutch 
government construction projects, 
exposed by parliamentary investigations in 
2002-2003 ; began decades ago, ended 2002 
Dutch government estimates 
from testimony at 
Parliamentary  hearings  8.8 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6), 
109. International cartel in retail gasoline 
in Italy 1994-2000 
Italian competition authority 
statement  3.6 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6), 
110. International cartel in retail gasoline 
in France 1999-2002 
French competition council 
statement; conservative 
estimate based on comparisons 
of prices in near by countries 
25+ --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6), 
111. International cartel in retail gasoline 
in Sweden Nov. 1999-Feb. 2000, convicted 
by the competition authority and by 
Stockholm court on appeal 
Estimate of the Swedish 





112. International cartel in bids for military 
fuel to the Korean defense  procurement 
agency 1998-2000 
Analysis by the Korean FTC 
17 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.6) 
113. International flat  glass cartel 
operating in U.S. 1991-1995; DOJ 
investigation, no indictments; civil 
settlement approved 2/2000 after jury 
finding of guilt in private treble-damages 
trial (but before damages phase)   
Conclusion of plaintiffs’ 
expert’s (John Beyer) 
testimony from an econometric 
model  30-35 -- Connor(2003: 
Table A.6) 
114. International cartel in ready-mix 
concrete in Germany 1995-1998; fined by 
Germany’s BKT 
Report of the German 




115. International cartel in manufacture of 
ball and roller bearings in France 1993-
1997, fined by the French competition 
council  
French Competition Council 
statement  17.6 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6) 
116. International bid rigging in the 
Norwegian electrical (hydro-power) 
equipment industry 1990-1997, fined by 
Norway 
Norwegian competition 




117. International cartel that fixed the fees 
for Italian cell (mobile) telephone services 
1998-1999, fined by Italian antitrust 
authority (AGCM) 
Estimate of the Italian antitrust 
Authority AGCM  11 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.6), 
118. Bid rigging against Italy’s national 
health service for pharmaceuticals 
treating respiratory illnesses 1995-1997, 
fined by AGCM  
Statement of the AGCM 
50 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.6), 
119. Bid rigging against Italy’s national 
health service for pharmaceuticals 
treating high cholesterol 1995-1997, fined 
by AGCM 
Statement of the AGCM 
50 --  Connor(2003: 
Table A.6), 
120. Frozen foods cartel in Tasmania, 
Australia , “late 1990s” (ca. 1996-99), 
prosecuted and fined by Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission 
Report of the government of 
Australia to the OECD  10-12 --  OECD  (2003:53) 
121. Installation of fire protection devices 
in Australia; ca. 1996-99; fined by 
Australian CCC 
Report of the government of 
Australia to the OECD  5-15  --  OECD (2003:53)   135
122.  Bid-rigging by 260  electric wiring 
contractors and electricians in Denmark 
in late 1990s (ca. 1996-99); convicted and 
fined by Danish courts 
Report of the government of 





123. Bid rigging of public tenders for road 
markings in Germany in 1990s (ca. 1990-
99); fined by BKA 
Report of the government of 
Germany to the OECD  13+ --  OECD  (2003:54) 
124. Power cables (high tension?) in 
Germany beginning in 1902; ended late 
1990s; probably bid rigging; fined by BKA 
Report of the German 
government to the OECD  -- 50  OECD  (2003:54) 
125.  Hotel association in Spain; ended late 
1990s; fined by Spain’s competition 
authority 
Report of the government of 
Spain  to the OECD  3  --  OECD (2003:55) 
126. Sugar in Spain; ended late 1990s; 
fined by Spain’s competition authority 
Report of the government of 
Spain to the OECD  3 --  OECD  (2003:55) 
127A. The U.S. Railroad Express Cartel 
fixed prices for long-distance shipments of 
packages by rail or ship from 1851 to 
1913, when its members came under the 
authority of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission; in its 62 years; only one price 
war, in response to a failed attempt at large-
scale entry; only two brief episodes of 
dissention; annual profits in late 19
th cent. 
averaged 40% on invested capital despite 
very large side payments to shipping firms 
(which provided no free services)  
Rates are taken from several 
archives of the internal 
business records of the five 
cartel members; mark-ups are 
calculated from the inter-
member charges  (costs) for 
transshipments between 
exclusive territories in 1885-
1900   
150-233 --  Grossman 
(1996:227) 
127B. Same as above 
Change in rates in overlapping 
cities during the only recorded 
price war in 1886 -1888 
50-72 --  Grossman 
(1996:229) 
128.  To stem to steep decline in tea prices 
since 1927, a voluntary agreement in 1930 
by four regional producer associations 
representing hundreds of tea plantations led 
to an agreement on significant output 
reductions in 1931-1932;  followed by a 
mandatory British Empire cartel in 1933  
Prices in 1931-1932 (the first 
since before 1927) compared 
to prices in late 1920s in the 
London market (handled 56% 
of world market) for four teas, 
weighted by the four regions’ 
average quantities sold in 1931 
and 1932. 
29.0 -- Gupta (2001: 
146) 
129A.  International Electric Association 
operated from London from 1945 to at least 
the early 1980s; members rigged bids to 
private and public utilities, most in low-
income countries;  controlled  72-86% of 
world trade in heavy electrical power 
equipment in 1965-67; 1945 DOJ 
conviction; 1947 FTC consent decree 
covered only trade with U.S.; U.S. 
Congress hearings and Brazilian 
investigation in early 1980s, but no legal 
actions; the IEA as a formal organization 
was still in existence in 1999 but 
effectiveness ended earlier (ca. 1990-95) 
Detailed internal records of 
IEA’s bids for large power 
transformers May 1965-Dec. 
1967 show differences in 
winning prices between rigged 
and unrigged tenders (latter is 
the yardstick); lower average is 
for industrialized countries; 
upper is for LDCs; peak is for 
bids with single bidders 
11.9-









129B. Same as 129A above 
Winning bid prices when by 
agreement only one IEA 
member bid and no outsiders 
bid vs. bids with outsiders  
50 --  U.S. Congress 
(1980:125) 
129C.  With the advice of their foreign  National price indexes for all  34  50  Hasegawa   136
licensors, the four Japanese manufacturers 
of heavy electrical equipment formed a 
domestic cartel in May 1931; two more 
joined by Dec. 1933; rigged bids to achieve 
agreed quotas; effective in certain more 
standardized product lines but not high-tech 
lines until about 1938-39  
heavy electrical equipment in 
1933-1937 relative to base 
years 1930-32; peak year was 
1937 
(1994:252) 
130A. International uranium cartel of 
world’s major producers in France, Canada, 
Australia, UK, and South Africa was 
founded in 1972 and operated effectively 
from mid 1974 to Dec. 1975; private U.S. 
suit filed against Gulf Oil (parent of 
Canadian member) resulted in payout of 
about $1 billion; criminal DOJ 
misdemeanor case ended with Gulf 
pleading nolo and paying $40,000 fine, 
because of Canadian government objections 
U.S. prices in Dec. 1974 to 
Dec. 1975 compared to early 
1974; peak is Dec. 1975; world 






130B.  Same as above; book by Canadian 
journalist identifies the effective cartel 
period as mid 1972 to Feb. or Mar. 1974, 
after which market forces influenced 
primary control; by July 1974, world prices 
were 25% higher than the cartel’s list price 
Price data not very precise; 
appears that pre-cartel price 
outside U.S. was about 
$4.50/lb.; cartel raised prices 
by $2 to end of 1973 and by 
another $1.34 in late Jan. 1974 
44 74  Gray (1982: 
147,151,164) 
130C.  Same as 130A  Lerner index predicted from 
econometric model  100.0 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
130D*.  Same as 130A, except that price 
data from the US civil trial show that the 
cartel floor prices in 10/1973 and 1/1974 
led the rise in spot US prices; author 
concludes that cartel had only short-run 
price effects. 
Average US Nuesco spot 
prices in 10/73 to 12/74 
compared to spot prices in 
6/73 to 9/73 ($6.25) 
62.7 140  LeCraw (1977: 
78) 
130E*.  Same as 130A 
Same as above except that the 
base price is total economic 
costs, including profit and a 
risk premium (also $6.25) 
67.2 140  LeCraw (1977: 
78 and 82) 
130F*  Same as 130A 
Author concludes that it was 
“unlikely” that cartel affected 
prices  
0 0  Joskow  (1976) 
131A.  Quinine Convention, intl. cartel 
with four manufacturers (NL, DE, UK, FR); 
agreements on reducing export sales, 
stocks, and member quotas from 1959-
1966; 1968 criminal indictments by U.S. 
DOJ resulted in nolo pleas and substantial 
fines; EC fined 6 firms $470,000 in 1970 
World prices in early 1964 to 
1966 compared to prices in 
early 1960s; some of the 
increase was due to a surge in 







131B.  Same as 131A 
Price offered to League of 
Nations for relief programs 
compared to cartel price 
77.5 --  Staley 
(1937:289-290) 
132.  Red phosphorous cartel 1959-“early 
1960s” (ca. 1963); three companies from 
UK, NL, and DE; price fixing and territorial 
division everywhere except Asia 
Prices before cartel compared 




133.  The Southern Railway & Steamship 
Association was the second successful and 
stable U.S. cartel 1875-1887; all long 
distance freight and passenger transport 
An estimate made by the 
association in prior to its first 
month of operation of revenue 
losses due to discounting from 
42 --  Hudson (1890: 
71)   137
among companies operating south of the 
Potomac and Ohio rivers and east of the 
Mississippi; historical study based on its 
internal records   
regular rates 
134A.  The Western Ontario petroleum 
lamp oil refiners’ cartels, 1870-73  
Econometric cartel model with 
monthly wholesale lamp oil 
prices Jan. 1870 to May 1880, 
with dummy variable for 
known collusive periods; 
difference between predicted 
competitive and collusive 
prices  
31 55  Grant and Thille 
(2001: Figure 2) 
134B. Same as above for 1874 to mid 1877  Same as above  68 84  Grant and Thille 
(2001: Figure 2) 
134C. Same as above for mid 1877 to May 
1880 
Same as above  0 --  Grant and Thille 
(2001: Figure 2) 
        
135A.   The 1926-1939 phosphate rock 
cartel began with the cooperation of the 
French and German national cartels (under 
government pressure); in 1933 the 
Phosphate Export Assn. (a U.S. Webb-
Pomerene assn.) joined the European cartel, 
for which it was indicted by the DOJ in 
1939; other phosphate cartels from North 
Africa, Egypt, and Curacao joined in 1933-
1934  
Eckbo’s interpretation of the 
abuse of dominant position of 
the French and German cartels 
in place of “unpublished” 
export prices; such prices are 






135B.  U.S. Webb-Pomerene phosphate 
export association, active 50 years, 1919-49 
and second episode 1961-67 
Econometric model with 
insignificant quantity effects; 
price effect almost significant  
9.2 --  Dick  (1992:103) 
135C. International cartel of 1933-1937  Lerner index from econometric 
model  72.4 --  Griffin 
(1989:189) 
136A. “Artificial silk” (rayon) cartels 
formed in Germany, France, and Italy in 
late 1920s; unusual cartel because a 
technologically dynamic industry with rapid 
output and productivity increases 
Author asserts that neither 
national nor international 
industry groups show any 
signs of market power 
0 --  Benni et al. 
(1930) 
137B*.  Examines two earlier episodes, 
1906-Oct. 1910 and 1911-14; members 
from DE, FR, IT, CH, BL, UK, and (after 
1911) US; assigned export quotas and 
exclusive home-country monopolies 
The Feb. 1913-1914 agreement 
allowed members to buy 
additional export quotas for a 
“commission”; a yardstick 
5 -- Coleman 
(1969:73) 
137.  An international linoleum cartel was 
formed Dec. 1911 by almost all the 
factories of Europe; invented in 1860, but 
production technology standardized in early 
1900s; cartel enforced uniform quality 
standards and grades; cartel objective was 
constant prices, not higher ones; ended 
1939 [UK branch ended operations 1960]  
European prices from League 
of Nations show nearly flat 
prices 1924-1930, despite large 
increases in industry labor 
costs and two biggest material 
inputs (linseed oil and cork) 
0 --  Benni et al. 
(1930:64) 
138.  Mechanical sulphite paper pulp 
cartel formed in 1930 after European prices 
fell 66% by leading companies from 
Austria, Germany and Scandinavia; 
probably ended 1939 
Prices of sulfite pulp fell 22-
26% 1930-35; but prices of  
yardstick (noncartelized 
sulphate pulp) fell more 
2.8-10.0 -- Oualid  (1938:26) 
139.  Bid-rigging on sales to U.S. 
government purchases of titanium metal 
Prediction from a time-series 
econometric model used for  1.1 -- Duggan and 
Narasimhanm   138
1970-1976;  found guilty at trial in U.S. v. 
RMI Co. (1978) 
expert economic testimony  (1981:243) 
140.  The Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation held the Steenbock patent to 
Vitamin D and licensed its manufacture; 
author, the U.S. AAG for antitrust alleges 
that its agreements with various buyers set 
prices in 1930s until the weakness of the 
patent became apparent in 1938-40 
Compares agreement with du 
Pont for use in bread products 
with prices charged to Gen. 
Mills (1940) and Gen. Baking 
(1938) 
48-233 --  Berge 
(1944:104-105) 
141.  A conspiracy (11/1900-7/1904) 
among three U.S. industry associations (for 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers) to 
raise the retail prices of  pharmaceuticals 
to a pharmacist by “blacklisting” him; from 
a U.S. jury trial decision in Loder v. Jayne 
(1906) 
The Court decided the 
combined price effects of the 
three restraints on trade using 
the change in gross profit on 
sales from before the 
conspiracy to during 
8.0 -- Timberlake 
(1961:258) 
142A.  U.S. corrugated cartons 
(containers) cartel 1960-1976; guilty 
finding confirmed by Supreme Court; 
private federal class-action suit ( In re 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation) 
against three last defendants, of which 2 
settled before the trial’s conclusion  
Jury decision after hearing 
class plaintiffs’ expert testify 
to a 8% to 19% overcharge and 
defense expert testify to a less 





142B.  Same as 142A 
Plaintiffs’ econometric model 
prediction; authors judge that it 






142C.  Same as 142A 
Plaintiffs’ model is fitted to 
same data, but some if not all 






142D.  Second treble damages suit by opt-
outs from federal class (see 142B above) 
Revised econometric model by 
plaintiffs’ expert, which 
authors judge to be more 





142E.  Same as 142D above 
Testimony by Defendants’ 
expert finds numerous 










143A.  In New Mexico v. American Pipe 
and Construction bid-rigging on concrete 
pipes from Feb. 1968 to Dec. 1973; one of 
several similar cases  
Plaintiff’s expert predicted the 
but-for price from an 
econometric model using 
dummy variable for a brief 
competitive period; model 






143B.  Same as 143A 
Defendant’s expert presented a 
rival econometric prediction 
using the “residuals” approach, 





144.  In In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation 
(1980) only the plaintiffs presented 
econometric evidence on an alleged 
association program to raise prices Jan. 
1971-March 1973; the DOJ imposed 
Plaintiff’s experts predicted a 
negative overcharge, which is 





(1983:165)   139
injunctive relief 
145A.  In  In re Plywood Antitrust 
Litigation, three manufactures were found 
guilty of price fixing (using basing-point 
pricing system) from Feb. 1968-Dec. 1973 
by a jury; jury ignored the statistical 
evidence and figured damages from the 
“phantom freight” charges and excess 
weight allowances. 
Defendants’ econometric 
model predicted no overcharge 
because of high demand during 
conspiracy, but experts judge 







145B*.  Southern plywood cartel lasted 
from 1964 to Dec. 1973; system used 
Douglas fir plywood prices in Portland, OR 
plus Denver-to-East RR delivery prices; 
cartel had 4 members 1964 and 24 by 1974, 
when CR4 slipped to 55% 
The average discount from the 
official basing price was 5% 
1967-1973; post cartel 
discounts are the but-for 
prices; best measure is Feb. 
1977 when all sellers shifted to 
F.o.b. plant pricing 
19 --  Loescher 
(1980:16) 
146A.  International tin cartel Sept. 1929-
March 1931; initially an entirely voluntary 
agreement of British, Dutch and Bolivian 
producers to reduce production by major 
mines; when cuts became too large, British 
and Dutch governments stepped in to 
enforce them and buy stocks; in 1931 an 
intergovernmental commodity agreement 
was signed that increased prices soon 
thereafter 
Lerner index predicted from an 





146B.  Same as 146A; Plummer quotes 
only falling prices 
London exchange prices from 
before cartel to 1930-early 1   -10 --  Plummer 
(1934:92-94) 
146C.  Same as 146A  Judged to be “ineffective”  0  --  Elliott et al. 
(1937) 
146D. Same as 146A 
Price rise from fall 1932 to 
spring 1933 due to cartel’s cut 
in export volume; after spring 
1933 demand increased prices 
27-36 -- Staley (1937: 
308) 
146E.  International cartel of 1921-1924  Econometric model predicts 
Lerner Index  22.0 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
146F.  International cartel of 1956-1981; 
possibly government sponsored 
Econometric model predicts 
Lerner Index  47.1 --  Griffin 
(1989:189-190) 
147A.  International coke cartel April 1937-
Sept. 1939; export quotas for all major 
European producers administered by a joint 
venture in Brussels 





147B.  Same as 147A 
Compares 1902 domestic 
German  price with price of 
exports to Austria  
53 --  Hirst  (1905:115) 
148A. The formal U.S. Whiskey Trust was 
formed in May or June 1887 to make 
distilled alcohol for cheap whiskeys; 
preceded by numerous short-lived pools 
that were briefly effective in raising prices 
during 1882-86; first successful episode 
ended late 1888; data from hearings of US 
(Congressional) Industrial Commission.  
When pools were operating, 
gross margin increased about 
$0.25/bu. of corn; avg. prices 
net of taxes and discount were 
$0.85-$1.12 for whiskey made 
from 1 bu. 
22-29 --  Jenks (1900:146-
150) 
148B.  Same as above, 1890-94  
First effective period for 
formal trust is 1890-1894; 
comparison of gross margin 
increase with wholesale prices 
12-18 --  Jenks (1900:146-
150)   140
148C.  Same as above  for 1896-99  Effective period is 1896-99; 
uses gross margin approach  0-9 --  Jenks (1900:146-
150) 
148D.  Same as above for 1906-09 
Gross margins in 1906-09 
compared to competitive 1903-
06 period, taking into account 
upgrading of product quality 
7-12 --  Jenks and Clark 
(1929:100-105) 
148E*. Studies 16 years of at least 4 
episodes: the summer quarters of 1882 to 
1898 (except for 1895); thus same as 148A 
to 148C plus 1882-86; peak cartel supply 
control of US market was 40% to 48% in 
1887-1892; slipped to 29% by 1895. 
 The authors fit four different 
demand  functions to a 
complex econometric system 
of equations; the model 
predicts four elasticity-
adjusted Lerner indexes; 
average overcharges are 83% 
to 94% below the monopoly 
overcharge; two peak periods, 
4 quarters in late 1888 and 
1824-93, are 58% to 84% 





148F*.  Same as 148E, but adds 22 new 
quarters of data from April 1888 to March 
1895, a total of 38 quarters   
Same as above, but for more 




149A. The U.S. Wire Nail Pool lasted for 
19 months in May 1895-Nov.1896; very 
complex organization; made side agreement 
with similar cartels in Canada and Europe; 
also co-opted U.S. cut-nail makers; 
collapsed when new factories came on 
stream; ineffective after 1901 
Comparison of prices in month 
before cartel with average 
prices in 18-month period; 
peak is last 6 months 
97 117 
Jenks (1900:62), 
Jenks and Clark 
(1929) 
149B.  Same as 149A   Method not explained  113  --  Jones (1921:10) 
150.  U.S. steel rails pool; Jones gives dates 
of 1887-93 and 1894-98 [Seager and Gulick 
describe a second episode from 1897 to 
1904]; the association of 15 members 
controlled 90%+ of the U.S. market; set 
total tonnage and quantity shares to achieve 
an elevated price  
Jones refers to a U.S. DOJ 
court brief  that states that after 
1897 prices fell 41% 
41 -- 
Jones (1921:9-
10), Seager and 
Gulick (1929:90-
91) 
151.  U.S. cartel in steel tubes from June 
1899 to 1900 
Prices in 1899 compared with 
before cartel  227 --  Jones  (1921:264) 
152.  U.S. Webb-Pomerene export 
association for carbon black, active for 
48+ years 1923-51 and 1958-70+ 
Econometric model with 
dummy variable for the 
cartel’s active years; quantities 
exported fell 19.8% 
7 --  Dick 
(1992a:103) 
153.  Effects of concentration (numbers of 
firms) on the spreads of U.S. tax-exempt 
bond underwriting auctions; a study of 
9420 bond issues during 1959-1967; 
suggests bid-rigging behavior 
Comparison of estimated 
regression coefficients of 
winning bids in issues with 9 
or more bidders with price 
spread when only two bidders 
were in the auction 
-- 2.35 Brannman 
(1989:73) 
154.  Same as 153 above for 2221 auctions 
for government offshore oil leases from 
the U.S. Department of the Interior 1954-
1975; suggests bid-rigging behavior 
Same as 153 above except 
competitive number of bidders 
in 10 or more 
-- 2.5 Brannman 
(1989:73) 
155A.  The Rhenish-Westphalian (Rhur) 
Coal cartel was formed in late 1893, a mix 
of private and state-owned mines; effective 
in raising prices until state price controls 
were imposed in March 1919; the Deutsche 
The author states that Essen 
Coal Exchange prices were 
representative of the pre-cartel 
period 1891-93; average 1894-
1913 prices and peak 1907-09 
16.5 34.6  Liefmann 
(1932:52)   141
Mark experienced little or no inflation 
through at least 1909 
prices compared 
155B. Same as 155A   
Compares 1902 domestic 
German  price with price of 
exports to Belgium and 
Netherlands 
5.8 --  Hirst  (1905:115) 
156.  The second phase of a U.S. plumbing 
fixtures conspiracy involved 15 companies 
from Sept. 1962 (for cast-iron bath tubs) or 
Oct. 1962 (porcelain toilets) to 1968; most 
companies pleaded guilty and were fined, 
but three companies and three executive 
were found guilty at trial in late 1969.   
Authors were guided by direct 
testimonial evidence accepted 
by the jury in the trial; price 
changes apparently were the 







157.  A regression model fitted to 1950-
1985 data on 12 legal Japanese export 
cartels; only the one for paints has results 
consistent with price mark-ups 
Coefficient on export price  56.9  --  Dick 
(1992b:287) 
158A.  The U.S. gunpowder trust was 
formed in 1872 as a price-setting trade 
association; became a formal cartel of 7 
producers in 1886-1902; later grew to 12 
members; assigned quotas in 7 regions, had 
a penalty system and a trigger mechanism; 
after 1895 the agreement was kept secret 
and code names were used to prevent 
discovery; morphed into the du Pont 
monopoly by 1907; found guilty of price 
fixing and monopolization in 1912 
In 1882-1884, members of the 
cartel that were over quota 
were required to compensate 
the others by selling powder at 





158B. During 1896-1902, three new 
gunpowder firms briefly entered the 
Midwestern market; the strongest of the 
entrants was Indiana Powder; the trust built 
a new plant nearby and cut prices in its 
sales region 
Difference between price in 
Indiana Powder sales region 
(the yardstick) and prices 
charges by trust in surrounding 
regions  
29 --  Stevens 
(1912a:459) 
159A.  The international dyestuffs cartel 
had dominated the Japanese market before 
WWI, but a domestic industry had 
developed during the War to serve the 
rapidly developing textile industry; tariffs 
were imposed to protect Japanese dyestuffs 
in 1924 until the national industry 
negotiated a division  of dye types between 
exclusively domestic lines and  I.G. Farben 
import lines, effective Aug. 1928; tariffs 
were eliminated  
Comparison of prices of 
imported dyes (net of tariffs) 
in early 1928 with immediate 
price increase after bilateral 
agreement by Farben in Oct. 
1928 
5 --  Kudo  (1994:216) 
159B*.  Legal Swiss dyestuffs cartel was 
formed by three companies in 9/1918 to 
combat expected decline in export demand 
as major importing countries increase 
tariffs; starting in late 1918, quantity 
exported fell by 73% in 1924-25 compared 
to 1913; prices highest in 1918-1920, but 
this was an abnormal period; ended 1929 
Real average Swiss export 
prices of dyestuffs in 1921-
1925 are compared to  prices 





159C*.  A German national cartel was 
formed under I. G. Farben in 1925; joined 
with the French cartel to allocate world 
exports in 1927; Swiss joined in 1929, 
During 1932-1939, members 
could sell export quotas to 
each other for cash equal to 





(1990:139)   142
UK’s ICI in 1932, and Japan’s NSK in 
1935; by 1938, 80-90% of world exports 
under its control; ended 1939 
yardstick 
160.  Beginning  as early as 1829, large 
railroads began buying anthracite coal 
mines in 5 counties of NE Pennsylvania 
refused to carry coal of independent mines 
(except under onerous tolling contracts); in 
early 1830s excess mine capacity 
developed; in 1870s dual ownership 
accelerated even though PA constitution 
outlawed it from 1874; in 1873, top 5 RRs 
carried 90% of coal to Tidewater points; by 
1900, the railroads controlled 62% of 
production and in 1904-1923 it was 70%; 
court testimony later revealed that Reading 
RR was the collusive price leader 
      
160A.  NYC prices fell 54% 1864-72; 
various pool agreements began Jan. 1873 
with 5 members; first cartel ended August 
1876 
Curtis interprets “Pooling 
agreement” of 1873 that set 
supply limits; immediate effect 
on Eastern Tidewater price of 






160B. Same as 160 for August 1876 to 
December 1877 
Same method as above for 
what Curtis calls the “1876 
pool agreement”; Jones writes 
that pool unable to agree from 





160C. Same as 160 for 1886;[ note that 
Curtis omits mention of three successful 
pools that began 1/1878, 1879, and 
12/1884]. 
Same method as above for 
1886 pool agreement, which 





160D. Same as 160 for 1907; Curtis omits 
mention of the pools that Jones judges to be 
effective that began in 1/1892, 2/1896, and 
late 1902 
Same method as above for 




160E. Same as 160 for 1921-26; Curtis 
notes that during 1923-27, average profit 
rates for railroad-owned anthracite mines 
were 14 times the rates of the seven 
railroads carrying the largest volume of coal 
Easter Tidewater price in 
1921-1926 corrected for 
inflation compared to the 1913 
price 
50 --  Curtis 
(1931:344) 
160F (none)         
160G.  Same as 160A, Jones’ “ first pool” 
of Jan. 1873 to Aug 1876; concentration of 
coal-tonnage hauling was high (HHI=1809) 
Compares average 1873-75 
prices of all grades f.o.b. NYC 
per long ton with 1872 price; 
peak year was 1875 
32.2 37.5 
Jones         
(1914: 41-42, 
228) 
160H.  Same as 160A 
Compares average 1873-75 
prices of all grades f.o.b. NYC 
with 1877 price; peak year was 
1875 
108.1 116.4 
Jones         
(1914: 41-42, 
228) 
160I.  Jones’ 2
nd pool of Jan. 1878 to 
12/31/1878; concentration fell slightly 
(HHI=1789) 
Compares average 1878 prices 
of all grades f.o.b. NYC with 
1877 price 
29.1 --  Jones         
(1914: 45, 228) 
160J.  Same as 160I for 2
nd pool of Jan. 
1878 to 12/31/1878 
Compares average 1878 prices 
of all grades f.o.b. NYC with 
1879 price 
34.6 --  Jones         
(1914: 45,228) 
160K.  Jones’  3
rd  pool of 1880-1884;   Compares average 1880-84  56.9  --  Jones           143
unlike previous pool, no formal association 
was formed, just a “friendly understanding” 
after negotiations in 1879 
prices of all grades f.o.b. NYC 
with 1879 price 
(1914: 46-47, 
228) 
160L.  Jones’ 4
th pool  of Dec. 1884  to end 
of 1885; despite high concentration (HHI = 
2363), ineffective because Penn. RR  
dissatisfied with its quota share; Reading 
RR went bankrupt in 1884 
Prices fell throughout cartel 
episode  0 -- 
Jones         
(1914: 47-48, 
228) 
160M.  Same as 160C, Jones’  5
th pool 
organized by J. P. Morgan in March 1886; 
agreement in effect from April 1886-Dec 
1891, but set total output too high; 
HHI=2288 
Compares average 1888-1890 
prices of all grades f.o.b. NYC 
with 1891 average price 
7.9 --  Jones         
(1914: 49, 228) 
160N. Jones’ 6
th pool of Jan. 1892 to late 
1894; dissolved sometime in 1895; Reading 
RR failed again in 1892, so this year is 
ignored for price analysis 
Compares wholesale price of 
long ton of  “stove coal” f.o.b. 
NYC in 1893-94 with  1895; 
peak year 1893 
24.4 33.8  Jones         
(1914: 156-157) 
160O.  Jones’ 7
th pool; after numerous 
secret meetings among 11 railroads that 
controlled 100% of coal hauling 
(HHI=1105), in effect 2/1/1896 to late 
1897; in early 1897 mines operated only 5-
10% of the time; nearly perfect adherence 
to quotas until recession of 1898 leads to 
cheating; 1898-99 termed normal, 
competitive years 
Compares wholesale price of 
long ton of  “stove coal” f.o.b. 
NYC in 1896-97 with  1895; 
peak year 1897 
24.6 28.1 
Jones         
(1914: 55-
58,156) 
160P.  Same as 160O 
Compares wholesale price of 
long ton of  “stove coal” f.o.b. 
NYC in 1896-97 with  1898-
99 
4.0 --  Jones         
(1914: 58, 156) 
160Q. Same as 160D, Jones’ 8
th pool of late 
1902 to 1911; RRs solved low 
concentration problem by RR mergers, 
cross-ownership, interlocking directorships, 
and elimination of rival mines (by 1907 
RRs controlled 78% of all coal output; labor 
strikes in late 1900 and mid 1902 boost 
costs; during 1903-11 monthly prices nearly 
constant; collusion “nearly perfect”(p.180) 
despite 1908 antitrust trial.  
Compares wholesale price of 
long ton of  “stove coal” f.o.b. 
NYC in 1903-11 with  1898-
99 prices adjusted upward for 
changes in total costs of 
mining 
12.3 12.4 
Jones         
(1914: 59-97, 
156-157) 
161A. Japanese public-works construction 
bid rigging, several cases discovered 
roughly 1970-1990; parameters are verified 
by guilty judgments in legal suits  
Using data on the average 
number of bidders (10) and 
comparable Canadian data on 
the spread in bidders’ costs, a 
mathematical model of 
competitive bidding can 
simulate the difference 
between the competitive and 







161B.  Same as 161A 
Summary of estimates of 
scholarly Japanese studies and 
government commission 
findings 
30-50 --  Woodall (1996: 
48) 
162. The Star Friendship Association with 
about 100 corporate members rigged bids 
on U.S. naval shipyard construction 
Statements by U.S. 
government officials of the 




Magazine   144
projects in Japan in the 1980s; the Japan 
FTC investigated and fined the firms in 
1989; after a threat of a U.S. suit, the 
association paid $32.6 million in 
compensation 
Navy’s losses due to bid 
rigging, which were 8% higher 






163.  Bid rigging on a kitchen 
construction project in Matsuyama City, 
Japan in 1982; bidders were convicted in 
court; average pre-tax operating income of 
civil engineering firms in Japan 1966-89 
was 5.6% of total assets 
Japanese court decision that 
total profits by the winning 
firm were an excessive 31% of 
revenues;  I subtract 4-12% of 








164.  Bid rigging on a river-dredging 
project in Tsukuba City, Japan in 1979 ; 
tried in court 
Prosecution estimate of the 
excess profits made by the 
winning bidder 
37 --  McMillan 
(1991:210) 
165.  Bid rigging among companies that 
delivered soil and gravel to build Kansai, 
Japan Airport in late 1980s 
Comparison of winning bid 
with the government’s 
(generous) ceiling price 
9.7 --  McMillan 
(1991:210) 
166A. The northeastern English Coal Gild 
(a/k/a the Newcastle Vend) was formed by 
mine owners in 1771 to supply the London 
market by ship; it first began to collapse 
between late 1780 and early 1781 
Rochester Harbor prices in 
shillings per chaldron in 1780 
are compared to 1785 
17 --  Levy  (1927:116) 
166B.  Cartel reformed in 1786-87 with 
more elaborate agreements on monthly 
quotas for each mine and fines for 
overproduction; according to Levy,  not 
effective in raising prices until about 1824; 
Sweezy dates effective period from about 
1810; ended in 1844-45 when rail 
shipments of coal to London became 
significant; supplies in Wales and Scotland 
constrained pricing 1800-1845; experienced  
five brief intermittent “fighting trades” 
(price wars); price data from a 
Parliamentary inquiry that found consumer 
complaints about prices “not unfounded” 
Comparison of  before (early 
1832)  price for best grade of 
coal with lowest month’s price 
(June 1833) during the Nov. 





166C.  Same as above except for 1836 
Price at the mouth of the Tyne 
River in 1836 compared to 
“pre-cartel”  year 1823 
22-27 --  Levy (1927:138-
139) 
166D.  Same as above for 1844-1845  Same as 166C above, except 
price change from 1844  22 22  Levy  (1927:161) 
166E. Same as above for 1810-11 
London price of best grade 
coal per chaldron  before 
“open market” (competitive 
period) began in 1812 
4-11 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166F. Same as above for 1823- July 1824  Same as above before open 
market of 8/1824-7/1825  12 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166G. Same as above for Aug. 1825- March 
1826 
Same as 166E above before 
open market of 4/1826-
12/1826 
16 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166H. Same as above for 1827- Feb. 1829  Same as 166E above before 
open market of 3/1829-8/1829  12 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166I. Same as 166B  for Sept. 1829 - 1831  Same as 166E above before 
open market of 1/1832-3/1834  28 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166J. Same as above for 1813-14  London price best grade for 1-
2 years after open market of  11 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155)   145
1812 
166K. Same as 166G  Same as above for open 
market of 8/1824-7/1825  7 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166L. Same as 166H  Same as 166E above for open 
market of 4/1826-12/1826  5 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166M. Same as 166I  Same as 166E above for open 
market of 3/1829-8/1829  9 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166N. Same as 166C, but for April 1834-
1835 
Same as 166E above for open 
market of 1/1832-3/1834  33 --  Sweezy (1938: 
155) 
166O. Same as 166D 
Price change after the final 
collapse of the Vend in May 
1845 when many small 
inefficient mines had closed, 
compared to late 1844 price  
75 --  Sweezy (1938: 
127, 155) 
167.  The Birmingham Bedstead Makers’ 
Alliance successfully raised prices on metal 
bed frames from 1891 to 1900; ended 
because of imports from European 
continent 
 Simple comparison of 1891-
1900 prices with pre-1891 
prices 
100 --  Levy  (1927:200) 
168. The British Salt Union was formed in 
Oct. 1888 by 64 firms that controlled 90% 
of UK supply, much of it exported; coal 
accounts for 90% of the cost of production; 
the Salt Union was acquired by ICI in 1937; 
mergers from 1945 to 1975 produced a 
virtual UK duopoly 
      
168A. Episode of  October 1888-1891 
Average export prices in 1878-
1887 (the yardstick) compared 
to 1888-1891, corrected for the 







168B.  Same as 168A; evidence of 
geographic price discrimination 
Average prices in the county 
where salt was produced  in 
1888-91 compared to 1878-87, 
corrected for increase in price 
of coal; prices briefly peaked 
in 1888 
19 320  Levy (1927:243, 
295) 
168C. New salt producers entered in early 
1890s and by 1892 began to affect prices, 
though they never dipped below 1878-87 
levels; from 1888 to 1905, the cartel formed 
side agreements with non-Union mines, but 
by 1907 the Salt Union controlled only 46% 
of UK production; ended 1906; although 
domestic power waned, export position was 
favorable. 
Change in export prices from 
1904 to 1907  13 --  Levy  (1927:243) 
168D.  The drop in domestic prices from 
1904 to 1906 caused a new cartel, the 
North-Western Salt Co., to be formed in 
late 1906; achieved nearly 100% market 
control through at least 1927; profits in 
1907 rose 46% over 1906 levels and were 
355% higher in 1925 
Change in export prices 1906-
1907   9.1 --  Levy  (1927:244) 
168E.  Same as 168A 
Immediate change in price of 
common salt f.o.b. works from 





168F.  Same as 168A  Same as 168D above for “fine”  --  100  Calvert (1913:   146
grade salt  xxiii) 
168G.  Same as 168A 
Change in works price of 
finest “brisk” grade from 
11/1888 to 9/1890 
100 --  Calvert (1913: 
15) 
168H.  Same as 168A  Same as above for 9/1890 to 
3/1891  75 --  Calvert (1913: 
15) 
168I.  Same as 168A  Same as above for 3/1891 to 
8/1891  50 --  Calvert (1913: 
15) 
168J.  Same as 168A 
Comparison of “brisk” grade 
export price with UK price in 
3/1889 to March 1891  
52 --  Calvert (1913: 
18-20) 
168K.  Same as 168A 
Comparison of Prussian Rock 
Salt sold to chemical 
manufacturers versus all 
others, 12/1888 to 12/1889  
38 --  Calvert (1913: 
18-20) 
169A. A European steel rails cartel 
included the leading manufacturers of the 
UK, Germany, and Belgium; first formed in 
1883, it was unstable until French producers 
joined in 1907; ended 1914 
UK rail prices in 1907 
compared to the 1904-06 
average 
35-75 --  Levy  (1927:268) 
169B.  Same as 169A; with a US-UK price 
difference of 12% in 1901, large US exports 
to UK had occurred, but there were none in 
1907 
UK prices compared to US 
export prices  21-25 --  Levy  (1927:268) 
169C.  Same as 169A 
Compares 1900 domestic 
German price with price of 
exports to Portugal 
26  --  Hirst (1905: 115) 
170.  In 1902, German manufacturers of 
thorium nitrate were able to monopolize 
the only world source in Brazil of monacite, 
the key raw material; ended sometime after 
1904 
The price of saltpeter in 
Germany in 1904 compared to 
early 1902 
56 --  Levy  (1927:295) 
171A. A study of three British ocean 
shipping conferences 1870-1913; focus is 
on 47 episodes of entry and 14 predatory 
price wars of 2 days to 1 year long 
precipitated by them; all wars saw price 
changes of at least 30%; no line lost money 
Price during war compared to 
rate before war, average of 4 
episodes 1891-1902 
60 75  Scott-Morton 
(1997:693) 
171B.  Same as 171A above 
Price during war compared to 
after war when entrant was 
admitted to cartel, two 
episodes 
49 75  Scott-Morton 
(1997:693) 
172.  Study of the determinants of all price 
wars among U.S. passenger airlines 
1978Q2 to 1995Q4; discussion assumes that 
conduct observed is tacit collusion by price 
leadership, but later convicted of illegal 
signaling, a facilitating collusive device. 
Econometric study, but no 
averages given  15-25+ --  Morrison and 
Winston (1996) 
173. Buyers’ cartel by 23 elite U.S. 
universities that met to fix the (purchase) 
price of needs-based graduate 
scholarships from 1958 to 1991; 22 found 
guilty by U.S. court, but DOJ settled with 
one university that appealed by means of a 
consent decree 
Both econometric studies find 
that income was redistributed 
from high- to low-income 
applicants, but no average 
price effects 
0 -- 
Carlton et al. 
(1995), Hoxby 
(2000) 
174.  Bid rigging by more than 2000 
building construction companies in 
Federal Cartel Office analysis 
of  overcharges on the 8000  9 --  OECD  (1976:24)   147
northern Germany in 1959-1973; 559 were 
prosecuted by the Federal Cartel Office 
(BKA), which provided a written report to 
the OECD on the 8000 projects 
projects 
175.  A report of the French Technical 
Commission on Cartels and Dominant 
Positions to the OECD on bid rigging on 
public tenders in electrical wiring 
construction ca. 1975 
Estimated by the reduction in 
the winning bid on the same 
project after the cartel was 
disciplined 
20 --  OECD  (1976:26) 
176.  Same as 175 above, except for 
construction of a Mirail University 
building ca. 1970 - 1975 
Same as 175 above  40  --  OECD (1976:26) 
177.  Same as 175 above, except for road 
building project in France in 1968  Same as 175 above  22  --  OECD (1976:26) 
178.  Based on a Japan FTC prosecution of 
Yuasa Timber Co. and  64 other plywood 
manufacturers that made identical bids for 
a public tender ca. learly 1970s 
JFTC report that found that the 
identical bids were exactly 
10% higher than the previous 
winning bid for the same 
product 
10+ --  OECD  (1976:37) 
179. The Northern Collieries Association 
fixed the price of black coal in the 
Newcastle, Australia region in six episodes 
from 1855 to 1893; the NCA accounted for 
85% of colonial supply in the 1860s, but 
slipped to 60% by 1900   
     Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179A.  First episode began with 2 mines in 
1855, but high prices quickly (by ca. 1856) 
induced large-scale entry 
Price increases ineffective in 
the long run  0 -- Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179B. Same as above, but for years 1861-62  Price increases only in the 
short run  0 -- Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179C.  Same as above, but for year 1865-66  Price increases only in the 
short run  0 -- Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179D.  Same as above, but for mid 1866-
1868 
Comparison of real prices of 
“Northern” coal in 1867-68 
with early 1866 price 
30  Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179E. Same as 179D 
Comparison of real prices of 
“Northern” coal in 1867-68 
with 1870-72 average price 
30 -- Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179F.  Same as above, but for 1874-1880 
Comparison of real prices of 
“Northern” coal in 1874-80 
with 1872 price 
55 -- Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179G.  Same as 179F 
Comparison of real prices of 
“Northern” coal in 1874-80 
with 1881 price 
80 -- Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179H.  Same as above, but for 1882-1893 
Comparison of real prices of 
“Northern” coal in 1882-93 
with 1881 price 
46 -- Flemming 
(2000:50) 
179I.  Same as 179H 
Comparison of real prices of 
“Northern” coal in 1882-93 
with average 1895-1900  price 
34 -- Flemming 
(2000:50) 
180A. The UK Linoleum Manufacturers 
Association formed in 1905, formalized in 
1934, was judged to have engaged in a long 
list of horizontal and vertical restrictive 
practices through 1955 that were 
anticompetitive; agreements with other 
European assns. guaranteed a UK 
The two UK nonmembers sell 
linoleum of the same quality 





(1956b:26,66)   148
monopoly for the LMA; the LMA 
controlled 80% of the market in 1955; 
setting common prices; though “not against 
the public interest,” pricing was deemed 
“perilous” by the Commission.  
180B.  Same as 180A 
The Commission seems to 
suggest that the “loyalty 
rebate” awarded to all LMA-
“approved wholesalers” is a 






180C.  Same as 180A for period early 1887 
to 1904 
Pool kept prices at a constant 
$28/t from 1887 to 1904, 
except for one brief , “ruinous” 





181A. The British Non-Ferrous Metals 
Federation was created in 1945 by the 
merger of 12 metals associations, one 
founded in 1875; had 69 members in 1945 
covering semi-manufactured copper, brass, 
zinc and nickel alloys; set common prices in 
UK and since 1946 in exports under the 
Lausanne Agreement, which protects UK 
market from European exports; many other 
restrictive practices that Commission says 
“operate against the public interest” and 
“keep prices up” ; ended 1955 
In July 1946, export prices to  
British Commonwealth 
countries were raised by £7 to 
10 at a time when (yardstick 
products) copper wire, strips, 







181B.  Same as 181A 
Same as 181A above, but £10-







182A. The UK Cable Makers Association, 
formed 1899, and Covered Conductors 
Assn. had 22 members in 1950 with 65-
69% of UK market for insulated wires and 
cables; prices fixed on exports from 1928 
when Intl. Cable Development Corp. 
formed for power distribution cables; ended 
1952 
UK parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Trust reported 
that in 1921 non-CMA firms 






182B.  Same as above, except for 1948 
Loyalty rebates in 1948 are 






182C.  Same as above, except for 1949-50 
Commission seems to suggest 
that profit/sales of 10% is 
reasonable; subtracted 10% 
from average actual profits on 





 183A.  The British Electrical & Allied 
Manufacturers Assn sets common prices 
and terms of sale for 84% of the UK’s 
market for large electric power 
equipment; covers 37 lines of business; 
cooperates with the Intl. Elec. Assn. on 
exports; ca. 1930 to 1957 
In early 1950s, a yardstick 
firm, the Central Electric 
Authority, paid 5-15% lower 
prices on small transformers of 






183B.  Same as 183A 
A large industrial firm got 13 
bids for 1000 KVA 




(1957a: 177)   149
non-BEAMA bids were lower 
than 10 BEAMA firms 
183C.  Same as 183A 
Another large industrial buyer 
got lower bids from 
nonmembers on a tender for 17 
transformers (10 to 4000 





183D.  Same as 183A 
North Scotland Electric Board 
reports lower bids from 
nonmembers on small 






184A.  Since 1905 the Electric Lamp 
Manufacturers Assn. of Great Britain fixed 
common prices and standardized product 
quality; 8 members (two dominant) have 
90-95% control of UK electric bulb 
market; ELMA is affiliated with Phoebus 
(#21 above); price fixing is condemned; 
ELMA largely prevented superior long-life 
bulbs from being sold; ended 1951  
In 1933-35, UK chain stores 
sold Japan-made bulbs at 





(1951: 13), Prais 
(1974) 
184B.  Same as 184A 
In 1939 5 firms not in ELMA 
sold 60W general-service 
filament bulbs of same quality 
to chain stores at 68-71% 
lower price than ELMA firms; 
after acquisition in 1950, 





185.  German wire cartel in operation in 
early 1900s (ca. 1900-04) 
Compares 1900 domestic 
German  price with price of 
exports 
38 --  Hirst  (1905:115) 
186.  German nail cartel in early 1900s (ca. 
1900-04) 
Compares 1900 domestic 
German  price with price of 
exports 
44 --  Hirst  (1905:115) 
187.  German steel girders cartel active in 
early 1900s (ca. 1900-04) 
Compares 1900 domestic 
German  price with price of 
exports to Belgium and 
Netherlands 
20-30 --  Hirst  (1905:115) 
188A. The U.S. arc-light carbon industry 
began in 1879 and attempted to fix prices 3 
times between 1885 and 1887; the first 
successful episode was by six leading firms 
in late 1886 
Price increase from early 1886 
to late 1886  20 --  Passer (1953: 
60) 
188B.  Ten leading firms with 75% of 
supply agreed to raise prices on April 15, 
1887; ended because of large scale entry in 
July 1887 and inability to control coke 
(principal ingredient) supplies 
Prices in mid 1887 compared 
to early 1887  100 --  Passer (1953: 
61) 
189. U.S. incandescent electric light bulb 
industry became unconcentrated because 
the validity of GE’s Edison patent was in 
doubt until a 1891 court decision affirmed 
its validity; in August 1896 GE made a 
price-fixing agreement with 16 other 
manufacturers; cartel controlled 95% of 
U.S. market for several years (ca. 1900?) 
Change in price of light bulbs 
of various sizes from 1895-
early 1896 to late 1896 and 
some time afterwards 
11-67 --  Passer 
(1953:162- 163) 
190.  Major oil fields discovered in Texas  Change in price per bbl. from  0+  --  Wiggins and   150
and Oklahoma 1926-31 doubled U.S. 
reserves, causing price of crude petroleum 
to fall 92%; private cartelization attempted 
ca. 1926- Sept. 1933 resulted in an 
“imperfect cartel” that was “quite 
ineffective”; entry at small scales was easy; 
even imposition of legal quotas from 1929 
by TX and OK state commissions was 
observed by only the top 25 producers with 
1% shares or more 
1926 to 1932 due mainly to 
huge shift in supply and some 
general deflation; no 
quantitative analysis of 
whether price decline was 
slowed by sporadic supply 
controls.  
Libecap (1987) 
191A.  U.S. Webb-Pomerene crude sulfur 
exports association, active for 46+ years 
1929-32 and 1934-1970+  
Econometric model predicts 
8.3% decline in export volume 
during cartel years; price effect  
statistically significant 
6.3 --  Dick  (1992:103) 
191B*. Same as 191A, except refers to 
effect of an agreement between US and 
Sicilian producers to divide world market in 
11/1923 
Compares prices in 1924-1929 




192A.  British Radio Valve Assn., formed 
in 1926, had 10 members in 1954-56 that 
controlled  97% of sales in the UK market 
for cathode ray and electronic vacuum 
tubes;   BVA exclusively supplied all UK 
manufacturers of radio and TV sets; fixed 
prices and terms of sale to manufacturers, 
wholesalers and retailers; condemned as  
“against the public interest”; ended Sept. 
1956 
Largest set makers (80% of 
sales to mfgrs for new sets 
only) get 70-80% discount off 
list, smaller (20% of sales) got 






192B. Same as 192A, but refers to 1953-54 
sales of tubes by #1 firm (Phillips with a 
59% share) compared to similar sales by 9 
smaller members of BVA 
Phillips’ price-cost margin on 
sales under BVA agreement 
was 16% higher than non-
BVA sales; yardstick is PCM 
difference (-21%) of 9 smaller 





192C.  Same as 192A, except 1936 sales of 
radio tubes to retail customers through 
hobby magazines ; at this time US imports 
were large (20% of UK sales) and subject to 
a 33% import duty, and a large number of 
consumers built their own sets 
Compares 1936 retail prices of 
a large variety of BVA-made 





192D.  Same as 192A, except refers to 1936 
sales by leading UK wholesalers 
Price of BVA tubes in 1936 
compared to same tubes 





192E.  Same as 192A, except refers to a 
change in 1955 BVA list prices of radio 
tubes effective 9/56 in reaction to the 
impending (12/56) negative finding the 
UKMC 
Median post-cartel price 
reduction on the 9 most 
common models; range was 






80  ) 
192F. Same as 192E, except 1955- August 
1956 list prices of cathode ray tubes  
Median price reduction on the 
3 most common models; range 
was from 14.3% to 18%, 





80  ) 
193. Bid rigging against the Korean 
government by 26 road construction firms 
in 1998-99 building the Western Coast 
Expressway 
The average deviation of three 
winning bids from the 
government’s pre-qualification 
review, compared to yardstick 
of the same ratio for all 
10 --  KFTC (2001: 5-
6)   151
contracts  
194A. The Michigan Salt Association 
operated from April 1868 to at least 1888; 
supplied northern US west of Pennsylvania; 
controlled 75% to 95% of MI production; 
ineffective in raising prices for most of its 
existence but enjoyed brief success in 1868 
MI prices per bbl. in 1868 
compared to linear price trend 
in the competitive periods 
during 1866-1877 
13.8 --  Jenks  (1888:92) 
194B.  Same as above, except second 
episode May 1881 to March 1882 
Compared to average monthly 
prices June 1880 to April 1881  22.6 --  Jenks  (1888:94) 
194C. Same as 194B 
Compared to average monthly 
prices April 1882 to Mar.  
1883 
28.7 --  Jenks  (1888:94) 
194D. Same as 194A except period 
immediately after a price war 
Prices in mid 1887 compared 
to early 1887  6.1 --  Jenks  (1888:92) 
195.  A summary of a large number of 
federally prosecuted instances of bid-
rigging in U.S. road construction, mostly 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
Various methods, used by the 




196. A summary of an analysis of seven 
1984-1987 U.S. federal court final decisions 
in bid-rigging cases involving a total of  12 
defendants in various industries. 
Trial decisions of a judge or 
jury based on direct testimony 






197.  High fructose corn syrup raised 
prices in the US market from Jan. 1989 to 
June 1995; 4 of the 5 defendants in a civil 
suit settled by mid 2004   
Rough minimum estimate 
based on a yardstick: the 
largest settlement ($400 
million by leader ADM) 
4.0 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.3) 
198. Carbon fiber; 1993 to May 2002; 
under US DOJ investigation 
Press reports of rise from pre-
cartel prices  25 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.4) 
199. Aluminum metal; Feb. 1994 to Feb. 
1996; some quasi-official national trade 
associations were members and openly 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding; 
investigated by US DOJ but not indicted, 
possibly because of international comity 
reasons 
Increase in prices in June 1994 
relative to Nov. 1993 pre-








200.  Tobacco leaf; bid rigging of US 
auctions 1996-2001; antitrust class action 
by 400,000 growers and quota holders 
settled by 4 defendants May 2003; trial for 
remaining manufacturer scheduled for 2004 
Preliminary minimum 
yardstick estimate made from   
settlement worth $1,400 
million; gross farm sales from 






(6/21/ 2004 ) 
201.  Linerboard; 10/1993 to 11/1995 in 
US market; US civil court case resulted in 
three settlements by April 2004 
Settlement of $202 million is 
asserted to amount to about 
50% of the overcharge; 
benchmark is pre-cartel price; 







202.  Carbon dioxide; Jan. 1968 to Nov. 
1992 in US market civil case settled 7/1996 
just days before trial was to begin 
Estimated from Court 
comments on overcharge 
during fairness hearing on fees 
16.5 --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6) 
203.  Cardizem CD (diltiazem hydro-
chloride) heart medicine; Sept. 1997 to 
June 1999 in US market; private damages 
suit settled 2002; motion to dismiss denied 
6/13/2003 
The patent holder of Cardizem 
paid a maker of a generic 
substitute $90 million as profit 
compensation to withhold the 
generic from the market; this is 
likely to be less than half of 
the monopoly profits earned by 
both companies 
16-32+ --  Connor (2003: 
Table A.6)   152
204. Asphalt, liquid ; Alabama bid rigging 
1971-78; class-action suit of 133 
government units was initiated in 1979 and 
settled a few years later 
Overcharge is shown in Figure 






205A*. The Almond Board of California, a 
group of elected industry representatives 
operating under a USDA-enforced 
Marketing Order, controls 95% of the US 
market and two-thirds of the world market 
with inventory; cannot control tree 
plantings and sells to a concentrated 
processing sector; from about 1935 to 2004  
An econometric model applied 
to 1962-1997 data predicts a 
Lerner Index for the US 







205B*. Same as 205A 
Same as above for the world 
export market; the Lerner 







206*. Four-fifths of the world coconut oil 
market is controlled by a Philippines 
processors’ export cartel after 1972 that was 
composed of 7 companies 
An econometric model applied 
to 1959-1987 data to predict a 
Lerner Index for the pre-cartel 






207A*.  Fluid milk in the US is controlled 
by USDA-mandated Marketing Orders; mid 
1930s to 2004 
Econometric model applied to 
producer (blend) prices in 38 
markets (1960) and 46 in 
1970; peak is 1970 
14.4 17.8  Kwoka 
(1977:377) 
207B*.  Same as 207A 
Slightly different econometric 
model applied to 1973 blend-
price data; range depends on 





207C*.  Same as 207B 
Effect on consumer prices is 
net effect of increases in fluid-






208*  The California raisin  marketing 
order controls by USDA mandate a reserve 
pool through an elected board or industry 
representatives since 1949; three joint 
products are made: raisins, fresh grapes, 
and raisins; price stabilization is achieved. 
Authors develop a complex 
econometric model of the US 
industry for 1963-1984, with 9 
no-control scenarios; grower 
prices for juice grapes rise 
slightly but fall by a nearly 
equal amount on raisins and by 
a larger amount for fresh; net 





209A*.  The California-Arizona navel 
orange USDA marketing order controls the 
supply of about 75% of US winter orange 
supplies; because of a freeze in Florida, the 
restrictions on selling fresh oranges were 
unexpectedly suspended in 1985 
Predict the negative effect on 
FOB grower prices during the 
suspension of the marketing 
order from best-performing of 
4 econometric models with 42 
weeks of data from 2/1985 to 
5/1987; they later repeat the 





209B*.  The 1934-1981 California-
Arizona fresh orange industry was 
cartelized by a mandatory USDA marketing 
order; study covers equilibrium prices in 
1970s; competition raises prices to growers 
An econometric simulation 
mode predicts prices for 
oranges with and without the 
marketing order for Valencia 
oranges in the 1970s  
-20 --  Shepard 
(1986:118) 
209C*.  Same as 209B, except navel 
oranges 
Same as above  -15  --  Shepard 
(1986:118)   153
 
210A*.  The California-Arizona lemon 
marketing order controls the US supply 
under a USDA mandate; in 1973 the policy 
was changed from one that emphasized 
constant prices to one that kept price 
constant; grower prices decreased and retail 
prices increased   
An econometric model 
compares actual 1986-87 retail 
prices under the constant-price 
policy with the former 
consumer-friendly constant-
quantity-policy yardstick   
1.1 --  Carmen and Pick 
(1990:354) 
210B*. Same as 210A, but examines the 
effect of the new stabilization policy of 
returns to middlemen 
Same as above, but calculates 
change in the marketing 
margin compared to the old 
policy yardstick 
6.8 --  Carmen and Pick 
(1990:354) 
211A*.  Two bid-rigging cartels in the 
Upper Midwest U.S. road seal-coating 
construction industry are detected from 
1994-1998 data on almost 18,000 
procurement contracts by private and public 
buyers; authors judge that the upper quintile 
of contracts (3500) were affected by one or 
more of two duopolistic cartels. 
A sophisticated econometric 
model incorporating Baysian 
expert knowledge predicts 
cartel behavior on bids where 
the two largest firms are 
bidders; largest 20% of 
collusive markups are 
compared to the upper 20% of 
markups of competitive bids  
8.0 --  Bajari and Yi 
(2003:Table 12) 
211B*.  Same as 211A  Same as above, except cartel 
consists of the #1 and #3 firms  21.0 -- Bajari and Yi 
(2003:Table 12) 
212*.  The legal Norwegian cement cartel 
was established in 1923; until 1968 it set 
market quotas and exported through a 
common sales agency; without capacity 
constraints, the cartel over-invested in 
capacity 
Authors find that the cartel 
exported at prices below 
marginal cost during 1955-
1967 
0 --  Roller and Steen 
(2003) 
213A*. Survey report of the Japan FTC on 
several  bid-rigging schemes involving 
large companies for 21 cases of  public 
construction projects and materials 
procurement in Japan 4/1996-3/2003 
Price change if bids were not 
rigged; method compares 
actual bid prices to prices 




Jiji wire service 
3/9/04 
213B*. Bid rigging of a tender made by 
Osaka, Japan city government for 
germicidal chemicals used in sewer 
systems; sometime during 4/1996-3/2003 
Price decline on product after a 
raid by the JFTC   41.5 -- 
Kishi (2004), 
JFTC (2004:8); 
Jiji wire service 
3/9/04 
213C*. Bid rigging of a tender made by 
Osaka, Japan city government for one 
water purification plant; sometime during 
4/1996-3/2003 
Price decline on product after a 
raid by the JFTC   28.0 -- 
Kishi (2004), 
JFTC (2004:8); 
Jiji wire service 
3/9/04 
213D*. Bid rigging of a tender made by 
Osaka, Japan city government for four 
water purification plants; sometime 
during 4/1996-3/2003 
Price decline on product after a 
raid by the JFTC   28.8 -- 
Kishi (2004), 
JFTC (2004:8); 
Jiji wire service 
3/9/04 
213E*. Bid rigging of a tender made by 
Osaka, Japan Prefecture government for a 
water purification plant; sometime during 
4/1996-3/2003 
Price decline on product after a 
raid by the JFTC   29.0 -- 
Kishi (2004), 
JFTC (2004:8); 
Jiji wire service 
3/9/04 
214*.  Survey report of the Japan FTC 
summarizing the average overcharges of 14 
price-fixing cartels selling “basic 
materials” (food, plastic, steel, chemicals, 
drugs, etc.) in Japan April 1992 to March 
2003 
JFTC staff studies that 
compare average fixed prices 
to prices after the cartels were 





Jiji wire service 
3/9/04 
215*.   In 1986 the UK white salt duopoly  Rees proves overt collusion  23-32  --  UK  Monopolies   154
was found to have colluded in the 1974-
1984 period at least, but the duopoly failed 
to achieve the monopoly level of prices and 
costs (costs 2 to 5% above); see also #168 
above. 
using an unusual method: 
comparing the predictions of 
noncooperative oligopoly 
price-leadership models with 
predictions from an infinitely 
repeated game model; Rees 
suggests a profit yardstick of 7 




216A*.  In the Euro-Zone banks  case, the 
EC fined 5 German banks €100 million for 
fixing the commission for exchanging their 
customers’ local-currency bank deposits 
into Euros, from 1/1/1999 to 12/11/2001; 
originally the cartel consisted of 25 German 
and Dutch banks, but 20 consented to lower 
their fixed fees or variable fees in 2000; 
several eliminated all fees after 10/01 (an 
infinite overcharge?)   
Author explains the basis of 
the EC’s fine was to recover 
90% of the banks’ illegal 
profits; fixed commissions 
were 3.0% and but-for 
yardstick margin was 0.3%; 
thus, mark-up was 2.7 
percentage points  
800 --  Guersent 
(2004:23) 
216B. Same as 216A, except 5 German 
banks agreed to fix their foreign exchange 
fees for the Deutsche mark at 3% during the 
Euro transition period 1/98-12/01  
One of the original members 
of the cartel (Bayerische 
Landesbank) agreed to 
eliminate its fixed fee and 
reduce its variable fee to 2%  
50+ -- 
EC (5/3/01 and 
12/11/01), OJ 
(1/21/03) 
216C. Same as 216A above, except an EC 
consent decree involving Westdeutsche 
Landesbank of Germany   
Percentage charge reduced 
from 3.5% to 1.5%  133 133 EC  (5/14/01) 
216D. Same as 216A, except EC consent 
decree with Bank J. Van Breda of NL 
Fixed fee of €2.48 eliminated, 
but 1.25% fee retained; 
assumed that a typical 
exchange amount was €50-200 
50-80 --  EC  (5/14/01) 
216E. Same as 216A, except EC consent 
decree with ING, Postbank, and ABN 
AMRO Bank of NL 
Minimum fee lowered from fl. 
7.5 to 3.5, but 2.75% charge 
unchanged; assumed typical 
amount exchanged is €50-200 
20-38 --  EC  (5/7/01) 
216F. Same as 216A, except EC consent 
decree with Fortis Bank Nederland 
Fixed service fee reduced from 
fl.5 to 2.5  100 100 EC  (5/7/01) 
216G.  Same as 216A, except EC consent 
decree with ING Bank Group in Belgium  
Reduced their minimum fee 
from BEL 100 to 45, but  fee 
of 2.25% unchanged; assumed 
typical amount exchanged is 
€50-200 
17-35 --  EC  (5/7/01) 
216H. Same as 216A, except EC consent 
decree with Ulster Bank of Ireland 
Reduced its fee from 2.25% to 
1% and eliminated a minimum 
fee of €2.5; assumed typical 
amount exchanged is €50-200 
56-80 --  EC  (5/3/01) 
216I. Same as 216A, except EC consent 
decree with Bayerische Landesbank of 
Germany 
Abolished its minimum fee of 
€2 and reduced its service fee 
from 3% to 2%; assumed typ-
ical amount exchanged is €50-
200 
33-50 --  EC  (5/3/01) 
217*.  Chilean miners of sodium nitrate, 
from the world’s sole source of natural 
caliche  deposits, formed a series of six 
voluntary export cartels from June 1884 to 
January 1914; each lasted an average of 3 
years; exports grew 900% from 1880 to 
1910; cartel set sales and export quotas for 
When first formed, each cartel 
saw an increase in prices, 
followed by a slump when it 







(1930: 26-56)   155
each mine and imposed penalties for 
violations but did not control entry; 
constant per ton export tax accounted for 
30-70% of the export price .  
217A*.  First Chilean export cartel of 1884-
1886 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices 
1884-86 compared to 1883; 





217B*.  First Chilean export cartel of 1884-
1886 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices 
1884-86 compared to 1887-





217C*.  Second Chilean export cartel of 
1891-1894 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices 
1891-94 compared to 1887-90; 





217D*.  Second Chilean export cartel of 
1891-1894 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices 
1891-94 compared to 1895; 





217E*.  Third Chilean export cartel of 
1896-1897 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices 
1896-97 compared to 1885; 





217F*.  Third Chilean export cartel of 
1896-1897 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices 
1896-97 compared to 1885; 





217G*.  Fourth Chilean export cartel of 
1901-06 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices 
1901-06 compared to 1898-





217H*.  Fifth Chilean export cartel of 1907-
08 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices 






217I*.  Sixth Chilean export cartel of 1913- 
July 1914; in July 1919 the Chilean Nitrate 
Producers’ Assn. was formed with active 
government assistance (by 1925-26 with 
effective entry control tradable quota rights 
sold for 24% of the export price) 
Chilean f.a.s. export prices in  







218*.  The “east of Burma” agreement 
covered flat rolled steel products; began ca. 
1985; still in operation 2003; steel mills in 
EU and Eastern Europe agreed to export 
only west of Burma; Japanese and Korean 
producers only east of Burma; fixed quotas 
annually and prices quarterly 
Method not explained, but 
cites a 1993 OECD report by 
Alan William Wolff 
25-30 --  Jenny  (2003) 
219*.  Roofing felt manufacturers in 
Belgium fixed prices and shares from at 
least 1/1978 to 4/1984; 9 companies 
controlled 60% of market; fined by EC in 
1986 
EC Decision mentions several 
times that the cartel agreed to 
limit discounts to certain 
buying groups the yardstick) 
while charging list to other 
customers 
23-25+ -- EC  (8/19/1986) 
220*.  Flour procurement by the Taiwan 
Flour Mills Association for 32 member 
companies from May 1997 to May 2000; 
fined by the Taiwan FTC in May 2000 
Press release by Taiwan FTC 
estimates cost to consumers to 







221*.   Distributors of natural gas in 
southern Taiwan (Pingtung-Kaohsiung and 
Tainan) fixed prices from 4/2000 to 1/2001 
and were required to pay record fines by the 
Taiwan FTC  
An analysis by the Taiwan 






222A*.  Bid rigging on road construction  Bench trial decision; damages  10.6  --  State of   156
in Greeley, Colorado (the “Second  35
th Av. 
Project”) around 1983 





222B*. Same as 222A, for “Third 35 Av. 





223*.  Tetracycline  manufacturers in the 
US settled a civil damages case brought by 
43 states, many cities, and indirect 
purchasers; a previous criminal trial 
conviction was overturned by an Appeals 
Court panel; conspiracy dates uncertain, 
probably Nov. 1953 to 1960  
Defendants offer is based on 
an overcharge assumed to be 
66.7% (method unknown), but 
“allowing for uncertainties in 
law and in fact” a compromise 





224*. In a class action by buyers of 
polypropylene carpet, a Daubert challenge 
results in a court decision to accept the 
opinion of one of the plaintiffs’ experts 
Econometric model predicts an 
overcharge for 1990-1995 for 







225. UK copper smelters, most in Swansea 
district of So. Wales, began rigging bids for 
ore 1719-1726 and later rigged bids for 
export copper; first buyers’ cartel of 4 
smelters 1719-1726; second more formal 
agreement (“Associated Smelters”) 1737-
1779; Newell says second was “quite 
effective” at lowering ore prices and raising 
copper prices 




225A*.  Cornish Metal Co., a sales-agency 
cartel, formed 1785 to buy all copper ore 
and set prices; controlled 2/3 by miners and 
1/3 by smelters in Cornwall and later made 
side payments to Anglesea mines; collapsed 
in Oct. 1787 when stocks reached 2 years’ 
supply, imports increased, and Anglesea 
defected.  
Compares copper prices in 
1787-88 with early 1785; peak 
is 1787 
13.3 16 Allen  (1923) 
225B*.  Same as 225A, except period is 
Dec. 1787 to early 1792; more successful 
because a new common sales agency 
covered both Cornwall and Anglesea 
districts and total production quotas were 
observed 
Large stocks of copper were 
eliminated 1788-1790 at prices 
8% above 1785; peak is 1791 
12.0 21 Allen  (1923) 
225C*. First Copper Trade Association 
formed 1824; failed Dec. 1829 because no 
agreement on quotas and leading firms’ 
shares dropped too far. 
Author develops a price series 
on smelters’ price-cost 
margins for 1824-29 and 
compares margins after 
collapse of cartel  
25-30 --  Newell 
(1998:183) 
225D*.  Second Copper Trade Assn. 
formed 1844 and kept secret until it ended 
1867; more elaborate organization and 
higher degree of control of the industry 
(CR4 = 70%); copper prices constant during 
cartel, but ore prices forced down 
Author’s figures on copper 
prices and ore prices 1844-
1867 compared to 1842-43 
prices; profit figures confirm 
effectiveness of cartel 
19 --  Newell 
(1998:191) 
226*  Associated Milk Producers was found 
guilty at trial of price-fixing , mostly in 
Southern US fluid milk markets from 1972 
to 1980 
Econometric model applied to 
14 markets; dummy measures 
effect of DOJ consent decree; 
ave. is for all markets, peak for 
monopolized markets 
4.5 5.3  Madhavan et al. 
(1984:161-69)   157
227*.  Price fixing and market-sharing of 
cast iron and cast steel rolls covered 
virtually all of W. Europe from Jan. 1968 to 
June 1980; many changes in pricing and 
organization during cartel; originally target 
prices for all Europe, later separate 
minimum price increases for each currency 
area; the Intl. Roll Manufacturers’ Assn. 
(IRMA) was the collusive cover from May 
1971; from 1971-77, bids from steel 
companies were handled through a Zurich 
office (ATAG);  30 companies and national 
associations fined by EU in 11/83 
EC decision recounts many 
price increases by IRMA that 
were “quite efficient”: from 
Jan. 1969 10% in 10/69, 40% 
by 10/70, 46% by 1/73, 55% 
by 1/74, and 100%+ by 10/74; 
but general inflation was 
significant in 1969-74, about 
40-50%, so real price increases 
are calculated 
40-60 -- EC (11/15/83:  
5-9) 
228*A.  The EU fined 40 firms from No. 
Am. and W. Eur. in the European market 
for bleached sulphate paper pulp sold in 
open markets;  two episodes, 1/75-12/76 
and 1/79 to 12/84; Decision gives quarterly 
transaction prices of bright (GE>80) prime 
bleached softwood pulp from 1/74 to 1982  
Episode 1 (1975-76) average 
prices compared to 1974 
(before) prices; peak same 
years  
23 23  EC (3/26/85: 
para 15, 24, 113) 
228B*.  Same as 228A 
Same as above, except 
comparison is 1977-78 after 
prices  
25 25  EC (3/26/85: 
para 15, 24, 113) 
228C*.  Same as 228A, except episode 2 
(1979-81) 
Episode 2 average prices 
compared to 1977-78; peak is 
4/80 to 12/81 
49.9 64.2 EC (3/26/85: 
para 15, 24, 113) 
228D*.  Same as 228C 
Same as above, except 
benchmark is price after 
collusion 
20 31  EC (3/26/85: 
para 15, 24, 113) 
229A*.  The Taiwan Fair Trade 
Commission fined 27 distributors of 
liquefied petroleum natural gas (LPG) in 
southern Taiwan of price fixing from April 
2000 to Jan. 2001 
The increase in a kg. of gas in 
Pingtung-Kaohsiung was from 







229B*.  Same as 229A, except in Tainan 
Price increase was from 
NT$0.80 to $1.00 (before) to   
$2.00 
100-150 --  TFTC 
(1/12/2001) 
230*.  The EC fined 5 French producers 
and a Taiwanese export trade Assn. for a 
Jan. 1973 agreement to raise prices on sales 
of canned mushrooms in Germany in Mar. 
1973; in Dec. 1975, the cartel became 
ineffective because of a surge in Chinese 
imports. 
Prices were raised in Germany 
Mar. and April 1973 from Jan-
Feb. levels 
10 --  EC  (1/8/1975) 
231*.  The EC disbanded and fined an 
association of four manufacturers of 
wallpaper in Belgium that had fixed f.o.b. 
and retail prices and all terms of sale from 
1922 to 1974; perhaps the most detailed set 
of uniform rules of any trade association 
ever recorded  
The association had complex 
rules for awarding discounts to 
wholesalers on the basis of 
annual purchases from the 
members; the most revealing 
yardstick for gauging price 
effect is the discount offered to 
all contractors and builders 
regardless of size 
33.3 33.3  EC (7/23/1974: 
para.13) 
232*. The EC fined virtually every major 
PVC manufacturer of polyvinyl chloride 
plastic  for price fixing during 1980Q4 to 
1983Q4; although overturned by the 
Average transaction prices for 
three years compared to price 
several months before the 
cartel started 
56 70  EC (12/21/1988: 
para. 17-19)   158
European Court, the price effects were not 
questioned. 
233A*.  A study of bid rigging in the 
commercial cartage (garbage collection) 
industry in NYC 1978-1985 
Uses sales of customers among 
suppliers as a yardstick to 
compute the capitalized value 
of  rents from overcharges 
50 --  Reuter 
(1993:193) 
233B*. Same as 233A, except for 
residential customers in NJ and Long 
Island, NY 
Same as above  15  --  Reuter 
(1993:193) 
234*.  The Taiwan Flour Mills Assn. was 
fined by the Taiwan Fair Trade 
Commission for allocating flour and wheat 
imports among its 32 members from May 
1997 to May 2000 
Price of imported wheat and 
flour during cartel compared to 
before cartel, estimated by the 
TFTC 
5.8 --  TFTC  (5/5/2000) 
  DATA ADDED AFTER 9/04      
73Y. Same as 73A. 
Yardstick is prices of 
profitable German mines not in 
cartel, ca. 1900-1910  
30 --  Tosdal 
(1916:830) 
149C. Same as 149A. 
Author gives monthly prices of 
8 d. nails, the modal type; 
benchmark is prices for 4 
months before May 1895; peak 
is May-Nov. 1896 
75 113  Edgerton 
(1897:260) 
149D. Same as 149A. 
Same as above, but corrects for 
increase in major input price, 
No. 11 steel wire 
50 88  Edgerton 
(1897:260) 
149E. Same as 149A.  Benchmark is prices 4 months 
after cartel dissolved  69 106  Edgerton 
(1897:260) 
149F. Same as 149A. 
Same as above, but corrects for 
increase in major input price, 
No. 11 steel wire 
44 81  Edgerton 
(1897:260) 
166P. Covers all episodes 1770-1845 
Econometric model using 
annual data on wholesale 
prices 
6.9-7.8 --  Hausman 
(1984:326) 
166Q. Covers the years 1699-1770; no 
other author suggest that this was a cartel 
period 
Econometric model using 
annual data on retail prices 
paid by two London buyers 
0 --  Hausman  (1980) 
235A. In 3/1999 SAS Airlines (a DK-SW-
NO joint venture) and Maersk Air informed 
the EC about a new code sharing 
agreement.  After raids in June 2000, the 
EC determined (the “Danish Air Routes” 
case) that Maersk had agreed to withdrawal 
from the Copenhagen-Oslo and 
Copenhagen-Stockholm routes in return for 
Maersk’s monopoly on the Billung-
Copenhagen and Copenhagen-Venice 
routes plus monetary compensation; the 
agreement was effective from 3/99 to 4/01  
The EC decision uncovered 
secret planning documents that 
showed that SAS would and 
did raise the fares on its route 
to Stockholm by DKK 100 to 
pay for the Maersk 
withdrawal; fares are about 
DKK2000-2500 on this route 
4.0-5.0 -- EC (7/18/2001: 
para. 92-95) 
235B. Same as 235A, except for the 
Copenhagen-Oslo route 
Price increase of DKK 100 
relative to fares of DKK 2100-
2700 
3.7-4.8 -- EC (7/18/2001: 
para. 92-95) 
236A. A study of the Swedish roundwood 
procurement  market in 1954-1984 found 
evidence of oligopsonistic pricing behavior 
by paper buyers in two interrelated sub 
markets: sawtimber and pulpwood [an EC-
A sophisticated econometric 
model simultaneously estim-
ates the negative price effects 
on forestry firms for pulpwood 
in 1979-1984; peak is 1984 
25 29.4 Brännlund 
(1989:702-703)   159
FI antitrust probe was launched in 2004]   
236B. Same as 236A  Same as above for sawtimber  10  11.8  Brännlund 
(1989:702-703) 
237. The European Union fined 3 
companies for price-fixing of flat glass 
products in Benelux; 1978-1981 
From internal documents of 
the cartel quoted in the EC 
decision (para. 14 and 41)  
10-15 --  EC  (8/8/84) 
238A.  The German iron and steel cartel 
of Mar. 1904 – June 1907 fixed prices of 
crude metal, rails, beams, rods, bars, sheets, 
axels, wheels, and castings; may be a 
successor to cartels #185-187 above. 
Benchmark is 1895-1897 
prices (the last normal demand 
period) of crude ingots 
0 --  Walker 
(1906:860) 
238B. Same as 238A, except billets 
Benchmark is 1895-1897 
prices (the last normal demand 
period) 
5.3 -  Walker 
(1906:860) 
238C. Same as 238A, except beams 
Benchmark is 1895-1897 
prices (the last normal demand 
period) 
6.1-9.1 -  Walker 
(1906:860) 
238D. Same as 238A, except rails 
Benchmark is 1895-1897 
prices (the last normal demand 
period) 
7.7 --  Walker 
(1906:860) 
238E. Same as 238A, except billets 
Yardstick is f.o.b. Antwerp 
prices adjusted for 
transportation costs and 
subsidies  
30 --  Walker 
(1906:864) 
239.     A U.S. Circuit Court convicted 16 
companies for price fixing of enameled 
iron bath tubs from 6/1/1910 to 1/1/1911; 
one of the first cases of anticompetitive 
patent pooling 
The decision quotes letters 
from the head of the Sanitary 
Enameled Ware Assn. 
complaining about cheaters 
undercutting the fixed price; 
peak price is from testimony of 
a nonmember of the cartel  
15-17 45  Ripley 
(1916:614-616) 
240.  From 1982 to 1999, three companies 
colluded on harbor loading services in 
Taichung, Taiwan; fined by the TFTC 
Based on yardstick prices for 
unloading scrap iron in two 
similar harbors 
20-120 --  TFTC-OECD 
(2001:14) 
241.  Bid  rigging on a tender by National 
Taiwan University Hospital for surgical 
suture thread, by 3 Taiwanese, one U.S., 
and one German companies in August 1988  
Yardstick is prices paid for 
same products by other Taiwan 
hospitals in 1997 
50-80 -- TFTC-OECD 
(2001:16) 
242.  The Taiwan Fair Trade Commission 
fined 15 distributors of liquefied 
petroleum natural gas (LPG) in Tamshui, 
Taiwan area of price fixing from May 1999 
to May 2000 
Before price NT$400 raised to 
NT$500 per cylinder  25 --  TFTC-OECD 
(2001:18) 
243.  The Taiwan FTC fined 5 cable TV 
operators  for fixing the price of services 
from 1/1/2000 to 12/31/2000 in Kaohsiung 
City and County, Taiwan  
TFTC calculated the monopoly 
profits of the 5 operators for 
2000 
30.5 30.5 TFTC-OECD 
(2001:14,19) 
244. The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Bureau 
fined 5 business groups for rigging a bid in 
late 1999 for the right to operate for 3 years 
a brickyard plant owned by a township in 
Zhejiang Province, China  
The agreement provided for 
side payments to the 4 losers 
of RNB200,000; I assume that 
the winner made at least RNB 
50,000 on the RNB180,088 
winning bid 
38.8+ --  Wang  (2001:8-9) 
245. The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Bureau 
fined 1 construction company for rigging a 
bid with 9 others on Oct. 6, 1998 for the 
right to construct a primary school 
The Bureau calculated the 
illegal gains of the winner to 
be RNB9000 on the 
RNB263.574 project 
3.4 --  Wang (2001:9-
10)   160
building    in Changding County,  Fujian 
Province, China 
a   If the dates of the cartel’s effective period of operation are different from its formal existence, the former dates are 
given if known.
 
b The first number is from the first edition of Posner, the second from the second (2001) edition. 
Note: Connor (2003) includes some observations added August 2003- October 2004; the data appendix tables (A.1-
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Membership  Legal Status  Bid Rigging  Cartel  
Episode 
End Date 





Conduct  Other 
 













            
Before 1891  37-39  41-48  --  38-41  --  38-41 
 20-25  42-50  --  31  --  31 
  (47) (14)  -- (43) -- (43) 
            
1891 - 1919  40-47  43-44  24  43-46  39  42-45 
 35  50  24  38-40  39  36-40 
 (37)  (30)  (22)  (33)  (0)  (33) 
            
1920 - 1945  9-21  42-48  45-81  37-45  --  39-47 
 6  30-31  9  30-33  --  30-33 
 (14)  (76)  (79)  (71)  --  (73) 
            
1946 – 1973  18-22  35-36  19-21  32-35  19-22  30-33 
 15-20  32-34  13  28-44  12  24-25 
 18  19  17  21  18  21 
            
1974 – 1990  23-25  65-68  29-31  31-40  26-29  34-36 
 21-22  44-46  22-23  34-34  23-24  23-26 
 (22)  (80)  (41)  (20)  (23)  (53) 
            
1991 – 2003  17-18  32-38
b 30-37  19  21-21  32-40 
 15-16  22-25  20-23  19  17-17  22-25 
 (17)  (52)  (47)  (0)  (17)  (50) 
            
Total, mean  25-29  38-43  28-35  38-43  22-24  36-42 
         median  20-22  30-32  19-20  32-36  17-18  28-30 
Source: Appendix Table 2 (as of 1/6/04)  
a) If ranges are given, both lower and upper bounds are shown. (lower bound only). 
b) Includes 12 EU cartels with an average overcharge of …. 
-- = Not available   162
Appendix Table 4.  Final Court Decisions with Overcharges Data 
 
Overcharge  Name and Type of Case 
Average Peak 
1. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U.S. 211 (1899) 
(conspiracy to allocate customers via secret bidding 
pool)(Court provided a typical  
result, but not an average figure
180) 
34.7-42.6%+  
    
2. Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota,             




    
3. Armco Steel Corp. v. Adams County, 376F. 2d 212 
(1967)(highway construction bidding conspiracy) (same 
defendants as previous case but different victims) 
17.3-20.3%  
 





5. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Association, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (legal 




    
6.  Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n. of Retailers, 322 F. 3d 1133    150% 
                                                 
180 “The cost of producing pipe at Chattanooga, together with a reasonable profit, did not exceed $ 15 a ton. It could 
have been delivered at Atlanta at $ 17 to $ 18 a ton, and yet the lowest price which that foundry was permitted by 
the rules of the association to bid was $ 24.25. The same thing was true all through 'pay' territory to a greater or less 
degree, and especially at 'reserved' cities." 
 
This means that the typical price increase was at least $24.25 - 18 = 6.25/18 = 34.7%  And, 24.25 - 17 = $7.25/17 = 
42.6%  
 
181 “We have no difficulty whatever in holding that there was adequate basis... proximate injury in the amount of 
$258,355, on the extent of the artificiality involved in the fixed prices and its ingrediency in the $1,396,500 list-price 
aggregate ... which had entered into the construction projects let during the conspiracy period, and in the $2,000 
quantity of direct purchases made by the State.”  If $258,355 of the $1,396,500 was an overcharge, then the 
overcharge would have been 22.7% of the base figure of $1,138,145.   
 
182  The court found that plaintiff has reliably proved the overcharges on two of the three contracts at issue; 
competitive prices of $333,253 and $343,051 were increases by $35,381  and $29,732.  Colorado ex rel. Woodard v. 
Goodell Bros., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P67,476 Id at 7.  
 
183 Legal aid attorney conspired to raise fees.  Cartel/boycott by Washington DC lawyers (public defenders) that 
demanded (& received) a price increase from $30 hr court time and $20 hr non court time to $35 hr for both in the 
span of a week.  They would later seek and obtain a price increase to $55 hr court time & $45 hr non court time 
(without a boycott).  
 
184  The increase was 16.7% for in court time and 75% for out of court time, but it was not possible to compute the 
average.  
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(2003)(conspiracy to standardize subscription charges
185) 
    
7. Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass’n., 721 F. ed 
1019 (5




    
8. Homewood Theatre v. Loew’s,                   
110 F. Supp. 398 (D. Minn. 1952) 
(conspiracy involving first run films
187) 
6.3%  
    
9. Kruman v. Christies’ Intern. PLC, 284 F. 3d 384, 390 (C.A. 
2 2002)
188 (fine art auction cartel)  50 %  150% 
    
10. New York v. Hendrickson Bros. 840 F.2d 1065 (2d. Cir. 
1988






                                                                                                                                                             
185  Group of realtor associations combined and standardized their charges. Some raised subscription price from $10 
up to $25, others lowered them.  Although it was not a simple price fixing conspiracy, Judge Kozinski called it 
“price fixing”.  However, since he did not state how much the average charge increased, we did not include it in our 
median or average estimates. 
 
186  Jury decided amount of overcharge and appellate court upheld.  Id at 1026-27. 
 
187 $39,432.67 loss on sales of $625,763.78. 
 
188 “On November 2, 1992, Sotheby's announced it would increase its buyer's premiums from 10% to 15% for the 
first $ 50,000.00 of the purchase price. On December 22, 1992, Christie's declared an identical increase in its 
buyer's premiums. The defendants allegedly agreed not to reduce these premiums. The defendants also agreed to set 
their seller's commissions at identical levels. Prior to March 1995, the defendants would permit clients to negotiate 
smaller seller's commissions. On or about March 10, 1995, Christie's announced it would implement a fixed 
schedule of non-negotiable seller's commissions ranging between 2% and 10% depending on the value of the item to 
be sold. On April 13, 1995, Sotheby's stated it would implement a fixed schedule of non-negotiable seller's 
commissions substantially identical to the schedule set by Christie's.” Id at 390. 
 
For the items covered by the agreement, buyers’ commissions rose by 50%, from 10% to 15%.  In addition, the new 
sellers’ commissions means that total commissions had increased from 10% up to as much as 25% - a 150% 
increase. 
 
189 Jury determined that contract overcharges were $590,000 on what should have been a $1.2 million contract 
(49.2%: page 1070), $644,000 on what should have been a $2,004,000 contract (32.1%: page 1071-72), and 
$1,113,000 on what should have been a $8,187,000 contract (13.6%). The Court also noted: “Amfar was advised not 
to "get too greedy," i.e., it was to limit the excess profit included in its bid to 20-25% and was not to seek excess 
profits of 40-50%. Later review by Ambrosio of bids submitted by other coconspirators led him to the conclusion 
that most of them were submitting bids that included excess profits higher than the 20-25 % benchmark.” Id at 1070. 
 
Most of the economic analyses we surveyed would have called these different episodes and analyzed them 
separately, even though legally they were treated together. This clearly is a judgment call upon which reasonable 
people could differ. If they were treated as one larger conspiracy, the overcharges would total $2,347,000 on a base 
of $11,391,000, or 20.6% overall. Alternatively the average of the three computed overcharges is 31.6%. In 
addition, the Court found that a subcontract that should have been bid at $512,000 was given to a fellow conspirator, 
in return for not bidding, for an additional $338,000, a 66% overcharge.  This was not included as a separate 
overcharge figure, however, since is subsumed in the conspiracy for its prime contract.  
   164
    
11. New York v. Cedar Park Concrete Corp,  
85 Civ 1887 (2001) (construction bid rigging 
during 7 year period
190) 
5.87%  
    
12.  North Texas Producers Ass’n v. Young,        
308 F. 2d. 235 (5
th Cir. 1962) (conspiracy to 
exclude low cost milk seller
191) 
36%  
    
13.  Ohio Valley Electric Corp. v. General        
Electric Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (SDNY 1965)              




    
14. Palmer v BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46,47       




    
15. Pease v. Jasper Wyman & Son, 2004 ME          
29 (2004) (conspiracy to suppress prices  
paid for wild blueberries
194) 
21.6%     32.8%
195 
    
16. Story Parchment Co. v Patterson               
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931) 




                                                 
190 The conspiracy was organized personally by Paul Castellano, on behalf of "the governing body of New York's 
five organized crime families".  Yet the Court only found that it raised prices by 5.87%. 
 
191 This involved a horizontal conspiracy to exclude a low-priced milk seller that would have sold milk for 69 cents 
instead of 96 cents.  He was awarded $100,000 in lost profit damages for the period at issues.  The important point 
for our study, however, is the Court’s conclusion that that the horizontal competitors caused the price of the milk 
that plaintiff would have sold to consumers at 69 cents to be sold to them at 96 cents instead.  The conspiracy 
prevented a 36% price drop.  Id at 237. 
 
192 ”This overcharge of $5,624,401 is slightly under eleven per cent of the total final order price for all units 
($52,027,785) and slightly under ten per cent of the total final billed price, including escalation ($57,116,819). Page 
947  This totals 10.92% of the pre-collusive amount. 
 
193 This case involved an agreement by the only 2 Bar Review preparation companies in Georgia. They entered into 
a naked division of markets, after which the price of a Bar Review course in Georgia went from $150 to "over 
$400." Id. at 47. We will conservatively assume that the price only went up to $400, an increase of $167%.   
 
194  This was a four year average, calculated from Solow exhibit 10, “Underpayment to Growers”, whose figures 
were accepted by the jury.  A $56 million judgment was upheld. 
  
195  For 1997. 
 
196 Conspiracy to monopolize and destroy plaintiff’s business. Jury verdict of $65,000, before trebling. Property that 
cost $235,000 allegedly reduced in value to $75,000. So damages must have been 65/235 = 27.7%. 
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17. Strobl v. N. Y. Mercantile Exchange,         
582 F. Supp. 770 (1984) (conspiracy to  




    
18. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 
(10
th Cir. 1961) (1938-48 conspiracy to reduce prices paid for 
vanadium ore
198) 
22.5%     38-47.5%    
    
19. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P. 2d 
231 (N.M/ 1980)(uranium cartel
199)   567% 
    
20. U.S. v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319             
11
th Cir. 2003)(bid rigging on USAID  
contract
200) 
16.4-39.2%         
    
21. United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d                      
645 (2000) (conspiracy to raise Lysine prices
201)   71.4% 
                                                 
197  Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 582 F. Supp. 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), motion to reduce award denied 
590 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),  aff'd 768 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1985).  “The $460,000 figure reached by the jury, 
therefore, was the equivalent of a finding that the price of the May potato futures contract would have been 
approximately $18.00, instead of $9.25, had the market been operating solely on the basis of supply and 
demand...The jury could have concluded from the evidence of low supply that the price of Maine potato futures was 
artificially low during the conspiracy period.” Id. at 779.  Price therefore was depressed 48.6%.  
 
198  “In these circumstances, we cannot say that the jury's finding to the effect that the free market price of 2 percent 
vanadium ore for the period October 1938 through March 1948 was 40 cents per pound instead of 31 cents was 
clearly erroneous.” 
 
199 United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d  231, 242 (N.M. 1980) "Fourth, between 1972, when the 
cartel apparently began, and 1975, when this suit was filed, the price of uranium in the United States increased from 
approximately $6.00 per pound to approximately $ 40.00 per pound."  The Court concluded that the price of 
Uranium had increased by 566% during the period of the conspiracy but did not say that all of this increase was due 
to the activity of the cartel.  For this reason this cartel’s increase has been put in the maximum column, not the 
average column. 
 
200 Exhibits 16 and 24 say that the winning bids on the three contracts at issue were $283.984 million On page 77 of 
the Transcript of Sentencing Before The Honorable Robert B. Propst, May 20, 2002, the judge found that the total 
overcharges for these three contracts were "greater than 40 and less than 
80" million dollars. Using the $40 m loss figure -- this would mean that the three jobs together should have cost 
$244 million, so 40/244 is 16.4%.  For the higher overcharge finding, the 
contracts should have totaled $204 million, so 80/204 = 39.2%.  
 
201 "The meeting ended without a sales volume allocation agreement, but two months later, at the recommendation 
of Whitacre, the cartel raised prices anyway, and prices rose from $ .70 to $ 1.05 per pound. ... [Much later] The 
producers also agreed on a new price of $ 1.20 for the United States market."  Id at 652-53 
 
The Court inferred that at least one sale took place at $1.20, so its maximum increase was (1.20-.70)/.70 = 71.4%.  
As is typical, this Court was not perfectly clear as to what caused the price to rise.  But the plain meaning of the 
quotation is that the Court found that, as a maximum, the cartel raised the price of Lysine by 71.4%. 
 
In fact this would be a modest conclusion because the Court also wrote:  "Together, the three parent companies   166
    
22. United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559 (11
th Cir. 
1988) (Bid Rigging on public works project
202)  34%  
    
23.  U. S. v. Foley, 598 F. 2d 1323,1327 (C.A. Md., 1979
203) 
(real estate companies agreed to raise their commissions on 
houses) 
16.7% 16.7% 
    
24. In Re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation,             
Animal Science Products v. Chinook Group, 
Misc. No. 99-0197 TFA, M.D.L. No. 1285 
(choline chloride cartel jury verdict
204) 
38%  
    
25.  Wall Products v. National Gypsum, 357 F. Supp. 832 




    
26. Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass.,568 F. 2d 670 









                                                                                                                                                             
produced all of the world's lysine until the 1990s, presenting an obvious opportunity for collusive behavior. Indeed 
the Asian cartel periodically agreed to fix prices, which at times reached as high as $3.00 per pound."  This would 
mean that the maximum increase was roughly (3.00-.70)/.70 = 329% 
 
202 7.  United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559  A $1.7 million profit on a $5 million contract is a profit of 
34%. 
 
203  On Sept. 5, 1975, competing real estate executives agreed to raise their commission from 6% to 7%.  ”Within the 
following months each of the corporate defendants substantially adopted a seven percent commission rate.” Id. at 
1327.  Since almost all, but not 100% of the sales were at a 7% Commission, 16.7% actually overstates the average 
actual rise somewhat. 
 
204 The jury verdict was $49.54 million "before trebling and credit for prior settlements". On page 6 Plaintiff's 
expert gives total U.S. sales in the industry of $130.85 million.  So this one jury verdict was 38% of total industry 
sales, which means that the markup by defendant had to be significantly more than 38%.  Surely 38% is a 
conservative estimate of the markup involved, despite the fact that the total industry sales came from the plaintiff’s 
expert. 
 
205  Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 357 F. Supp. 832 conspired among themselves and with others, to 
stabilize and maintain the price level of gypsum wallboard   27% 
 
206 Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass., 568 F. 2d 670, 676-77(1977).  “They had been able to obtain the same 
transportation service for 70 cents per mile from the other licensed brokers. However, with Greyhound they were 
obliged to pay a Special Operations Bus Order tariff of three and one-half cents per person per mile. Of the eleven 
tours operated they had to pay this higher rate for eight tours. Plaintiffs calculated that they suffered a total loss of 
$10,165 as a result of having to pay the higher tariff for the tours that they took.” 3.5/70 equals 5%. 
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a    Source                                        Reasons for Concern 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
74A  Gallet  (1997)    Study  cannot  distinguish overt from tacit collusion 
 
74A     Baker (1989)                           Refers to US data, whereas case is a European-based cartel   
 
74B  Barbezat (1989)    Covers a period in which cartel was government-directed 
 
None  Sproul (1993)     BLS data employed are inappropriate (see Werden 2003) 
 
None Block  et al. (1981)     Settlements in the bread industry are a poor guide to  
          overcharges, and dividing them by 3 worsens the problem 
 
37  Newmark (1988)    Ten other economists had by 1988 cited this case with  
     approval  (see  his  footnote  10); an Appeals court upheld the  
     conviction;  and  Mueller  and  Parker  (1992)  provide  a   
     devastating  critique  of  Newmark.   
 
190  Wiggins and Libecap (1987)      Repeated assertions by authors that cartel was ineffective  
     are  not  supported  by  (an  entirely feasible) quantitative  
     a n a l y s i s .  
 
9  Scott (2000)      A critique of Lanzilloti (2000), who appears to defend ably  
    his  original  conclusions.    
 
None  Sjostrom (1991)    Finds no evidence of national collusion in the Hardwood  
     decision of 1921, but most authorities have agreed on this  
     point  for  some  time   
 
207,208,209,210      These USDA Marketing Orders are formed voluntarily by  
          votes of their farmer-members, but once approved all  
          producers must conform to the quality and timing    
     restrictions  imposed  by  the  Order’s  administrators 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
a “None” means that this study is the only one about a potential cartel market; therefore, no cartel 
observation was created. 
 
 